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Accounting for CO2: The Enactment and Effects of the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative 
 
Atmospheric concentrations of CO2 continue to rise, and the electrical industry is one of 
the largest sources of emissions.  In the United States it has been difficult to enact CO2 
policies for the electrical sector.  A key exception is the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (RGGI), which became the first mandatory CO2 policy when it was enacted in 
2008.  RGGI is a market-based cap and trade policy that allocates allowances through an 
auction, whose revenues are recycled to support energy efficiency.  This research uses a 
combination of economic and institutional perspectives to describe and analyze how 
RGGI was enacted and the effects it is having on the electrical industry.  Policymakers 
were able to enact RGGI because they used design features that minimized the policy’s 
effect on the price of producing and purchasing electricity.  This design has resulted in a 
consistently low CO2 allowance price, which has led many individuals and organizations 
in the region to claim the formal policy is ineffective.  At the same time, these design 
features are also inducing a number of informal or cultural effects.  In particular, RGGI’s 
low allowance price makes it inexpensive for electrical companies and consumers to 
begin treating CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies as a controlled 
material and activity, which has allowed policymakers to strengthen future phases of the 
policy.  RGGI has also recycled approximately $500 million dollars to energy efficiency 
initiatives.  These funds are directly incentivizing the use of these technologies and 
practices, but they are also indirectly accelerating their diffusion by accentuating positive 
economic meanings and attenuating negative economic meanings.  In doing so, these 
funds are helping electrical companies, consumers, and regulators see and value the 
economic and non-economic benefits energy efficiency provides, which is facilitating the 
diffusion of existing approaches and stimulating the emergence of new approaches.  
When RGGI’s revenue recycler and cultural effects are accounted for it becomes clear 
the policy is having a significant effect that extends beyond its formal allowances and 




Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Introducing the Research Project 
 
In the United States electricity consumption as measured by total retail sales has 
grown from 255 billion kilowatt-hours (kWh) in 1949 to 3726 billion kWh in 2011 (U.S. 
Energy Information Administration, 2012a). To meet this demand the amount of 
generated electricity has increased from 296.1 billion kWh in 1949 to 4105.7 kWh in 
2011 (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2012b).  Of this electricity, 2790.3 
billion kWh or approximately 68% was produced with CO2-emitting technologies, and in 
2010 approximately 40% of the U.S.' anthropogenic CO2 emissions came from the 
production of electricity (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2012b; U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 2012a).  Due in part to these anthropogenic CO2 
emissions, the atmospheric concentration of CO2 has increased from approximately 305 
parts per million (ppm) in 1960 to 394.29 ppm in 2012 (Tans & Keeling, 2012). The 
increase in atmospheric CO2 has helped to raise the global average surface temperature 
by more than 1°F and is making the oceans increasingly acidic (Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change, 2007a, 2007b).  To limit these detrimental changes the amount of 
CO2 emitted by electricity-generating technologies and other sources needs to be 
controlled.  Thus far, the U.S. has not ratified the only international CO2-controlling 
policy.  Plus, nearly every attempt to develop federal policies for electricity-derived CO2 
emissions has failed (Cohen & Miller, 2012).  Within this context, the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) was enacted as a regional effort to control the 
electricity-derived CO2 emissions from New England and Mid-Atlantic states.  RGGI 
represents the first and longest-lived, mandatory policy for controlling electricity-derived 
CO2 emissions in the U.S., and portions of its revenues are being recycled to support the 
use of energy efficiency.  This research focuses on how RGGI was enacted and the effect 
2 
 
it is having on how electricity is produced and consumed in the RGGI states. The 
remainder of this chapter introduces the context of the research project, the motivations 
behind it, and the goals it intends to achieve.  The chapter concludes with an overview of 
the entire research project that outlines the remaining chapters.  
 
Context and Motivations for the Research  
 
The social impetus to stabilize and reduce global CO2 emissions has emerged 
through shifts in how individuals and organizations interpret and use the physical 
material of CO2 and the behavioral action of emitting CO2  (Hulme, 2009; Schnaiberg, 
1980; Scott, 2001).  More specifically, this shift involves interpreting and using CO2 as a 
socially and environmentally detrimental pollutant whose concentration in natural 
ecosystems needs to be controlled instead of as a benign, naturally occurring material 
(Hulme, 2009).  Tangentially, this shift also involves interpreting the operation of CO2-
emitting technologies as a behavior that needs to be managed and controlled rather than 
one that should be uncontrolled and indefinitely increasing (Hulme, 2009; Schnaiberg, 
1980). 
When CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies are respectively 
interpreted and used as a controlled material and activity it changes how the industrial 
processes that emit CO2 and the products and services that are created through these 
processes are viewed and utilized within industry and society (Hulme, 2009; Schnaiberg, 
1980).  In particular, treating CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies as 
controlled changes how electrical energy is produced and consumed, which in turn 
affects how current and future demand for it is met.  Under earlier, uncontrolled 
interpretations of CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting equipment, increasing 
electricity production was viewed as socially appropriate and desirable, which made 
consuming increasing amounts of electricity socially appropriate and desirable as well 
(Hirsh, 2002; Hulme, 2009; Schnaiberg, 1980).  However, when CO2 and the operation of 
CO2-emitting technologies are interpreted as a material and activity that need to be 
controlled then producing increasing amounts of fossil fuel-based electricity is no longer 
the most appropriate or desirable way to meet current and future demand for electricity 
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(Hulme, 2009; Schnaiberg, 1980).  Rather, under these new interpretations for CO2 and 
the operation of CO2-emitting technologies it is more desirable and appropriate to meet 
the demand for electricity by using existing electrical supplies more efficiently (Hulme, 
2009; Schnaiberg, 1980; York, Witte, Nowak, & Kushler, 2012).  This limits the amount 
of CO2 that must be emitted to produce the electricity society demands.  
The appeal of using energy efficiency technologies and practices that reduce 
electricity consumption, or demand-side resources, has fluctuated significantly since their 
initial emergence in the 1970s (York et al., 2012).  Traditionally, electrical companies 
were not proactively deploying energy efficiency initiatives because the subsequent 
reduction in electricity consumption reduced the revenues and profits they could earn 
(Hayes, Nadel, Kushler, & York, 2011; York et al., 2012).  Similarly, in the past many 
electricity regulators were reluctant to accelerate the deployment of energy efficiency 
initiatives when electricity supplies were inexpensive and abundant, and especially when 
doing so increased prices for consumers (York et al., 2012).  The upfront costs associated 
with adopting energy efficiency technologies and practices also reduce consumers’ 
internal motivation to use them to reduce the amount of electricity they consume (Jaffe & 
Stavins, 1994a; Zhao, Bell, Horner, Sulik, & Zhang, 2012).  Together, the initial, 
uncontrolled interpretations of CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies and 
electrical companies’, consumers’, and regulators’ limited interest in using energy 
efficiency made reducing electricity consumption on its own and to manage CO2 
emissions appear unnecessary, undesirable, and costly (Hayes et al., 2011; Hulme, 2009; 
Jaffe & Stavins, 1994a; Schnaiberg, 1980; York et al., 2012).  
However, individuals and organizations in society are increasingly interpreting 
and using CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies as controlled.  They are 
also increasingly interpreting the use of energy efficiency technologies and practices that 
reduce electricity consumption as a positive and valuable endeavor.  These shifts are 
reflected in the emergence of proposals for CO2-controlling policies, CO2 monitoring and 
reporting requirements for emitting equipment, and energy efficiency standards (Cohen 
& Miller, 2012; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2013; York et al., 2012).  While 
promising, achieving the necessary reduction in global CO2 emissions in the socially 
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optimal timeframe requires accelerating the diffusion of these policies, operational 
practices, and initiatives. 
One way to accelerate the development and deployment of CO2-controlling 
policies and operational procedures is by helping individuals and organizations involved 
with emitting industries accept and become familiar with treating CO2 and the operation 
of CO2-emitting technologies as controlled (Brint & Karabel, 1991; Caronna, 2004; 
Fligstein, 1997).  Similarly, the deployment and adoption of energy efficiency initiatives 
can be facilitated by helping electrical companies, consumers, and regulators see the 
value and benefits of using these technologies and practices to reduce electricity 
consumption (Brint & Karabel, 1991; Fligstein, 1997).  This means that shifting how 
individuals and organizations interpret and use CO2, CO2-emitting technologies, energy 
efficiency initiatives, and electricity are critical steps for accelerating the diffusion of 
CO2-controlling policies and the use of demand-side resources (Brint & Karabel, 1991; 
Caronna, 2004; Fligstein, 1997).   
As organizations accept and gain practical experience with existing CO2 policies 
their interpretations and uses of CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies are 
increasingly derived from treating them as a controlled material and activity instead of as 
uncontrolled (Lindblom, 1977; Scott, 2001).  When organizations willingly accept these 
new meanings and use them to guide their operations it can also facilitate policymakers’ 
efforts to strengthen existing and to develop new CO2-controlling policies (Caronna, 
2004).  Likewise, creating new funds that reduce the upfront cost of adopting energy 
efficiency initiatives or that make deploying them a profitable activity can help electrical 
companies, consumers, and regulators see the economic benefits of using these 
technologies and practices (Fligstein, 1997).  For economically rational individuals and 
organizations, these positive economic interpretations can then make other non-economic 
interpretations or benefits, such as limiting new construction, reducing CO2, or improving 
customer satisfaction, more appealing as well (Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  Together, 
the increasing salience of positive economic and non-economic meanings can motivate 
electrical companies, consumers, and regulators to actually deploy and adopt energy 
efficiency technologies and practices (Brint & Karabel, 1991).  The increase in aggregate 
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interest can help spur the diffusion of existing initiatives and also reveal innovative, new 
ways to reduce electricity consumption.  
As the first mandatory CO2 policy to be enacted in the U.S., RGGI represents an 
effort to shift the social meaning of CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies 
by setting a limit on the amount of CO2 that can be emitted by generating technologies in 
the RGGI states (Fligstein, 1997; Lindblom, 1977).  Furthermore, by recycling RGGI’s 
auction revenues to support energy efficiency policymakers are also trying to shift how 
electrical companies, consumers, and regulators interpret the use of energy efficiency 
initiatives so they will want to deploy and adopt these technologies and practices (Brint & 
Karabel, 1991; Fligstein, 1997).  Together, these two efforts represent an attempt to shift 
how individuals and organizations interpret the production and consumption of electricity 
so that increasing demand can be met by modifying consumption patterns instead of just 
by increasing the supply (Brint & Karabel, 1991; Fligstein, 1997). 
By formalizing the newer, controlled meanings for CO2 and the operation of CO2-
emitting technologies the presence of RGGI has the potential to change how individuals 
and organizations interpret and use this material and behavioral action (Brint & Karabel, 
1991; Lindblom, 1977).  These shifts may then facilitate policymakers’ efforts to 
strengthen RGGI or to develop CO2-controlling policies for other geographic or industrial 
realms (Caronna, 2004).  Likewise, by making the adoption of energy efficiency 
initiatives a low or zero cost for consumers and regulators and the deployment of them a 
profitable activity for electrical companies RGGI funds have the potential to change how 
individuals and organizations interpret and use these technologies and practices.  These 
shifts may then make these individuals and organizations more receptive to deploying 
and using demand-side resources, which may reveal new ways to market existing 
initiatives or new ways to reduce electricity consumption (Brint & Karabel, 1991). 
 
Goals of the Research  
 
The overarching goals of this research are threefold.  The first involves 
determining how RGGI policymakers were able to enact the first CO2-controlling policy 
when other attempts to enact regional or federal policies failed (Cohen & Miller, 
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2012).  The second is to determine whether policymakers are shifting how individuals 
and organizations interpret and use CO2, CO2-emitting technologies, electricity, and 
energy efficiency initiatives by enacting RGGI (Fligstein, 1997).  The third goal involves 
evaluating whether and how these shifts in meaning are helping to spur stronger or 
additional CO2 policies, and facilitating the diffusion of existing energy efficiency 
initiatives or the emergence of new ones (Brint & Karabel, 1991; Caronna, 2004).  
To address the first goal the research describes and analyzes the processes that 
RGGI policymakers used to select the design features ultimately included in the policy, 
as well as how these design features attracted support for its enactment.  In terms of the 
second goal, the research uses a combination of surveys, interviews, and archival 
documents to identify whether and how the ongoing presence of RGGI is shifting how 
electrical companies and consumers interpret and use CO2 and the operation of CO2-
emitting technologies.  The information provided by the interviews and archival sources 
is also used to identify whether and how RGGI’s revenue recycler is shifting how 
electrical companies, consumers, and regulators interpret the use of energy efficiency 
technologies and practices that reduce electricity consumption.  For the third goal, the 
interviews and archival documents are used to understand whether and how shifting 
interpretations of CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies affect 
policymakers’ ability to strengthen existing and to develop new CO2-controlling policies.  
The interviews and archival documents are also used to describe whether shifting 
interpretations of energy efficiency technologies and practices affect how existing 
initiatives are marketed, the types of energy efficiency initiatives that are used, and how 
demand-side resources are integrated into wholesale electricity markets.  
 
The Structure of the Remaining Chapters 
 
To set up the overarching structure of this research project and to preview the 
upcoming content and topics a short summary of each of the subsequent chapters is 
presented.  The second chapter describes the background information this research draws 
upon.  This includes information about the structure and operations of the electrical 
system, such as the organizations, technologies, and regulations associated with the 
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production of electricity.  It also includes information about the demand-side of the 
electrical system, such as how electricity is consumed, the technological and operational 
practices associated with demand-side management, and their diffusion in the years 
preceding the enactment of RGGI.  The presentation of this background material is used 
to show how increasing demand for electricity had been historically met by increasing the 
supply, as well how recently efforts are being made to meet demand by modifying 
consumption patterns (Hirsh, 2002; York et al., 2012).  Next, the different ways that 
social behaviors, and specifically environmental affecting activities, can be controlled are 
described.  These include formal mechanisms, such as command and control and market-
based policies, and informal mechanisms, such as cultural cognitions, norms, and 
ideologies (Lindblom, 1977; Scott, 2001).  The structure of these mechanisms and 
examples of each are presented along with the connections and relationships between 
them.  Then the main international, national, and regional efforts to control CO2 
emissions, which predominantly employed market-based policies, are described.  Extra 
attention is devoted to the background and initial operations of RGGI as it is the first and 
longest-lived example of a CO2-controlling policy and the focus of this research.  The 
proposed CO2-controlling policies that failed to be enacted and the few that were are then 
used to identify design considerations for CO2 policies that may facilitate their enactment.  
The third chapter presents the theoretical framework this research is based on.  It 
begins by expanding on the relationship that exists between formal and informal 
mechanisms for controlling behavior to show how all formal policies rest upon cultural 
controls, or the ways the materials and actions underlying a controlled activity are 
interpreted and used (Lindblom, 1977; Scott, 2001).  This conceptualization is then used 
to situate the enactment and effects of formal policies as a pair of negotiations over how 
the materials and actions underlying the activity to be controlled can be interpreted and 
used (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Lindblom, 1977; Scott, 2001).  The first negotiation 
revolves around whether policymakers can design and present a new formal policy so 
that its treatment of these materials and actions is aligned enough with individuals’ and 
organizations’ pre-existing interpretations and uses of them to be enacted (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992; Caronna, 2004; Fligstein, 1997; Lindblom, 1977).  The second 
negotiation is based on whether an enacted, formal policy can change individuals’ and 
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organizations’ cultural controls so they interpret and use the materials and actions 
underlying the controlled activity through the meanings conveyed by the formal policy 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Brint & Karabel, 1991; Lindblom, 1977).   These concepts 
are grounded by applying them to show how the social meaning and use of CO2, the 
operation of CO2-emitting technologies, electricity, and energy efficiency initiatives 
emerge as the products of negotiations occurring across all industrial fields, and 
specifically within the field centered around the electrical industry (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  They are then used to frame the questions 
about the enactment and effects of RGGI this research project addresses.  Then, the 
motivations driving the selection of these research questions are introduced.  Next, two 
theoretical perspectives are described and presented as the conceptual framework for 
answering the research questions.  This includes an economic perspective that defines 
how economically rational companies and consumers behave and suggests how they 
would respond to the creation of a market-based policy and to the emergence of new 
funds that incentivize the use of energy efficiency initiatives (Blanchard, 2008).  Then an 
institutional perspective is presented to show how and why individuals and organizations 
participate in institutional negotiations and how they could react to the negotiating 
contexts underlying the enactment and effects of RGGI (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; 
Scott, 2001).  The two theoretical perspectives are then merged together and used to 
produce hypotheses about RGGI’s enactment and effects. 
The fourth chapter evaluates the research hypotheses about the enactment of 
RGGI.  The presented data are drawn from the policymaker and stakeholder meetings 
where different design features were evaluated and then selected for the formal RGGI 
policy.  The data are then analyzed to answer how policymakers were able to enact RGGI, 
and whether specific cap and trade design features helped facilitate its enactment.  
The fifth chapter evaluates the research hypotheses about the effects of 
RGGI.  The chapter draws on multiple data sources, which include: surveys and 
interviews from individuals working within regulated and non-regulated organizations in 
the region; newspaper publications that describe how individuals and organizations in the 
region interpret CO2, the operation of CO2-emitting technologies, energy efficiency 
initiatives, and the RGGI policy itself; and industry publications that show how electrical 
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companies interpret and use CO2, the operation of CO2-emitting technologies, and energy 
efficiency initiatives.  These data are then used to evaluate whether and how RGGI is 
shifting the ways individuals and organizations interpret and use CO2 and the operation 
of CO2-emitting technologies, and whether these changes are affecting the extension of 
existing and the development of additional CO2-controlling policies.  The data are also 
used to evaluate whether and how RGGI’s recycled revenues are shifting how electrical 
companies, consumers, and regulators interpret and use energy efficiency initiatives that 
reduce electricity consumption, and whether these changes are affecting the deployment 
of or innovation in them. 
The sixth chapter presents the conclusions of this research project.  It begins by 
summarizing the analytical findings that emerged from the previous chapters.  The 
chapter then identifies the implications of the findings as they relate to the design and 
enactment of new market-based policies, the use of a policy’s informal or cultural effects, 
and the diffusion of energy efficiency initiatives that reduce electricity consumption.  The 
extensions of this research’s conceptual framework and findings and their limitations are 
then discussed.  Lastly, the implications of the research’s findings and their extensions 








 RGGI targets and broadly impacts the electrical system, so this chapter begins by 
presenting an overview of how electricity is produced, delivered, and consumed.  This 
includes: the technological systems used to produce and deliver electricity; the 
organizations that operate these systems; the markets and regulations that coordinate the 
use of these systems; and the basic principles of energy efficiency as a tool for electricity 
conservation.  Next, a discussion of CO2 and why CO2 emissions need to be controlled is 
presented.  After, three abstracted mechanisms for controlling individual and 
organizational behavior and the relationships between the different mechanisms are 
described.  The three mechanisms include command and control policies, market-based 
policies, and cultural or informal controls (Lindblom, 1977).  The three abstracted 
mechanisms are then grounded by applying them to discuss previous attempts to control 
CO2 emissions.  This discussion devotes extra attention to the history and operations of 
RGGI as it is the first and longest-lived CO2-controlling policy in the U.S.  Lastly, earlier 
attempts to control CO2 emissions are used to identify critical considerations that can 
help facilitate the enactment of CO2-controlling policies. 
 
The Electrical System  
 
 Electrical energy cannot be easily stored in large quantities, so the supply of 
electricity has to approximately match demand (Casazza & Delea, 2009).  The supply 
side of the electrical system is based on the generation, transmission, and distribution 
technologies used to produce and deliver electricity to consumers (Casazza & Delea, 
2009).  The demand side of the electrical system is based on the amount of electricity that 
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consumers use to power technologies to produce the services they desire (Casazza & 
Delea, 2009).  If the supply of electricity exceeds the demand, electrical companies or 
organizations have built and paid for equipment they are not using, which means they are 
losing money.  If demand exceeds supply it can lead to brown- or blackouts that prevent 
consumers from using electricity to get the services they desire (Casazza & Delea, 2009).  
The evolution of the U.S.' electrical system has been largely driven by the need to match 
the electrical supply and demand (Casazza & Delea, 2009).  Historically, the match 
between electrical supply and demand has been addressed by expanding the supply 
(Hirsh, 2002).  Regulations that coordinate the operation of the electrical system have 
motivated electrical organizations to increase the amount of electricity they can produce 
and sell (Casazza & Delea, 2009; Hirsh, 2002).  Increased consumer demand was met by 
expanding the electrical supply (Casazza & Delea, 2009; Hirsh, 2002).  This approach 
has led to increasing amounts of electricity-derived CO2.  However, this paradigm is 
shifting; efforts are being made to match the electrical supply and demand by modifying 
the demand for electricity (Casazza & Delea, 2009; Hirsh, 2002).  This specifically 
involves changing how consumers use electricity to get the services they desire (Eto, 
1996).  The goal is for demand to be met with existing supplies, instead of by expanding 
the supply. 
 
Electrical Supply          
The supply side of the electrical system is based on the coordinated operation of 
different electrical technologies.  Generation technologies produce electricity, and 
transmission and distribution systems move it to consumers.  The various organizations 
that can operate generation, transmission, and distribution systems are coordinated 
through a regulated monopoly or a wholesale market (Casazza & Delea, 2009).  The 
technical structure of the electrical system and the rules for coordinating its use have 
evolved in an effort to meet current and projected demand (Casazza & Delea, 2009; Hirsh, 
2002, 2003; Hughes, 1993).   
 Electricity is produced at generating facilities by first converting chemical, 
nuclear, or kinetic energy into mechanical energy via combustion, nuclear fission, or 
gravity (Casazza & Delea, 2009).  This mechanical energy is then converted into 
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electrical energy with an electrical generator (Casazza & Delea, 2009).  The primary 
generating technologies used in the RGGI states are nuclear-powered steam turbines, 
natural gas-fired steam and gas turbines, coal-fired steam turbines, and hydro-electrical 
turbines (Edison Electric Institute, 2011).  The other categories of generating 
technologies found in the RGGI states include oil-fired steam and gas turbines, and 
smaller amounts of biomass-fired steam and gas turbines, landfill gas turbines, wind 
turbines, and solar photovoltaics (Edison Electric Institute, 2011). 
 After production, electricity is delivered through transmission and distribution 
lines to end users, or consumers.  Transmission and distribution functions are 
distinguished by the voltage of the electricity they deliver.  Though some overlap exists, 
transmissions lines in the U.S. have voltages between 765 kilovolts (kV) and 115 kV, and 
distribution lines that connect to consumers have voltages between 169 kV and 120 V 
(Casazza & Delea, 2009).  Electricity consumers ultimately pay for the electricity they 
consume as well as for its delivery through transmission and distribution systems, which 
is the cost of electrical service (Casazza & Delea, 2009).  
 Historically, generation technologies exhibited economies of scale, which made it 
cheaper to produce one unit of electricity with a bigger generator than a smaller one 
(Hirsh, 2003).  For this reason, electricity has traditionally been produced with a smaller 
number of larger generators and then moved to the many locations where it is consumed 
(Hirsh, 2003).  The alternative would be to use many more, but smaller generators 
located where electricity is actually consumed.  Some electrical energy is lost when large 
amounts of electricity are moved over long distances.  Loss is reduced when the 
electricity is transported at a higher potential energy, or voltage (Casazza & Delea, 2009).  
However, most electrical consumers only use lower voltages of electricity (Casazza & 
Delea, 2009).  This is why a few higher voltage transmission systems bridge the longer 
distances between generation facilities and distribution systems, while more numerous, 
but lower voltage distribution systems are used to deliver electricity to consumers.   
 Building large generating facilities and extensive transmission and distribution 
systems is expensive, and a population of electricity consumers with unmet demand was 
often necessary to justify their construction (Hirsh, 2002; Hughes, 1993).  Historically, 
this demand was guaranteed in three ways.  Collections of electricity consumers built and 
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operated their own generation, transmission, and distribution systems to meet their own 
demand (Co-op Systems) (Casazza & Delea, 2009).  Cities, municipalities, or counties 
built and operated their own generation, transmission, and distribution systems to meet 
the demand found within their borders (Municipal Systems) (Casazza & Delea, 2009).  
Cities, municipalities, or counties gave investors exclusive access to a certain population 
of electricity consumers if they built and operated generation, transmission, and 
distribution systems (Investor Owned Systems) (Casazza & Delea, 2009).  In the RGGI 
states most electrical systems are owned by private investors, but there are a few 
municipal systems, primarily in Massachusetts, and a very small number of co-op 
systems. 
Under these approaches, the construction and operation of electrical systems were 
coordinated to restrict competition.  Generation, transmission, and distribution 
technologies were too expensive to build unless a set amount of electrical demand could 
be guaranteed by restricting the number of organizations that could provide electricity 
and electrical service to a specific population of consumers (Hirsh, 2002; Hughes, 1993).  
When competition is restricted, one organization operates generation, transmission, and 
distribution systems and has an obligation to serve all the consumers within its defined 
operating area (Casazza & Delea, 2009).  As there is no competition, the price that an 
organization can charge for producing and delivering a unit of electricity is set.  The 
members of a co-op system and the government of a municipal system set the prices in 
their respective systems.  Historically, investor owned systems have been granted a 
regulated monopoly, which meant that Public Utility Commissions (PUCs), groups of 
appointed electrical regulators, established the price these organizations could charge for 
producing and delivering electricity within their exclusive service area (Casazza & Delea, 
2009; Hirsh, 2002).  
 The prices of electricity and electrical service are based on the fixed costs of the 
technological components and the variable costs associated with operating them (Casazza 
& Delea, 2009).  The costs required to construct generation, distribution, and 
transmission equipment are fixed costs, while the costs required to produce and deliver 
one unit of electricity represent variable costs.  Variable costs include the cost of 
purchasing and disposing the materials required to produce and deliver one unit of 
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electricity, and the labor that carries out these activities.  The prices that municipals and 
co-ops charge their customers include both these variable costs and a proportion of their 
total fixed costs (Casazza & Delea, 2009).  In an investor owned system, the prices also 
include the variable costs and a portion of the total fixed costs, but they also include a 
return on the amount that was initially invested as fixed costs (Casazza & Delea, 2009; 
Hirsh, 2002).  When an investor owned system is regulated as a monopoly it submits the 
prices it wants to charge for producing and delivering a unit of electricity to its PUC 
(Casazza & Delea, 2009).  After evaluating these prices in a rate case, the PUC either 
allows them to be passed on to consumers or forces the organization to resubmit other 
prices (Casazza & Delea, 2009). 
 The fixed costs associated with producing and delivering one unit of electricity 
depend on how much electricity is produced and delivered with these technologies.  As 
more electricity is produced and delivered through existing equipment, the fixed costs 
attributed to each unit of electricity go down (Hirsh, 2003).  In co-ops and municipals the 
savings that come from maximizing the use of existing equipment are usually passed on 
to consumers in the form of lower prices (Casazza & Delea, 2009; Hirsh, 2003).  In 
investor owned systems the savings that come from maximizing the use of existing 
equipment can also be used to reduce prices, but are most often passed onto the initial 
investors as an additional return on their investment (Casazza & Delea, 2009; Hirsh, 
2003).  In all three cases, organizations are motivated to maximize the amount of 
electricity they can produce and sell to consumers to reduce the fixed costs associated 
with producing each unit of electricity.  The individuals running regulated investor 
owned systems are also motivated to spend more money to build new facilities because 
PUCs allow them to include a certain percentage return on every dollar they spend into 
the prices they charge for electricity and electrical service (Casazza & Delea, 2009; Hirsh, 
2002).  Pricing electricity and electrical service in this way encourages organizations to 
meet electrical demand by expanding the supply, which then in turns encourages 
consumers to use more electricity.  
 In the late 1970s and 1980s, some electrical consumers and PUCs became 
concerned that this method for producing and delivering electricity was encouraging 
investors to build excessive amounts of generation and transmission facilities because 
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they could earn a return on each dollar they spent (Hirsh, 2002).  The fixed costs of the 
new facilities were then passed on to consumers as higher prices for electricity and 
electrical service (Hirsh, 2002).  In response, a number of states deregulated or 
restructured the coordination of their electrical systems away from regulated monopolies 
towards wholesale markets (Hirsh, 2002).  States that restructured their electricity 
systems separated the operation of generation, transmission, and distribution systems, and 
wholesale electricity markets are used to coordinate their use (Casazza & Delea, 2009; 
Hirsh, 2002).  When the electrical system is coordinated through wholesale markets 
multiple organizations are allowed to construct and operate generation technologies 
(Casazza & Delea, 2009).  These include organizations that only own generation facilities, 
independent power producers (IPPs), and organizations that also own operationally 
distinct distribution systems (Casazza & Delea, 2009).  In these restructured electrical 
systems, all distributors, or utilities, purchase the electricity they supply to their 
customers from wholesale markets (Casazza & Delea, 2009).  In a restructured electrical 
system, distribution systems are still operated as regulated monopolies (Casazza & Delea, 
2009).  One utility is granted the exclusive right to provide electrical service to a set 
population of consumers, and they are obligated to serve all of the consumers within this 
area.  The price they can charge for electrical service is set by PUCs through the 
aforementioned rate cases (Casazza & Delea, 2009).  Restructuring the coordination of 
distribution systems would have been impractical as it would involve constructing 
expensive and redundant distribution lines to individual consumers.   
 Within restructured electrical systems, transmission systems deliver the electricity 
produced by multiple generating organizations to the different utilities that purchase it 
(Casazza & Delea, 2009).  Based on how transmission technologies are used in 
restructured systems, conflicts of interest could arise if one organization operated both 
generation and transmission systems as it could prevent other generators from using its 
transmission lines to deliver their electricity to wholesale markets.  In response to these 
potential conflicts of interest, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
created Independent Service Organizations (ISOs) to operate the transmission systems in 
states with restructured electrical systems (Casazza & Delea, 2009; Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, 2012a).  ISOs are non-profit organizations that operate, but do 
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not own, transmission systems to manage the wholesale selling of electricity by 
generating organizations and the wholesale purchasing of electricity by utilities (Casazza 
& Delea, 2009; Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2012a).  In wholesale electricity 
markets generators submit bids to supply certain amounts of electricity at certain prices 
and at certain times to the ISO (Casazza & Delea, 2009).  Utilities submit bids to 
purchase certain amounts of electricity at certain times to the ISO (Casazza & Delea, 
2009).  With this information, the ISO accepts enough bids for electricity to meet the 
projected demand at various points of time (Casazza & Delea, 2009).  For a particular 
time period, bids are submitted according to price, from low to high.  However, the price 
then paid for the delivered electricity is based on the price of the last bid needed to meet 
all the demand (Casazza & Delea, 2009).  In organizing these processes, ISOs enable 
wholesale markets to set the price for the electricity produced in restructured systems.   
With the exception of Vermont, the RGGI states have all restructured their 
electrical systems away from regulated monopolies to wholesale markets (U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, 2010).  This means that RGGI states have IPPs and utilities 
with and without generation facilities. The RGGI states also have three connected ISOs: 
New England (NEISO), which also includes the regulated state Vermont; New York 
(NYISO); and the Pennsylvania, Jersey, and Maryland Interconnect (PJM), which also 
includes the RGGI state of Delaware and parts of the following non-RGGI states or 
districts: Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, 
Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia (Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, 2012b, 2012c, 2012d). 
When the electrical system is coordinated through wholesale markets, the match 
between electrical supply and demand continues to be achieved by modifying the supply.  
Increasing amounts of demand are met by accepting more bids for electrical supplies 
(Casazza & Delea, 2009).  In wholesale markets, generating organizations are motivated 
to produce electricity at lower costs to make sure their bids are accepted and to make a 
greater profit from each unit they sell.  However, because generating organizations can 
use independently operated transmission systems to sell their electricity to many different 
utilities, the amount they produce is not constrained by the demand of a specific 
population of consumers.  This means that generating organizations will still be 
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motivated to build new facilities as long as they have access to unmet demand through 
their ISO system.  At the same time, utilities remain regulated monopolies that make 
money from building new distribution equipment and from delivering electricity to 
consumers (Casazza & Delea, 2009).   This motivates utilities to deliver as much 
electricity as they can, which in turn maintains and expands the demand for electricity.  
Therefore, even when the electrical system is structured and coordinated through 
wholesale markets, organizations are still motivated to meet demand by expanding supply. 
 
Electrical Demand 
 The end users of electricity, the consumers, are categorized according to their 
identity, how they use electricity, and how much they use.  The main categories of 
consumers are residential, commercial, and industrial (Casazza & Delea, 2009).  Other 
specialized classes of consumers include train transportation, agriculture, churches, and 
government entities (Casazza & Delea, 2009).  Patterns of electricity usage vary amongst 
these groups of consumers.  For example, residential consumers often use electricity to 
provide light, heating, or cooling; their use peaks in the early morning and in the early 
evening when people respectively depart for and arrive home from work (Casazza & 
Delea, 2009).  Commercial electricity consumers use electricity to provide light, heating, 
cooling, and power, and their usage often peaks during normal working hours (Casazza & 
Delea, 2009).  Lastly, industrial consumers primarily use electricity for power, and their 
usage can be constant if the facility operates twenty-four hours a day (Casazza & Delea, 
2009).  The amount of electricity that is used during different periods of time produces 
consumption patterns, or load profiles, that are specific to certain categories of consumers 
and uses of electricity (Casazza & Delea, 2009).  Increasing numbers of electricity 
consumers and changes in how electricity is used, such as to provide computing power, 
create changes in the load profile.  Historically, changes in the load profile were resolved 
from the supply side, or by constructing new generating facilities (Hirsh, 2002).  
However, beginning in the late 1970s and proceeding in fits and starts to the present, 
attempts have been made to accommodate changes in the load profile from the demand 
side, or by suppressing or modifying patterns of electricity consumption so they can be 
met with existing supplies (Hirsh, 2002; York et al., 2012). 
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 The broad umbrella of demand-side management (DSM) or electricity 
conservation encompasses any technology or activity that can change the electricity 
consumption profile (Eto, 1996).  The concept of and applications associated with DSM 
emerged in the 1970s in response to the oil crises, and their use grew throughout the 
1980s (Hirsh, 2002; York et al., 2012).  Following this wave of interest, the use of DSM 
declined during the 1990s as the electrical industry experienced the first phases of 
restructuring, which prompted electrical organizations to cut expenditures and reallocated 
responsibility for system reliability to ISOs (Hirsh, 2002; York et al., 2012).  From this 
nadir, interest in and the use of DSM has accelerated through the 2000s to its current peak 
(York et al., 2012). 
 The two primary categories of DSM are direct DSM and energy efficiency.  Direct 
DSM involves actually reducing the amount of electricity that end users consume (Eto, 
1996).  Under direct DSM, electricity consumers sign a contract with a utility, groups of 
utilities, an ISO, or an independent DSM company that allows them to reduce the amount 
of electricity delivered at a certain period of time in exchange for a financial payment 
(Eto, 1996; York et al., 2012).  On the other hand, energy efficiency involves making 
better use of existing electrical supplies by stimulating technological or behavioral 
changes that modify how and when electricity is consumed (Eto, 1996; York et al., 2012).  
After energy efficiency technologies and practices are adopted, consumers use less 
electricity to produce the services they desire.   
 This research primarily focuses on energy efficiency; the subsequent discussion of 
electricity conservation will be limited to this topic.  Historically, energy efficiency has 
been technologically driven.  Most energy efficiency initiatives revolved around 
developing incentives or innovative sales channels to motivate electricity consumers to 
exchange their older and less efficient technologies for newer, more efficient ones (Eto, 
1996).  Recently, there is an emerging shift towards behavioral approaches to energy 
efficiency that change how consumers understand and use electricity (York et al., 2012).  
Behavioral approaches can also utilize newer, more efficient technologies, but the crux of 
the electricity savings are achieved by collecting more and more granular data about 
consumption patterns (Friedrich, Amann, Vaidyanathan, & Elliott, 2010).  This 
information is then provided to consumers so they can better manage how and when they 
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use electricity (Friedrich et al., 2010).  
 Before electrical systems were restructured, energy efficiency initiatives were 
funded by increasing the cost of electricity and electrical service through a rate case with 
a PUC (York et al., 2012).  An electrical company would spend a certain amount of 
money on energy efficiency initiatives.  Then it would build these costs along with the 
revenues that were lost from producing and selling less electricity into the prices for 
electricity and electrical service it submitted to its PUC in a rate case.  After restructuring, 
electrical companies became more concerned about their costs and their ability to recover 
the money they spent on energy efficiency through rate cases, which depressed energy 
efficiency spending (York et al., 2012).  In response, many states created system benefit 
charges to fund energy efficiency initiatives (York et al., 2012).  System benefit charges 
were added to every electricity consumers' bill as a small increase in the price of 
electrical service.  Utilities used the resources created by the charges to fund energy 
efficiency initiatives.  In the late 1990s a number of state PUCs began to enact energy 
efficiency resource standards (EERS), which mandated that utilities meet a portion of 
their projected demand by reducing consumption (York et al., 2012).  The additional costs 
that utilities incurred were recovered through rate cases with their PUCs; but unlike 
supply-side rate cases, PUCs did not allow utilities to earn a return on the funds they 
spent on energy efficiency initiatives (York et al., 2012).  This began to change in the mid 
to late 2000's as PUCs began offering energy efficiency incentive programs (York et al., 
2012).  In an incentive program, a utility can earn a return on the funds spent on energy 
efficiency initiatives if they reduce electricity consumption by a certain amount; the 
specific return is often tied to the actual reductions achieved by the utility.  
 When significant amounts of electricity can be controlled in aggregate through 
electricity conservation practices it is possible to meet increasing demand by shifting 
existing consumption patterns across time and space instead of by building new facilities 
(American Council for an Energy-Efficiency Economy, 2012a).  Collectively, the 
negawatts achieved through electricity conservation, or demand-side resources, can be 
thought of as a virtual power plant (VPP) (Lovins, 1989; Zurborg, 2010).  Newly 
emerging FERC rules allow organizations involved with demand-side resources to bid 
them into some wholesale electricity markets along with supply-side resources (Federal 
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Energy Regulatory Commission, 2011).  To participate in these markets organizations 
establish the cost required to save a unit of electricity from being consumed during a 
specific period of time and then bid these savings into electricity markets at this cost.  
The provision of negawatts reduces the megawatts of electricity needed to meet the 
projected demand, which allows both to be traded within a single market (American 
Council for an Energy-Efficiency Economy, 2012a; Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, 2011; Lovins, 1989).  When demand-side resources can be priced in this 
way and electrical systems are coordinated to allow their use it encourages organizations 
to modify how electricity is consumed instead of just expanding the supply.  
 
Carbon Dioxide (CO2) 
 
 Anthropogenic, atmospheric emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) are produced 
when the solid or gaseous carbon found in fuels is converted to gaseous CO2 by burning 
these fuels in the presence of oxygen to produce electricity or to run other industrial 
processes (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2012b).  CO2 is a greenhouse gas 
(GHG); it absorbs and re-radiates solar radiation or heat (Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, 2007c).  This process traps the heat radiated from the sun in the earth's 
atmosphere and prevents it from reflecting back out into space, producing a greenhouse 
effect (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007c).  Within the earth's 
atmosphere, CO2 is the most prevalent anthropogenic GHG, but water vapor, methane, 
ozone, sulfur hexafluoride, hydrofluorocarbons, and perfluorocarbons are also GHGs 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007d; U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, 2012b, 2012c).  In addition to being the most pervasive anthropogenic GHG, 
CO2 emissions also have a relatively long lifetime and can remain in the atmosphere for 
more than fifty years (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2012b).  For these reasons, 
the concentration of atmospheric CO2 is often used as a barometer for the total amount of 
atmospheric GHGs and as a loose indicator of potential temperature increases.  
 Atmospheric concentrations of CO2 are increasing.  Within many countries, 
especially rapidly developing ones, the emission rate is accelerating.  According to 
National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) data recorded at the Mauna 
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Loa observatory in Hawaii, there were 394.29 parts of CO2 per million parts of air (ppm) 
in July of 2012, which is up from approximately 305 ppm in 1960 (Tans & Keeling, 
2012).  Furthermore, the annual CO2 emission rate is currently about 2 ppm per year, up 
from approximately .5 ppm per year in 1960 (Tans & Keeling, 2012).  Leading 
atmospheric and climate researchers have identified 350 ppm as the safe ceiling of 
atmospheric CO2 concentrations (Hansen et al., 2008).  The most commonly known issue 
associated with higher concentrations of CO2 revolves around its role as a greenhouse 
gas.  As atmospheric concentrations of CO2 and other GHGs rise increasing amounts of 
solar radiation are trapped in the atmosphere, which increases the average global 
temperature.  
 Upsurges in average temperature subject areas of the globe to higher local 
temperatures, but also make global temperature and weather patterns more volatile and 
extreme (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007e).  These extremes can take 
the form of longer and more excessive heat waves and droughts, but can also lead to 
more extreme precipitation, whether rain or snow (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, 2007e).  The temperature changes can also affect both the functioning and the 
composition of ecosystems, such as by slowing the photosynthesis process or accelerating 
the glacial melt rate, or by affecting the geographic range that certain species can exist 
within (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007f).  Certain ecosystem changes 
can also trigger feedback loops, where the initial shift then induces further changes.  
Feedback loops can revolve around GHG emissions, such as when increasing global 
temperatures cause terrestrial and aquatic sources of methane to thaw, releasing large 
amounts of this potent GHG gas into the atmosphere (Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, 2007f).  They can also be temperature-based, such as when increasing 
global temperatures cause white ice to melt into grey slush or blue water.  The shift from 
white snow and ice that reflect solar radiation to grey slush and blue water that absorb 
solar radiation traps more heat in the earth's atmosphere and further increases the average 
global temperature (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007f).  
 A second, but no less significant, problem caused by increasing concentrations of 
CO2 is ocean acidification.  Like all liquids, the ocean has a certain amount of hydrogen 
ions dissolved in it, and the amount of hydrogen ions dissolved in a liquid determines its 
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pH (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2012d).  Pure water has a pH of 
approximately 7 and it is considered neutral, while liquids with a pH higher than 7 are 
basic and those with a pH under 7 are acidic.  The earth's oceans, being saltwater, are 
slightly basic and have an approximate average surface pH of 8.1 (Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, 2007g).  As a critical component of the global CO2 cycle, 
oceans regularly absorb and release CO2 from and into the atmosphere 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007g).  Historically, the amount of CO2 
absorbed and released via the oceans was balanced.  With higher concentrations of 
atmospheric CO2, more CO2 is being absorbed than released from the oceans 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007g).  This increases the amount of 
positive hydrogen ions found in the oceans, which lowers the pH and effectively makes 
the world's oceans more acidic (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007g).  In 
fact, the average surface pH of the world's oceans has declined by .1 pH since the 
Industrial Revolution (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2012).  This 
change may seem slight, but small shifts in the ocean's acidity can have extremely large 
and widespread effects, such as by dissolving the calcium that comprises the shells of 
krill or plankton, animals that occupy the lower rungs of aquatic food chains 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007g).   
  
Mechanisms for Controlling Behavior 
 
 Within the broad category of social behaviors, an environmental-based behavior 
can be defined as any activity that involves transferring physical materials into, out of, or 
between different environmental ecosystems (Schnaiberg, 1980).  Environmental-based 
behaviors, which include emitting CO2 into the atmosphere, can be coordinated and 
controlled through a variety of formal and informal mechanisms, which are distinct in 
theory, but blur in practice (Lindblom, 1977).  These mechanisms include formal tools, 
such as command and control and market-based policies, and informal tools, such as 
norms and cognitions (Lindblom, 1977; Scott, 2001).  RGGI represents a market-based 
mechanism for controlling the CO2 emissions produced by combustion-based electricity 
generators.  It is a market-based mechanism because it caps the amount of CO2 that can 
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be emitted, allocates allowance rights for each ton of CO2 that can be emitted, and 
establishes price signals for allowances through auction and trading systems (Lindblom, 
1977, 2001).  The price signals that arise from the auction and exchange of property 
rights coordinate and control how individuals and organizations use combustion-based, 
generating technologies that emit CO2  (Demsetz, 1967; Lindblom, 2001).  
 Along with markets, command and control policies represent the other formal 
mechanism for controlling environmental-based behaviors: rules, regulations, or 
procedures dictating whether and how individuals and organizations can transfer 
materials into, out of, and between ecosystems (Lindblom, 1977; Schnaiberg, 1980).  
Command and control policies utilize direct authority to coordinate and control behavior 
by explicitly defining, monitoring, and enforcing how individuals and organizations can 
use specific practices and technologies to transfer specific amounts of a material between 
specific ecosystems (Lindblom, 1977).  In the context of environmental behaviors, the 
controlling authority is most often the state, but individuals and organizations can directly 
control the use of materials, ecosystems, and technologies they privately own.  Examples 
of how command and control mechanisms can be used to control electricity-derived CO2 
emissions include: limits on the amount of carbon-based fuels that can be extracted or 
used to produce electricity; limits on the amount of CO2 that can be emitted by a specific 
type of generating technology; restrictions on what types of generating technologies can 
be used to produce electricity; and technological or operational requirements for using 
specific technologies to generate electricity.  The specificity and monitoring requirements 
of command and control policies makes deploying them to control the CO2 emitted by 
different organizations utilizing different generating technologies in different locations 
both costly and difficult (Lindblom, 1977).  
 Markets formally but indirectly control behavior (Lindblom, 1977).  Markets 
formally control environmental-based behaviors by applying a price to a specific material, 
ecosystem, technology, or behavioral action associated with the environmental activity 
(Lindblom, 1977).  This price signal then indirectly controls how individuals and 
organizations transfer materials into, out of, and between ecosystems (Lindblom, 1977; 
Schnaiberg, 1980).  The price signals at the heart of market mechanisms can be created 
by taxing a material or behavioral action constituting an environmental activity or by 
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creating a tradable asset that allows the holder to engage in a particular environmental 
activity (Stavins, 2003).  The primary difference between the two types of market 
mechanisms revolves around how they are initially established and applied.  A tax pre-
sets the price signal to achieve a certain amount of environmental activities (Stavins, 
2003).  A cap and trade policy pre-sets the allowable amount of environmental activities 
and the exchange of property rights that enable the holder to participate in the activity 
then establishes the price signal (Stavins, 2003).  As a mechanism for controlling 
environmental activities, taxes are more common in Europe while cap and trade systems 
have been more prevalent in the United States (Harrington & Morgenstern, 2007).  
 Diversity also exists within each category of market mechanism.  With regard to 
CO2, taxes can be applied to each unit of carbon-based fuels extracted or combusted or to 
each unit of CO2 emitted (Stavins, 2003).  Taxes can also be levied for using the 
ecosystems that carbon-based fuels are extracted from or for using the atmosphere as a 
sink for CO2 emissions (Stavins, 2003).  The purchase, operation, and disposal of CO2-
emitting technologies can also be taxed (Stavins, 2003).  CO2 cap and trade policies can 
be set at different stringencies and can be applied to the extraction of carbon-based fuels 
from ecosystems, the combustion of carbon-based fuels, or to the emission of CO2 into 
the atmosphere (Stavins, 2003). The allowances that comprise the cap can be distributed 
for free, sold at a set price, or auctioned (Tietenberg, 2007).  The allowances can be held 
by organizations extracting carbon-based fuels, emitting CO2, or by anyone; allowable 
trades can be restricted to certain participants, volumes, geographic locations, temporal 
periods, particular market systems, or not at all (Tietenberg, 2007).  Cap and trade 
systems also allow different amounts of allowances to be banked or borrowed at different 
periods of time, or not at all (Tietenberg, 2007).  The initial cap can include varying 
“safety valves” that increase or withdraw the amount of allowances in the market 
(Tietenberg, 2007).  Lastly, the revenues created when allowances are sold or auctioned 
can be transferred to the government or recycled to support other programs or endeavors 
(Tietenberg, 2007).  
 Taxes and cap and trade mechanisms can control CO2 emissions through the 
creation and application of price signals because they both rest on the assumption of 
economic rationality (Lindblom, 2001).  In other words, market mechanisms assume the 
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individuals and organizations involved with extracting carbon-based fuels or emitting 
CO2 are economically rational: increasing the economic cost of engaging in these 
activities reduces individuals' and organizations' desire to do so (Blanchard, 2008; 
Lindblom, 2001).  As a pre-set price signal, a tax is directly applied to the extraction of 
carbon-based fuels, the emission of CO2, or the use of CO2-emitting technologies to limit 
individuals and organizations from participating in that specific activity.  On the other 
hand, cap and trade policies pre-set a desired amount of extracted or emitted CO2 and 
then divide this amount into individual allocations or property rights that enable the 
holder to extract or emit a certain amount of CO2 out of or into specific ecosystems.  
When multiple buyers and sellers of these property rights create competitive conditions 
and share a common medium of exchange the ongoing exchange of these rights creates 
prices signals (Demsetz, 1967).  These prices then inform individuals and organizations 
about whether and how they should be extracting or emitting CO2 (Lindblom, 2001).  In 
this way, both taxes and cap and trade mechanisms can control the CO2 extracted or 
emitted by different individuals and organizations using different types of technologies in 
different locations (Lindblom, 2001).  This is achieved without explicitly determining, 
monitoring, and enforcing whether and how individuals and organizations are 
transferring certain amounts CO2 between specific ecosystems with different behaviors or 
technologies (Lindblom, 2001).  
 In addition to command and control and market-based policies, behavior can also 
be culturally or informally controlled through norms and cognitions (Lindblom, 2001; 
Scott, 2001).   Norms and cognitions determine how individuals and organizations 
interpret and use the physical materials and behavioral actions that underlie the emission 
of electricity-derived CO2 (Scott, 2001).  These physical materials include the fuels 
extracted and combusted to produce electricity, the CO2 emitted during the combustion 
process, the ecosystems fuels are extracted from and CO2 is emitted into, and the 
technologies used to extract fuels from ecosystems or to deposit CO2 into the atmosphere.  
The behavioral actions include the operation of technologies that extract fuels from 
ecosystems or that deposit CO2 into the atmosphere, and the ways that consumers use 
fossil fuel-based electricity to produce the services they desire.   
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 The distinction between normative and cognitive controls is liminal and often 
hinges on the formality and precision of the control.  For the purposes of this research, 
the two components of this mechanism will be referred to as cultural or informal controls 
when both are referenced and normative and cognitive controls when they are referenced 
individually.  Perfectly normative controls represent specifically defined, but non-
mandatory norms and values that condition how individuals and organizations should 
interpret and utilize the physical materials and behavioral actions underlying the emission 
of electricity-derived CO2 (Scott, 2001).  Perfectly cognitive controls represent less 
precisely defined but extremely salient cultural ideologies and cognitions (Scott, 2001).  
These ideologies and cognitions determine how individuals and organizations understand 
and interpret their world, which then shape and enable how the physical materials and 
behavioral actions associated with electricity-derived CO2 are understood and utilized 
(Scott, 2001).  An example of the former would be industry or equipment standards or 
guidelines that suggest which and how physical materials should be used to safely 
produce as much electricity as possible.  An example of the later would represent the only 
conceivable way of identifying and using physical materials.  For instance, the emission 
of radioactive materials into the atmosphere through a combustion generator would be 
cognitively controlled if an individual or organization could never conceive of burning 
nuclear materials in a combustion generator to produce electricity.  In the absence of 
formal mechanisms, these norms and cognitions control behavior by conditioning how 
individuals and organizations interpret and use physical materials and by positioning 
specific behaviors or activities as feasible or acceptable (Lindblom, 1977; Scott, 2001).  
However, the informality and imprecision of cultural controls limits policymakers' ability 
to directly implement and use them to bring about behavioral changes, as well as the 
range and scope of behaviors they can control (Lindblom, 1977). 
 The three mechanisms for controlling behavior are artificially delineated for 
descriptive ease.  In practice, controls on social behavior often reflect different features of 
multiple mechanisms (Lindblom, 1977; Scott, 2001).  For instance, the informality and 
imprecision of cultural controls means they are often combined with more formal and 
precise means of control, whether command and control or market-based (Lindblom, 
1977).  At the same time, the aforementioned difficulties associated with controlling large 
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and diverse swaths of social behavior with command and control policies have prompted 
many states to deploy them in conjunction with market-based mechanisms (Lindblom, 
1977).  The application of market policies similarly depends on command and control 
mechanisms to apply the tax, to establish and secure the property rights being exchanged, 
and to monitor and regulate market participation to ensure that competitive conditions are 
present (Demsetz, 1967; Eggertsson, 1990).   
 Additionally, markets and command and control policies both rest upon cultural 
controls, or the specific meanings and uses of physical materials or behavioral activities 
the formal policy is trying to induce (Lindblom, 1977; Scott, 2001). Command and 
control policies often rest upon normative and cognitive controls that support the 
commanding authority's claims over physical materials, and that induce individuals and 
organizations to accept the authority's control over their activities (Dahl, 1971; Weber, 
1946).  Market mechanisms also depend on normative and cognitive controls (Lindblom, 
2001).  These controls condition individuals and organizations to voluntarily accept 
certain meanings, such as price signals, as an appropriate way to interpret and use 
physical materials (Fligstein & Dauter, 2007; Lindblom, 2001).  Cultural controls also 
influence how individuals and organizations understand and participate in certain 
behavioral activities (Scott, 2001).  For instance, a new tax has the potential to change the 
behavior of economically rational individuals or organizations because they interpret a 
specific activity according to the costs and revenues incurred or received from doing so.  
Markets also depend on cultural controls to constrain and enable how individuals and 
organizations behave to ensure the competitive conditions that produce price signals are 
present (Fligstein & Dauter, 2007; Lindblom, 2001).  
 The connection between formal and cultural mechanisms also influences whether 
and how a specific behavior is actually controlled.  Markets and command and control 
policies formally control behavior by respectively defining certain types of environmental 
activities as allowed and by applying price signals to specific environmental activities or 
the use of particular materials, ecosystems, or technologies.  However, in doing so, these 
formal policies also informally control behavior by stimulating changes in how 
individuals and organizations understand and utilize the physical materials and behavioral 
actions underlying the environmental activity, or the normative and cognitive controls 
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that simultaneously control it (Lindblom, 1977; Schnaiberg, 1980; Scott, 2001).  Formal 
policy mechanisms stimulate changes in cultural controls by highlighting alternative 
ways for individuals and organizations to interpret and utilize the physical materials and 
behavioral actions comprising the controlled activity.  The degree to which the ensuing 
shifts in normative and cognitive controls continue to support the meanings embedded 
within an enacted, formal mechanism creates opportunities to strengthen the formal 
mechanism (Caronna, 2004; Lindblom, 1977).  
 Based on this perspective, the enactment and effects of a formal policy are not 
independent events occurring in isolation from these cultural controls.  The pre-existing 
cultural controls that govern how physical materials and behavioral actions are 
interpreted and used influence whether and how formal policies can be enacted.  
Specifically, there must be alignment between pre-existing cultural controls and the 
meanings and interpretations embedded within a potential, formal policy (Caronna, 2004; 
Lindblom, 1977).  For example, if a specific material and ecosystem were intrinsically 
valued for aesthetic purposes then it would be difficult to use a market-based mechanism 
to control the extraction of the material from the ecosystem.  The cultural controls 
associated with the policy would be based on the extrinsic or monetary value of the 
material and ecosystem misaligning the pre-existing and proposed cultural controls.  The 
need for alignment is especially pertinent when applying formal controls to an activity for 
the first time or when altering the type of formal control, such as from command and 
control to markets.  Deploying new formal controls or changing existing ones makes the 
underlying cultural controls that also guide individuals' and organizations' involvement 
with the activity more salient.  Ignoring, marginalizing, or failing to resolve the alignment 
between pre-existing cultural controls and the meanings and interpretations encapsulated 
within a formal policy can prompt individuals and organizations to interpret the meanings 
embedded within the policy and the policy itself as invalid, inappropriate, or illegitimate 
(Caronna, 2004; Lindblom, 1977).  Perceived or actual misalignment between pre-
existing cultural controls and the cultural controls associated with newly proposed formal 
policies can prompt individuals or organizations to reject or contest the enactment of 
formal policies (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Caronna, 2004).   
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 A formal policy's ability to effectively control a specific type of activity is also 
partially derived from its ability to change how individuals and organizations interpret 
and use the physical materials and behavioral actions associated with the activity 
(Lindblom, 1977; Scott, 2001).  If individuals and organizations continue using pre-
existing cultural controls, versus those embedded in a formal policy, to interpret and 
utilize the materials and actions underlying the activity to be controlled then they may 
contest the policy (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Caronna, 2004).  The actual act of 
contestation can include forcibly taking the power that the direct authority or market rests 
upon, at one extreme, to vocally protesting the controls while complying, at the other, 
with legal challenges, incomplete compliance, intentional non-compliance, and other acts 
falling in the spectrum between them (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  As an example, if 
individuals and organizations believe the materials extracted from a particular ecosystem 
are under divine control, it would be difficult for a secular state authority to effectively 
control the extraction of this material with a command and control policy.  Its claims over 
the material and ecosystem would not be valid to these individuals and organizations.  
Actually using this form of command and control mechanism to control this specific 
behavior would require inducing individuals and organizations to interpret the material 
and ecosystem through alternative cultural controls, or as under state authority instead of 
divine authority.  Failing to do so can lead individuals and organizations to intentionally 
misrepresent their involvement with the activity, to avoid compliance, or to try to repeal 
the policy.  All of these dynamics limit the formal policy's ability to actually control 
individual and organizational behavior.  
 Misalignment between pre-existing and proposed or newly enacted cultural 
controls can emerge around both the physical materials and behavioral actions underlying 
the activity or the use of the policy mechanism itself (Caronna, 2004; Lindblom, 1977; 
Scott, 2001).  Furthermore, the degree of misalignment can vary.  For example, the ways 
that expensive or important technologies are interpreted and used can be especially 
sensitive to the misalignment brought about by proposing alternative cultural controls, 
even if they are not significantly different.  Subsequently, the individuals and 
organizations that interpret or use the technologies through these pre-existing meanings 
may be more likely to contest the enactment of formal policies that encapsulate 
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alternative cultural controls.  Additionally, different types of individuals and 
organizations may perceive misalignment more readily than others (Caronna, 2004).  For 
instance, the individuals and organizations who own certain technologies will be more 
likely to perceive misalignment around how their technologies are interpreted and used 
than non-owners.  If certain individuals and organizations are more likely to perceive 
misalignment between their pre-existing cultural controls and the cultural controls 
embedded in a newly proposed policy, then their support is more critical for enacting the 
policy than individuals and organizations less likely to perceive misalignment.  This 
means that enacting new formal policies to successfully control an environmental activity 
requires identifying which materials and behaviors are most sensitive to misalignment, 
and which individuals and organizations are most likely to perceive misalignment 
(Caronna, 2004; Lindblom, 1977).  
 
Controlling CO2 Emissions 
 
 The previously discussed, abstracted examples of mechanisms for controlling 
behavior are now grounded by using them to describe previous efforts to control CO2 
emissions in the U.S.  In this treatment, the type of formal mechanism employed is 
presented first.  Then the outcome of each attempt is described along with the design 
features that influenced this outcome.  The most recent command and control-based 
attempt is presented first.  It is followed by the more numerous market-based policies, 
beginning with the one designed to control global CO2 emissions.  Next, the few 
examples of tax-based policies proposed in the U.S. are described.  They are followed by 
the more numerous examples of domestic cap and trade-based policies.  Of the many cap 
and trade policies that were proposed, RGGI is described last and in the greatest detail as 
it is the primary focus of this research.  The section concludes by using these examples to 
identify critical design features for market-based policies in general and cap and trade-






Attempts to Control CO2 Emissions  
 The main CO2 command and control policy is based on the authority of the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)(Cohen & Miller, 2012).  Before CO2 and other 
GHGs were classified as pollutants, the EPA did not have the authority to control these 
materials and was unable to enact command and control policies (Cohen & Miller, 2012).  
In 2007 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that CO2 and other GHGs are pollutants that can be 
regulated under the Clean Air Act, which obligated the EPA to control them (U.S. 
Supreme Court, 2007).  This enabled the EPA to issue the Mandatory Reporting of 
Greenhouse Gas Rule (74 FR 56260), which includes the Greenhouse Gas Reporting 
Program (GHGRP) (40 CFR Part 98) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2013).  
The GHGRP does not control GHGs, but facilities that emit more than 25,000 metric tons 
of GHGs have had to monitor and report their emissions since 2010 (U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, 2013).  However, even after this legal decision and the enactment of 
this rule, a number of states, members of Congress, and industry organizations challenged 
both the need to control GHGs and the EPA's authority to do so (Cohen & Miller, 2012).  
These contesting efforts involved legal challenges, new legislative policies, and attempts 
to reduce the resources of the EPA (Cohen & Miller, 2012).  The EPA's ability to 
regulate GHGs and the command and control policies they have proposed to do so are 
still being challenged (Cohen & Miller, 2012).  As of 2012 the EPA's ability to regulate 
CO2 and GHGs as pollutants has been upheld (U.S. Court of Appeals: District of 
Columbia Circuit, 2012).  This has allowed the EPA to propose a Carbon Pollution 
Standard for New Power Plants, which is a command and control-based mechanism that 
specifically defines the amount of CO2 that a new generation facility can emit (U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 2012e). 
 The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCC) is the most significant effort to control CO2 emissions at a global scale 
(United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2012a).  When the Kyoto 
Protocol was designed, thirty-seven industrialized countries (Annex 1) agreed to binding 
restrictions on the amount of CO2 that individuals and organizations within each country 
could emit into the atmosphere (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, 2012a).  The Kyoto Protocol is a cap and trade market mechanism as it controls 
32 
 
CO2 by mandating that Annex 1 countries reduce their emissions by a certain percentage 
from a historical point (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
2012a).  Annex 1 countries can meet their emission reduction targets themselves, by 
trading emissions allowances, or by funding joint implementation projects in other Annex 
1 countries (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2012a).  
However, binding emission reductions were only applied to industrialized, Annex 1 
countries, which did not include currently large but historically low emitters like China 
and India (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2012a).  The 
delineation between Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 countries necessitated an additional 
design feature, the Clean Development Mechanism, to facilitate trading between these 
two categories of countries (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
2012b).  While the United States signed the Kyoto Protocol, it was never formally ratified 
by the U.S. Senate.  The Kyoto Protocol was not ratified because members of the 
conservative movement, which includes conservative Congressmen and think-tanks, 
many of whom were funded by fossil fuel-based industries, actively contested its 
ratification (McCright & Dunlap, 2003).  Many of these individuals and organizations 
believed that CO2 is a benign, naturally occurring material and that ecosystems can 
absorb infinite amounts of CO2 emissions without functionally changing (McCright & 
Dunlap, 2003).  Others thought that controlling the U.S.' CO2 emissions would be both 
unnecessary and economically harmful, especially if other large emitting countries did 
not have to control their emissions (Byrd & Hagel, 1997; McCright & Dunlap, 2003).  
These arguments and opposition motivated the Byrd-Hagel Resolution which was passed 
before the Kyoto Protocol was formalized to prevent the U.S. Senate from ratifying it 
(Byrd & Hagel, 1997).  
 At the national level, Congressmen have tried to enact a number of formal 
mechanisms to control CO2 emissions.  They proposed a variety of market-based 
mechanisms, which included cap and trade and tax-based policies.  However, cap and 
trade policies were proposed much more frequently than taxes. None of these policies 
were successfully enacted. 
 In 2007 Representatives Larson and Stark proposed bills in the House of 
Representatives that taxed the production of carbon, such as the extraction of coal, oil, 
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and gas, ultimately emitted into the atmosphere via combustion (Larson, 2007; Stark, 
2007).  The Stark bill (H.R. 2069) didn't specify how the tax revenue would be used, 
while the Larson bill (H.R. 3416) proposed recycling the revenue from this tax towards 
clean energy technologies and customer rebates (Larson, 2007; Stark, 2007).  Both tried 
to pass similar carbon tax bills again in 2009 (H.R. 594 and 1337) (Larson, 2009; Stark, 
2009).  In 2009 Rep. Inglis also unsuccessfully proposed a carbon tax in H.R. 2380 
(Inglis, 2009).  Rep. Stark repurposed his carbon tax bill for the third time in H.R. 3242, 
but it was not enacted (Stark, 2011).  As a whole Americans generally oppose new or 
higher taxes, which makes controlling CO2 through tax-based policies unappealing as 
well (Lachapelle, Borick, & Rabe, 2012).  As a result, these policies were not enacted 
because they created new taxes that would make producing and consuming fossil fuel-
derived energy more expensive for everyone in the U.S., and because the conservative 
movement continued to sow doubt about the need to control anthropogenic CO2 
emissions (Lachapelle et al., 2012; McCright & Dunlap, 2010).  
 Americans' general distaste for taxes is also reflected in the quantity and the 
diversity of cap and trade-based market mechanisms proposed to control CO2 emissions 
versus those that are tax-based.  In 2006 Rep. Udall (H.R. 5049) and Rep. Waxman (H.R. 
5642) proposed cap and trade policies (Udall, 2006; Waxman, 2006).  H.R. 5049 set a 
mandatory cap on the amount of carbon-containing fuels that could be produced based on 
expected CO2 emissions three years after enactment, incorporated safety valves, and gave 
20% of allowances away for free, 20% to states to distribute, and 60% to the Federal 
Government to sell (Udall, 2006).  H.R. 5642 set a mandatory cap on large sources of 
CO2 at 2010 levels, established a schedule for reducing total emissions to 80% of 1990 
levels by 2050, allowed the banking of credits, but did not determine an allocation 
method (Waxman, 2006).  
 During the 110th session of Congress between 2007 and 2008, a number of CO2 
cap and trade policies were proposed.  These included another version of Rep. Waxman's 
proposal (H.R. 1590), as well as new proposals put forth by Rep. Markey (H.R. 6186), 
Rep. Doggett (H.R. 6316), Senator Lieberman (S.280), Sen. Sanders (S.309), Sen. Kerry 
(S.485), and Sen. Bingaman (S.1766) (Bingaman, 2007; Doggett, 2008; Kerry, 2007; 
Lieberman, 2007; Markey, 2008; Sanders, 2007; Waxman, 2007).  Rep. Markey's bill 
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capped the amount of CO2 released by large emitters at 2005 levels by 2012, tightened 
the cap each year between 2012 and 2050, and recycled the revenues to support climate 
change, clean technology development, and consumer assistance (Markey, 2008).  Rep. 
Doggett's bill broadly proposed that the Department of the Treasury create a CO2 cap and 
trade program that used the revenues to address climate change and to help consumers 
cope with higher energy prices (Doggett, 2008).  The Lieberman bill proposed a 
mandatory cap on all large emitters that restricted 2012 emission levels to those found in 
2004, then tightened the cap to achieve 1990 emission levels by 2020, and 60% of 1990 
levels by 2050 (Lieberman, 2007).  It allowed banking and borrowing of allowances, but 
proposed an undetermined mix of freely distributed and auctioned allowances 
(Lieberman, 2007).  Sen. Sanders' bill proposed that the EPA set a mandatory cap on CO2 
emissions at 2010 levels that would then be tightened to achieve 1990 levels by 2020, a 
30% reduction from 1990 levels by 2030, a 60% reduction from 1990 levels by 2040, and 
a 80% reduction from 1990 levels by 2050, but did not specify how allowances should be 
allocated (Sanders, 2007).  The Kerry bill capped the emissions from large emitters at 
2010 levels, capped 2050 emissions at 65% of 2000 levels, allowed allowance banking, 
but left the allocation ratio between freely distributed and auctioned allowances 
undefined (Kerry, 2007).  Lastly, Sen. Bingaman's bill proposed a mandatory cap on CO2 
emissions based on emission intensity that would be reduced by 2.6% each year between 
2012 and 2021 and 3% annually beginning in 2022 (Bingaman, 2007).  It included 
allowance banking, safety valves, and the following distribution of allowances: 50% 
given away for free; 10% auctioned; and 30% given to states (Bingaman, 2007).  
 In the 111th session of Congress between 2009 and 2010, three other CO2 cap and 
trade policies were proposed.  While none were enacted the House of Representatives did 
pass Rep. Waxman's American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (H.R. 2454) 
(Waxman, 2009).  This marked the first time either House approved a formal policy for 
controlling CO2 emissions.  In addition to H.R. 2454, Rep Doggett introduced another 
version of his bill (H.R. 1666), and Rep. Van Hollen also proposed a CO2 cap and trade 
policy (H.R. 1862) (Doggett, 2009; Van Hollen, 2009).  Rep. Doggett's bill introduced a 
mandatory cap on CO2 emissions that would reduce total emissions from 6 billion tons in 
2012 to 250 million tons in 2050 and included allowance banking and an auction-based 
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allocation (Doggett, 2009).  Rep. Van Hollen's proposal capped 2012 emissions at 2005 
levels, progressively tightened the cap so that 2050 emissions would be 85% less than 
2005 levels, established partial allowance auctions, and incorporated a revenue recycler 
that would use the auction proceeds to address climate change and to support affected 
consumers (Van Hollen, 2009).  Rep. Waxman's H.R. 2454 proposed a number of 
broader changes to the U.S.' energy infrastructure in addition to controlling the CO2 
emissions associated with its use (Waxman, 2009).  The cap and trade component of H.R. 
2454 capped 2012 emissions at 97% of 2005 levels and progressively tightened the cap 
so that 2050 emissions would not be more than 17% of 2005 levels (Waxman, 2009).  It 
allowed allowance banking and safety valves, established an 85-15% mix of freely 
distributed and auctioned allowances, and created a revenue recycling feature to support 
affected consumers and to address climate change (Waxman, 2009).  
 Many of the same arguments employed to prevent the ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol and the enactment of tax-based CO2 policies were also used to contest these cap 
and trade proposals.  Specifically, individuals and organizations associated with the 
conservative movement and fossil fuel industries used a combination of ideological and 
economic arguments to prevent the enactment of these policies (Cohen & Miller, 2012; 
Pooley, 2011).  From an ideological standpoint, the conservative movement continued to 
discredit the scientific position that increasing concentrations of CO2 were anthropogenic 
and that increasing concentrations would negatively affect the functioning of 
environmental ecosystems (Cohen & Miller, 2012; McCright & Dunlap, 2010; Pooley, 
2011).  They then exploited the artificial scientific uncertainty that they induced to 
contest the enactment of CO2 cap and trade policies (Cohen & Miller, 2012; McCright & 
Dunlap, 2010; Pooley, 2011).  Their ideological arguments were also supported by 
economic arguments, which claimed that cap and trade policies were a new tax that 
would increase the price of producing and consuming fossil fuel-based energy for 
everyone in the U.S. (Cohen & Miller, 2012; Murray & Yeatman, 2010; Pooley, 2011).  
These economic arguments became even more salient as the American economy entered 
the recent economic recession (Cohen & Miller, 2012).  Individuals and organizations 
associated with the conservative movement and the fossil fuel industry successfully used 
this combination of economic and ideological arguments to prevent any of these cap and 
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trade proposals from being enacted (Cohen & Miller, 2012; Pooley, 2011). 
 The lack of a federal CO2 policy encouraged individual and groups of states to try 
to control the CO2 emitted within their borders themselves.  These efforts initially 
manifested as regional aggregations of states who shared a common desire to begin 
controlling CO2 emissions.  These groupings included the Midwestern Greenhouse Gas 
Accord (MGGA), the Western Climate Initiative (WCI), and the Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative (RGGI).  Despite producing a set of draft recommendations in 2010, 
progress on the MGGA has ground to a halt as most of the participating states are no 
longer pursing it due to changes in state leadership (Center for Climate and Energy 
Solutions, 2012a).  The WCI initially included Arizona, Montana, Utah, California, New 
Mexico, Oregon, and Washington, but due to changes in political leadership and 
diminishing support for regional cap and trade policies California is the only state still 
participating (Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2012b; Craig, 2011; Western 
Climate Initiative, 2012a).  Despite this, the WCI, which includes a number of Canadian 
provinces in addition to California, intends to enact a cap and trade-based CO2 policy in 
2015 (Western Climate Initiative, 2012b).  
 In the meantime, California has moved forward with its own market-based CO2-
controlling policy, which rests on the authority of the California Air Resources Board 
(CARB) (California Environmental Protection Agency: Air Resources Board, 2012a).  
Initially proposed as the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, Assembly Bill (AB) 32 
required the CARB to establish a policy for controlling the state's CO2 emissions 
(California Environmental Protection Agency: Air Resources Board, 2012a).  CARB 
proposed a cap and trade policy that included an allowance auction, but the 
implementation of this policy has been contested a number of times.  The major acts of 
contestation included the defeated Proposition 23, which would have suspended AB 32 
until the state's unemployment rate fell below 5.5%, and a failed legal challenge by the 
California Chamber of Commerce that sought to invalidate CARB's ability to auction 
CO2 allowances (Grimes, 2012; Roosevelt, 2010).  Both of these acts of contestation 
were based on the potential economic impacts of the policy: Prop. 23 claimed that AB 32 
would eliminate jobs while the California Chamber of Commerce claimed that auctioning 
CO2 allowances would effectively impose higher taxes on the state's businesses (Grimes, 
37 
 
2012; Roosevelt, 2010).  Despite these challenges AB 32 was finally implemented in 
January of 2012 and the first auction occurred in November of that year (California 
Environmental Protection Agency: Air Resources Board, 2012b).  The policy allows 
allowance banking, and includes a 507 million ton cap on the amount of CO2 emitted by 
large sources in the state that is progressively tightened to 427 million tons in 2020 
(California Environmental Protection Agency: Air Resources Board, 2012a).  The policy 
initially gives 90% of the allowances away for free and auctions the remaining 10%, but 
the percentage of freely allocated allowances declines over time (Center for Climate and 
Energy Solutions, 2013).  The AB 32 auction also includes a minimum price floor of $10, 
and the allowance price for the first auction was $10.09 (California Environmental 
Protection Agency: Air Resources Board, 2013; Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 
2013).  AB 32 also includes three allowance reserves that enable regulated organizations 
to purchase allowances outside of the auction system for $40, $45, and $50 (Center for 
Climate and Energy Solutions, 2013).  This reserve effectively functions as a price 
ceiling as a regulated organization would not bid more than $40 dollars in the auction 
because they can purchase an allowance at this price from the reserve.  
 
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) 
 The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative first went into effect in 2009, which 
makes it both the first and the longest-lived mandatory CO2-controlling policy in the 
United States (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 2012a, 2012b).  RGGI is a regional 
cap and trade market mechanism initially applied to control the CO2 emissions produced 
by electrical generating facilities over 25 megawatts in Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and 
Maryland (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 2012a).  The historical background of 
RGGI can be traced to 2003, when then New York Governor Pataki began 
communicating with other Governors of New England and Mid-Atlantic states about 
developing a strategy to control CO2 emissions (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 
2006).  Following these efforts, the Governors of Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Vermont came together in 2005 to formally 
create the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 
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2011a).  In doing so, the Governors of these states signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU), in which they all agreed to enact the first mandatory cap and 
trade policy for controlling the CO2 that is emitted by electricity generating facilities 
(Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 2011a).  State level environmental and energy 
policymakers, known as the Staff Working Group (SWG), were tasked with designing the 
formal policy mechanisms of RGGI, but they actively structured the design phase to be 
open and transparent (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 2005).  To achieve this 
inclusion and transparency, state policymakers actively consulted with different 
categories of stakeholders, such as generators, distributors, environmental non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), consumers, and public interest groups, about the 
design of the policy and the potential implications of using various designs (Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 2007).  They also made nearly all the documents associated 
with the design process available to the public.  
 In 2006, the SWG delivered a draft Model Rule, which laid out the specifics of 
the market-based policy proposed as the foundation for RGGI (Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative, 2008a).  The draft Model Rule was made available for public comments for 
sixty days before it was released (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 2008a).  This 
document described the policy features that would ultimately form the basis for RGGI, 
and to join RGGI a state had to enact them through its own governance structure 
(Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 2008a, 2012c).  The Model Rule specified that the 
cap on CO2 emissions would be based on the region's historical emissions and that 
individual state allocations would be distributed according to the proportion of the 
region's historical emissions emitted by facilities in each state (Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative, 2008b).  In 2007, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Maryland joined RGGI 
(Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2012c).  All of the participating states signed 
and enacted the Model Rule by 2008, and the first auction for CO2 allowances was held 
in September of that year (Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2012c).  Since then, 
four auctions have been held a year, one every three months (Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative, 2012d). 
According to the Model Rule, RGGI includes three compliance periods.  The 
policy's first goal is to stabilize total emissions during the first two periods: 2009 to 2011 
39 
 
and 2012 to 2014 (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 2008b).  The next goal is to 
reduce total emissions by 2.5% annually for a total reduction of 10% during the third 
period: 2015 to 2018 (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 2008b).  The cap for the first 
compliance period was 188 million short tons of CO2 and for the second it is 165 million 
short tons (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 2008b).  At the end of the third period 
the cap would be 148.5 million short tons (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 2008b).  
The Model Rule also includes: provisions allowing the banking of allowances; 
specifications on what types of offsets are allowed, how many offsets are allowed, and 
how they are accounted for; rules and procedures for monitoring and measuring CO2 
emissions; and administrative guidelines for allowance trading (Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative, 2008b).  
 State involvement with RGGI is voluntary, but to participate a state must enact 
the policy package prescribed in the RGGI Model Rule, which makes participation 
mandatory for eligible electrical facilities (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 2012c, 
2012e).  As state involvement with RGGI is voluntary, individual states can withdraw 
from the policy; doing so eliminates the formal, mandatory CO2 controls applied to 
qualifying facilities within its borders.  In the time since RGGI's initial enactment, the 
Governor of New Jersey successfully pulled his state out of the policy and kept it out 
despite state Congressmen's attempts to rejoin (New Jersey Today, 2012).  The reason the 
Governor used to justify New Jersey's withdrawal was that the allowances were not 
expensive enough to significantly reduce emissions, which effectively made RGGI a new 
tax on electricity (New Jersey Today, 2012). 
 As each state establishes the legal basis for RGGI, each is free to choose how it 
wants to distribute its allocations.  All the participating states have chosen to auction 
approximately 90% of their CO2 allowances, and these allowances can be held by 
regulated or non-regulated entities (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 2012f).  RGGI's 
allowance auctions include safety valves that allow regulated organizations to use 
increasing amounts of offsets, emission reductions that occur outside of the RGGI system, 
if certain price conditions are triggered as well as a minimum reserve allowance price 
(Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 2008b).  The safety valves have never been 
triggered, but the current period allowance price has been the reserve price for the last 
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eight, out of a total of sixteen, auctions (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 2012d).  
Additionally, the states have also chosen to recycle approximately 80% of the auction 
revenues to programs that benefit the public, such as low income rate assistance, 
renewable energy development, and energy efficiency (Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative, 2011b).  Compared to other market mechanisms that have been and are being 
used to control environmental activities, RGGI's use of a nearly full auction with revenue 
recycling and a reserve price is unique.  
  The CO2 cap for RGGI's first compliance period was based on the region's 
emissions from 2000 to 2004 (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 2009).  It was set at 
188 million short tons of CO2 per year; however, the total amount of CO2 emitted in the 
region in 2008 was only 153 million short tons, which made the initial cap very generous 
(Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 2009).  During this period, the RGGI states also 
experienced two external events that further reduced the amount of CO2 emitted in the 
region. The first was the economic recession that hit the entire U.S. during this period, 
which reduced the demand for electricity and subsequently the need to run CO2-emitting 
generation equipment (Stavins, 2012).  The second event revolved around the falling 
price of natural gas that occurred as hydraulic fracturing, a new extraction technology, 
opened up new, non-conventional reserves, such as the Marcellus shale gas field that 
extends under parts of New York and Pennsylvania (Stavins, 2012).  With large amounts 
of new natural gas supplies coming to market the price fell dramatically.  Along with the 
newly enacted allowance price for CO2, the presence of cheap natural gas prompted many 
generating organizations to accelerate the rate they were replacing older coal and oil 
burning facilities that were nearing the end of their useful lives with new natural gas 
burning facilities (Stavins, 2012).  As the combustion of natural gas releases about half as 
much CO2 as the combustion of coal and about a third as much as the combustion of oil, 
the accelerated replacement of coal and oil burning facilities significantly reduced the 
amount of CO2 emitted in the region (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2007).  
 The initial weakness of RGGI's emission cap and the subsequent suppression of 
the demand for CO2 allowances pushed the current period allowance price to the reserve 
price for eight of the last sixteen auctions (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 2012d).  
Additionally, during the first compliance period more than a hundred million allowances 
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were not sold (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 2012d).  For the first two RGGI 
auctions only current period allowances were sold, while auctions three through twelve 
included current and future, the next compliance period, allowances (Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 2012d).  However, the price of future allowances had been at 
the reserve price for six of the twelve auctions they were offered, and the amount being 
sold was declining so RGGI officials decided to stop selling future period allowances in 
the second compliance period (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 2012d).  
 Through sixteen auctions just under four hundred million CO2 allowances had 
been sold for the first compliance period and just under sixty million allowances had been 
sold for the second; these figures include those sold by New Jersey while they were still 
participating (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 2012d).  Despite the ongoing 
oversupply of allowances, the reserve price enabled the auctions to generate nearly one 
billion dollars in proceeds (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 2012d).  Of those billion 
dollars, approximately eight hundred million was used to benefit the public, with 
approximately 100 million dollars to stimulate the deployment of renewable energy 
technologies, approximately 150 million dollars to provide energy bill assistance, and 
approximately 500 million dollars to support energy efficiency (Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative, 2011b).  
 As of this writing, RGGI is in the midst of the 2012-13 review period (Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 2012g). The participating states are evaluating the impacts of 
the policy hitherto, and whether to adjust the cap and to re-evaluate the use of offsets 
going forward (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 2012g).  Much like the initial 
creation process, the review process is designed to be open and transparent.  The 
information and models policymakers are using to make their decisions have been 
presented to groups of stakeholders and the general public for comments (Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 2012g).  
 
Critical Considerations for Enacting CO2-Controlling Policies  
 From the many CO2 policies that were not enacted and the few that were, it is 
possible to identify a few critical considerations for designing and then enacting CO2-
controlling policies.  To begin with, every proposed federal policy was contested by 
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individuals and organizations associated with the conservative movement and the fossil 
fuel industry.  Many of these individuals and organizations are ideologically opposed to 
CO2-controlling policies due to their belief that increasing concentrations of CO2 are not 
anthropogenic and that increasing concentrations of atmospheric CO2 do not negatively 
affect the functioning of environmental ecosystems (McCright & Dunlap, 2010; Pooley, 
2011).  As all CO2-controlling policies presume the connection between anthropogenic 
CO2 emissions, atmospheric concentrations of CO2, and changes in ecosystem 
functioning, is unlikely that a particular policy mechanism or design feature can eliminate 
these ideological concerns.   
 The other major argument used to contest the enactment of CO2-controlling 
policies has been based on the potential economic impacts of the policies (Cohen & 
Miller, 2012; Pooley, 2011).  Specifically, many individuals and organizations that 
produce or consume fossil fuel-based energy, which is nearly everyone in the U.S., are 
concerned that enacting CO2-controlling policies would increase the cost of energy 
(Cohen & Miller, 2012; Pooley, 2011).  They then believe that higher energy prices 
would have a detrimental effect upon the U.S. economy and make it uncompetitive with 
countries that do not have CO2-controlling policies (Cohen & Miller, 2012; Pooley, 2011).  
In fact, ongoing and widespread concern about the economic impacts of CO2-controlling 
policies makes the perceived costs of a policy a critical consideration for its enactment.  
The paramountcy of a policy's perceived economic effects is reflected in the “iron law of 
climate policy” (46) (Pielke, 2010).  This posits that individuals and organizations are 
only willing to incur a certain amount of costs to control CO2 emissions, even if they 
believe that emissions need to be controlled (Pielke, 2010).  Following this 'iron law', 
CO2-controlling policies perceived as having large economic costs will not be enacted 
even if the ideological opposition to them can be eliminated or circumvented (Pielke, 
2010).  Under the same argument, CO2-controlling policies perceived to have low 
economic costs or potential economic benefits may be enactable even in the face of 
ideological opposition (Pielke, 2010).  This would be possible if the low economic costs 
or potential economic benefits of a policy can attract enough support to render those who 
are ideological opposed irrelevant.  
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 Based on the “iron law of climate policy” (46), the critical considerations for 
designing an enactable CO2 policy primarily revolve around reducing the perceived cost 
of a policy and using the policy to create perceivable benefits (Pielke, 2010).  This makes 
the stringency of a cap and trade policy a critical consideration as tight caps that are 
designed to significantly reduce emissions are likely to be perceived as too economically 
costly to actually enact.  Similarly, features that can reduce or limit the perceived 
economic costs of a policy may facilitate its enactment.  These features include safety 
valves that can release extra allowances if the allowance price exceeds a certain threshold 
or if the demand exceeds the available supply.  Other design features that can limit the 
perceived economic impact of a cap and trade policy include price ceilings that limit how 
high allowance prices can rise and the inclusion of offsets that enable less expensive 
emissions reductions that occur at other locations or sectors to be counted towards the 
policy's requirements.  Lastly, the revenues generated from selling or auctioning 
allowances represent a valuable resource that can be used to support various programs or 









 This chapter expands on the connection between formal and informal or cultural 
mechanisms to discuss how the relationship between the two affects the enactment of 
new, formal CO2-controlling policies and how both types of mechanisms influence 
individual and organizational behavior (Lindblom, 1977; Scott, 2001).  The RGGI policy 
is then framed as a combination of formal and cultural mechanisms, leading to several 
research questions about the policy's enactment and its subsequent effects on how 
individuals and organizations produce and consume electricity.  The motivations that 
prompted the selection of these questions are then identified and justified.  Next, an 
economic framework and an institutional framework are presented.  These two 
frameworks represent distinct conceptual lenses that can be used to analyze the enactment 
and effects of RGGI.  In the last section of this chapter, insights from the two theoretical 
frameworks are combined to produce hypotheses about the research questions.  The 
remaining chapters of this research use the data that were collected about the enactment 
and effects of RGGI to evaluate these hypotheses.  
 
The Connection between Formal and Cultural Mechanisms for Controlling CO2 
Emissions  
 
 Given the pervasiveness of CO2, its inherent role in ecological systems, and its 
lack of immediate toxicity, attention to and the desire to control CO2 emissions are 
relatively recent phenomenon (Hulme, 2009; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, 2007h).  These have been driven by concerns over climate change, ocean 
acidification, and changes in ecosystem functioning 
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(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007i).  Before these concerns were 
apparent to the general public, the emission of CO2 was motivated by certain cultural 
controls.  These cultural controls were based on how the physical materials and 
behavioral actions underlying the emission of CO2 (Schnaiberg, 1980; Scott, 2001).  In 
terms of physical materials these cultural controls were based on interpreting and using: 
CO2 as a benign, naturally occurring material that does not affect human or 
environmental health in any concentration; the atmosphere and the oceans as self-
regulating sinks that can absorb infinite amounts of CO2 without functionally changing; 
and CO2-emitting technologies as clean, safe, and desirable (Hulme, 2009; Schnaiberg, 
1980).  The cultural controls on behavioral actions were based on treating the operation 
of CO2-emitting technologies and the consumption of fossil fuel-based electricity as 
socially beneficial activities that should be encouraged (Schnaiberg, 1980).  With these 
cultural controls in place emitting more CO2 to produce, and subsequently consume, 
more electricity was viewed as an appropriate and positive contribution to society, and 
individuals and organizations were encouraged to do so (Hirsh, 2002; Hulme, 2009; 
Schnaiberg, 1980).  
As society has increased its understanding of how increasing concentrations of 
CO2 can affect the functioning of different ecosystems there has been a growing desire to 
control the amount of CO2 emitted into the atmosphere and oceans (Hulme, 2009).  
However, formal CO2 controls, whether command and control or market-based, 
encapsulate certain meanings and uses of the physical materials and behavioral actions 
associated with CO2 emissions (Lindblom, 1977; Schnaiberg, 1980; Scott, 2001).  These 
meanings and interpretations are different from those that condition the use of these 
materials and actions when CO2 emissions are not formally controlled (Lindblom, 1977; 
Schnaiberg, 1980; Scott, 2001).  More specifically, proposing to control or actually 
controlling CO2 emissions is based on interpreting and using: CO2 as a material that is 
dangerous in certain concentrations; atmospheric and aquatic ecosystems as finite sinks 
that are susceptible to overloading; and CO2-emitting technologies as less clean, safe, and 
desirable (Hulme, 2009; Schnaiberg, 1980).  Formal CO2-controlling policies are also 
based on treating the operation of CO2-emitting technologies and the consumption of 
fossil fuel-based electricity as social activities that should be controlled and managed 
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(Schnaiberg, 1980).  Under these cultural controls, increasing CO2 emissions to produce 
and consume increasing amounts of fossil fuel-derived electricity would be positioned as 
deleterious to society, and individuals and organizations would be encouraged to limit 
their involvement with these activities (Hulme, 2009; Schnaiberg, 1980). 
 
Enacting New Policies  
 Anthropogenic CO2 emissions had not been historically controlled with formal 
mechanisms.  As such, the development of many modern, fossil fuel-combusting 
industrial processes, such as the production and subsequent consumption of electricity, 
were predicated on the earlier meanings and uses of the materials and actions underlying 
the emission of CO2 (Hirsh, 2003; Hughes, 1993; Schnaiberg, 1980).  Industrial processes 
as a whole and the electrical system in particular are comprised of many interlinking, 
long-lived, and capital intensive technological systems (Casazza & Delea, 2009).  This 
limits the degree that many individual components can be quickly replaced.  Therefore, 
the cultural controls that were present when these systems were initially developed 
continue to influence how individuals and organizations understand and utilize the 
materials and actions underlying the emission of CO2, even as alternative cultural 
controls have become increasing salient (Hughes, 1993; Johnson, 2007; Schnaiberg, 1980; 
Scott, 2001).  This is especially true of CO2-emitting technologies.  The meanings and 
uses that supported their initial deployment have been conceptually cemented by their 
ongoing presence as debts to be repaid, sources of revenue streams, and vital cogs in the 
operation of electrical systems.  
 The predominance of these initial understandings and utilizations creates 
misalignment with the newer cultural controls that are embedded within recent proposals 
to formally control CO2 emissions (Caronna, 2004; Johnson, 2007; Lindblom, 1977).  
The misalignment between the pre-existing and proposed cultural controls challenges the 
existing organizational and technological configurations of electricity producing and 
consuming industries (Caronna, 2004).  Moreover, attempts to formally control CO2 
emissions represent direct and significant threats to the individuals and organizations 
whose economic health depends on freely emitting CO2 into the atmosphere or using the 
electricity that is produced from doing so.  As a result, many producers and consumers of 
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fossil fuel-based energy contest the enactment of formal mechanisms that limit 
anthropogenic emissions of CO2 or that make producing or consuming fossil fuel-derived 
electricity more expensive (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Pooley, 2011).  Many of these 
individuals and organizations are part of old, powerful, and well-connected industrial 
networks and they have successfully contested the enactment of nearly every CO2-
controlling policy in the U.S. (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Cohen & Miller, 2012; 
McCright & Dunlap, 2010; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).   
 
Formally and Informally Controlling Behavior  
 Anthropogenic CO2 emissions had not been previously controlled with either 
command and control or market-based mechanisms.  Individuals and organizations had 
been able to transfer unlimited amounts of CO2 into the atmosphere, and they could do so 
for free.  From this position, applying any formal market control increases the price of 
emitting CO2.  Increasing the price required to emit CO2 into the atmosphere up from 
zero incentivizes economically self-interested individuals and organizations to reduce 
their involvement with this activity (Blanchard, 2008; Stavins & Whitehead, 1992).  As 
RGGI formally employs the price signals created by capping, auctioning, and trading 
emission allowances to control CO2 emissions, these price signals represent the policy's 
formal channel of influence (Demsetz, 1967; Lindblom, 2001).   
 The price signals that constitute the formal channel of influence are created by 
defining a total emissions cap, allocating tradable rights to each ton of CO2, and enabling 
the auction and exchange of emission allowances (Demsetz, 1967; Lindblom, 2001).  
However, these actions are predicated on certain normative and cognitive interpretations 
of the physical materials and behavioral actions associated with CO2 emissions 
(Lindblom, 2001; Schnaiberg, 1980; Scott, 2001).  These meanings and uses differ from 
the normative and cognitive understandings that underpin these materials and actions 
when CO2 emissions are not controlled (Lindblom, 1977; Schnaiberg, 1980; Scott, 2001).  
By enacting a formal CO2 policy, policymakers are trying to highlight alternative ways 
for individuals and organizations to interpret and use the physical materials and 
behavioral actions underlying the emission of CO2 (Fligstein, 1997; Lindblom, 1977; 
Schnaiberg, 1980).  If individuals and organizations accept and support the formal policy 
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they will interpret and use these materials and actions through the cultural controls the 
policy encapsulates.  The normative and cognitive shifts that are induced by a formal 
policy represent an informal, or cultural, channel of influence (Lindblom, 1977; Scott, 
2001).  
When the cultural controls underlying the interpretation and use of physical 
materials and behavioral actions are identified it becomes clear that formal and cultural 
controls both influence individual and organizational behavior (Lindblom, 1977; 
Schnaiberg, 1980; Scott, 2001).  Under this perspective, formal market policies can 
change behavior through two different, but related channels.  They formally apply prices 
to the physical materials and behavioral actions associated with CO2 emissions, and they 
modify how individuals and organizations interpret and use these materials and actions 
(Lindblom, 2001; Scott, 2001).  Much like the distinction between the different 
controlling mechanisms, the two channels of influence are artificially separated for 
analytical ease.  In practice, the two blend together.  RGGI is a cap and trade-based 
market policy.  Its cultural controls are based on interpreting and using CO2 as a waste 
material that generators have to purchase an allowance to emit and the operation of CO2-
emitting equipment as a socially undesirable activity, which is only allowed with a 
purchased emission allowance.  The price signal-based meanings that are embedded in 
the formal RGGI policy represent a set of values, norms, cognitions, and ideologies that 
can shape and enable how individuals and organizations interpret and use the physical 
materials and behavioral actions associated with the emission of CO2  (Lindblom, 2001; 
Schnaiberg, 1980; Scott, 2001).  However, delineating the formal and informal channels 
of influence acknowledges that the price-signal based meanings associated with a formal 
market policy are not automatically accepted as reality (Lindblom, 2001; Scott, 2001).  
Rather, these meanings must be interpreted and negotiated against other sets of meanings 
before individuals and organizations accept them as appropriate ways to guide their 
behavior (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Calhoun, 1993).  The 
informal channel of influence is not included in many examples of policy analysis and 
evaluation; its effects are harder to identify and analyze than the readily observable and 
evaluable price signals and commands that characterize the formal channels of influence 
(Aldy, Krupnick, Newell, Parry, & Pizer, 2010; Lindblom, 1977).  Despite these 
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difficulties, the synergy that exists between the formal and cultural channels in shaping 
the effects of a formal policy, and the relevance of informal effects in extending or 
strengthening formal policies, makes a deeper understanding of them worthy of more 
nuanced and targeted analysis (Brint & Karabel, 1991; Caronna, 2004; Lindblom, 1977).  
 
Research Questions about the Enactment and Effects of RGGI 
 
 When formal and cultural controls are viewed in tandem it becomes clear that the 
enactment and behavioral effects of formal policies are based on successfully changing 
how individuals and organizations interpret and use physical materials and behavioral 
actions (Scott, 2001).  However, the economic and operational health of electrical 
companies and electricity consumers can be significantly impacted if the physical 
materials and behavioral actions associated with the emission of electricity-derived CO2 
are interpreted and used according to alternative cultural controls.  The high stakes 
associated with changing the formal and cultural controls over the emission of CO2 
places individuals and organizations following different cultural controls, or preferring 
different types of formal controls on contending sides of a negotiation (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992; Pooley, 2011).    
 At the most basic level, the negotiation processes that characterize the enactment 
and subsequent effects of RGGI represent a power struggle (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; 
Calhoun, 1993).  More specifically, the negotiation represents individual and 
organizational efforts to control or to avoid control over the emission of (Calhoun, 1993).  
The negotiation also encompasses participants' efforts to accentuate different ways to 
interpret and use the physical materials and behavioral actions associated with CO2 
emissions as more or less desirable or appropriate that others (DiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein, 
1997).  Within these negotiation processes, individuals and organizations frame 
interpretations and uses of the proposed policy or the materials and actions associated 
with the emission of electricity-derived CO2 as more appropriate than others (DiMaggio, 
1988; Fligstein, 1997).  Ultimately, they seek to induce individuals and organizations to 
accept a specific formal control, or a lack thereof, on the emission of CO2 (Fligstein, 
1997; Lindblom, 1977).  They also want to change or maintain how CO2-emitting 
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technologies are operated and used to meet the demand for electricity (Brint & Karabel, 
1991; Fligstein, 1997).  When this distinction is considered, the overall process segments 
into a negotiation over the enactment of RGGI, a negotiation over how CO2 and the 
operation of CO2-emitting equipment should be interpreted and used, and a negotiation 
over how the demand for electricity should be met.  
 
Enactment Research Questions 
 The enactment negotiation revolves around whether RGGI can be framed in 
alignment with pre-existing understandings and uses of the physical materials and 
behavioral actions associated with the emission of electricity-derived CO2 (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992; Caronna, 2004; Fligstein, 1997).  Or, whether pre-existing 
understandings and uses of these materials and actions can be reframed so that they align 
with the cultural controls embedded within RGGI (Caronna, 2004; Fligstein, 1997; 
Lindblom, 1977).  Failing to achieve this alignment would limit policymakers' ability to 
enact RGGI, or restrict the policy's ability to effectively control CO2 emissions over time 
(Caronna, 2004).  Despite increasing concentrations of atmospheric and oceanic CO2, it 
has been very difficult to enact market-based policies to control CO2 emissions (Cohen & 
Miller, 2012; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007h).  These difficulties 
suggest that there is significant misalignment between how electrical companies and 
consumers interpret and use the physical materials and behavioral actions underlying the 
emission of electricity-derived CO2 and the interpretations and uses that are encapsulated 
in potential, market-based policies (Caronna, 2004; Lindblom, 1977). 
 
 Research Question 1: How were state policymakers able to enact RGGI? 
 
Research Question 2: Did policymakers use innovative cap and trade features to 
help enact RGGI?  
 
Effects Research Questions 
 After policy enactment, individuals' and organizations' understandings and uses of 
the physical materials and behavioral actions underlying the emission of electricity-
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derived CO2 continue to be shaped by negotiation.  However, in this negotiation 
individuals and organizations highlight different ways these materials and actions can be 
understood and utilized rather than whether and how a formal policy should be used to 
control them (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Fligstein, 1997).  
In this negotiation, the cultural controls embedded in the formal policy represents one of 
multiple ways for individuals and organizations to understand and utilize the materials 
and actions associated with the emission of electricity-derived CO2 (Berger & Luckmann, 
1966; Lindblom, 1977).  RGGI's ability to change how individuals and organizations 
actually interpret and use CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies depends 
on whether they base their interpretations and utilizations on the cultural controls 
embedded in the formal policy versus alternative cultural controls (Lindblom, 1977; Scott, 
2001).  If electrical companies and consumers interpret and use CO2 and CO2-emitting 
technologies through RGGI's cultural controls they would treat CO2 as a material that 
needs to be controlled and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies as an action that 
needs to be managed.  Furthermore, if electrical companies and consumers interpret and 
use CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies through RGGI's cultural controls 
it would be easier to enact stronger or more expansive formal CO2 controls.  This is 
because electrical companies' and consumers' newly shifted cultural controls would be 
more aligned with the cultural controls encapsulated within stronger formal policies 
(Caronna, 2004).  
 
Question 3: Did RGGI change how electrical companies and consumers interpret 
and use CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies, and did these 
changes affect attempts to develop stronger or additional CO2-controlling policies? 
  
 In addition to its effects on the interpretation and use of CO2 and the operation of 
CO2-emitting technologies, RGGI also represents an attempt to change how electrical 
companies, consumers, and PUCs interpret the use of electricity.  By recycling the 
revenues from the RGGI allowance auctions to support energy efficiency, the RGGI 
policymakers are involved in a negotiation over how the electricity that is produced by 
electrical companies is used to provide the services that consumers desire (Bourdieu & 
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Wacquant, 1992).  Specifically, policymakers are using the RGGI funds to try to get 
electrical companies and PUCs to interpret and use energy efficiency initiatives that 
reduce electricity consumption as a better way to meet electrical demand than by building 
new supply resources (Brint & Karabel, 1991; Fligstein, 1997).  Policymakers are also 
using the RGGI funds to try to get electricity consumers to interpret and use energy 
efficiency initiatives that reduce electricity consumption as a better way to get the 
services they desire than by consuming more electricity (Brint & Karabel, 1991; Fligstein, 
1997).  If electrical companies, consumers, and PUCs interpret and use energy efficiency 
initiatives through RGGI's cultural controls they would view using these technologies and 
practices to reduce electricity consumption as desirable.  This would make producing and 
consuming increasing amounts of electricity unnecessary and undesirable.   Additionally, 
if these individuals and organizations interpret and use energy efficiency initiatives that 
reduce electricity consumption as a positive and desirable endeavor it could facilitate 
innovation in, or the diffusion of energy efficiency technologies and practices.  If 
electrical companies, consumers, and PUCs positively interpret the use of energy 
efficiency technologies and practices that reduce electricity consumption they would be 
more interested in expanding the use of them and more motivated to identify new 
approaches for reducing electricity consumption.  
 
Question 4: Did RGGI's revenue recycler help to change how electrical 
companies, consumers, and PUCs interpret and utilize energy efficiency 
technologies and practices, and did these changes influence innovation in or the 
diffusion of them? 
 
Motivations for the Research Questions 
 
 Current concentrations of atmospheric and oceanic CO2 have largely accumulated 
because CO2 emissions were not traditionally controlled (Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, 2007h).  Stabilizing and then reducing the concentration of atmospheric 
and oceanic CO2 requires controlling individuals' and organizations' CO2 emissions.  
However, controlling CO2 emissions imposes significant costs on electricity producers 
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and consumers, so policymakers have primarily proposed using market-based 
mechanisms to limit the economic impacts of achieving a certain reduction in CO2 
emissions (Baumol & Oates, 1988; Metcalf, 2009; Montgomery, 1972; Tietenberg, 1985).      
 For CO2-controlling market policies, the paramountcy of economic and 
environmental factors have primarily prompted researchers to evaluate the implications 
of potential design features according to their economic or environmental effects (Aldy et 
al., 2010).  Other criterion for evaluating different cap and trade design features revolve 
around their distributional effects on different types of individuals and organizations and 
their ability to induce different types and amounts of innovation (Aldy et al., 2010).  This 
research extends this line of inquiry in a more pragmatic direction.  Specifically, it 
analyzes the first mandatory CO2 policy in the U.S. to identify how policymakers were 
able to enact the policy and whether certain design processes or policy features helped 
them do so.  The results of this analysis can then inform future attempts to design 
enactable CO2-controlling policies for other emitting sources or geographic locations. 
 Additionally, increasing attention is being devoted to the schedule for deploying 
CO2-controlling policies (Brewster, 2010; Williams, 2012).  Overall, it has proven 
difficult to enact CO2 policies in general, though stronger, ideal policies have been much 
harder to enact, while weaker, less ideal policies are more politically feasible (Cohen & 
Miller, 2012; Pielke, 2010).  There is thus increasing interest in how CO2-controlling 
policies are deployed, and whether small steps, or initially weak policies, facilitate or 
impede policymakers' ability to strengthen, expand, or broaden future policies (Brewster, 
2010; Williams, 2012).  This research addresses this question by looking at whether the 
enactment of the first CO2-controlling policy in the U.S. can change the cultural controls 
conditioning the emission of CO2 in ways that can facilitate the enactment of further 
policies.  This focus dovetails with existing research on incrementalism in CO2-
controlling policies in that it looks at how an initial policy can affect public opinion about 
future policies (Brewster, 2010).  However, it diverges by focusing on how individuals 
and organizations involved with the electrical industry interpret and use the materials and 
behaviors associated with the emission of CO2 instead of how the public understands the 
effects of greater CO2 emissions, their preferences for stronger regulations, or the 
progression of industry and environmental coalitions (Brewster, 2010).  The resulting 
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findings can help policymakers leverage a policy’s cultural channel of influence to bring 
about additional environmental policies and to improve individual and organizational 
environmental performance.  
 Energy efficiency technologies and practices can reduce the amount of money 
consumers spend on electricity and enable the demand for electricity to be met with fewer 
material inputs and less waste outputs (Eto, 1996).  They also represent a relatively 
inexpensive and unobtrusive way to limit the CO2 emissions produced by the electrical 
sector(York et al., 2012).  Despite these benefits, the diffusion of these technologies and 
practices has been haphazard both overtime and across the country (York et al., 2012).  A 
significant portion of the money raised through the RGGI auctions is being recycled to 
support energy efficiency in order to reduce the amount of electricity consumed in the 
region and to indirectly reduce the region's CO2 emissions.  
 Recent research on the diffusion of energy efficiency technologies and practices 
highlights how limited incentives for reducing electricity consumption and the upfront 
costs required to reduce electricity consumption represent critical impediments to the 
diffusion of these technologies and practices (Hayes et al., 2011; Zhao et al., 2012).  
Furthermore, research on utilities' involvement with energy efficiency identifies how a 
lack of financial incentives limits their motivation to invest in these technologies and 
practices and to actually achieve reductions in electricity consumption (Hayes et al., 
2011).  Similarly, research on energy consumption demonstrates that consumers 
generally underestimate the amount they use and the amount they can save, and that the 
upfront costs required to achieve these savings represent a significant barrier (Attari, 
DeKay, Davidson, & Bruin, 2010; Zhao et al., 2012).  This research builds on these 
findings to investigate whether and how the appearance of new funding sources affects 
the diffusion and development of energy efficiency technologies and practices.  More 
specifically, it analyzes whether and how increasing amounts of energy efficiency 
funding, for both incentives and to reduce deployment costs, affects how electrical 
companies, consumers, and PUCs interpret and utilize energy efficiency technologies and 
practices.  The research then looks at whether these changes influence the deployment of 
existing technologies and practices or the development of new ones.  The subsequent 
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findings can then be used to help accelerate the diffusion and development of energy 
efficiency technologies and practices.  
 
Theoretical Frameworks for Analyzing the Enactment and Effects of RGGI 
 
 To answer the aforementioned questions this research analyzes the enactment and 
effects of RGGI through a combination of two theoretical frameworks.  An economic 
framework is used to understand the enactment and effects of RGGI as a formal, market-
based policy.  An institutional framework is used to understand the negotiation processes 
associated with enacting RGGI and its subsequent effects on how individuals and 
organizations understand and utilize the physical materials and behavioral actions 
underlying the emission of electricity-derived CO2 (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Scott, 
2001).  This section presents the nuances and conceptual trajectories of each framework 
and introduces how each can be used to understand the enactment and effects of RGGI.  
The insights that are drawn from the two frameworks are then combined and presented in 
the next section as hypotheses about the enactment and effects of RGGI.  
 
Economic Framework  
 RGGI is a market-based policy.  Its formal effects stem from the price signals it 
ascribes to CO2 emission allowances by capping the total amount of allowances, 
auctioning them, and allowing organizations to exchange them (Demsetz, 1967; 
Lindblom, 2001).  The resulting prices make transferring CO2 into the atmosphere more 
expensive.  These price signals inform and incentivize economically self-interested 
emitters to reduce their emissions, whether by restricting their operation of existing CO2-
emitting technologies, replacing existing technologies with low or zero CO2 technologies, 
or capturing and storing CO2  (Blanchard, 2008; Stavins & Whitehead, 1992).  As RGGI 
formally influences individual and organizational CO2 emitters through price signals, this 
suggests a need to analyze the policy through economic theory.  
 The discipline of economics is extremely diverse.  It broadly includes 
microeconomics, how individual entities behave within a single market, and 
macroeconomics, how markets can be integrated into and affect society (Dimand, 2008; 
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Taylor, 2007).  Within these two groupings a variety of economic sub-fields are 
distinguished by the empirical context they focus on, the underlying assumptions that 
guide their interpretations of individual and social behavior, and their intended goals or 
stated purposes (Backhouse & Medema, 2008).  Economic analysis can be used to study 
businesses, financial markets, health care, education, law, politics, and environmental 
conditions, among other topics.  In terms of underlying assumptions, mainstream, 
orthodox, or classical economics rests on the premise of rationality (Blanchard, 2008).  
Framed with physical items and prices, desired products and services represent “good” 
things and their prices or costs represent “bad” things; economically rational actors' 
behaviors and decisions are driven by getting the things they desire at the lowest cost 
(Blanchard, 2008).   
 Mainstream economics treats rationality as a goal in and of itself.  It doesn't 
address whether and why individuals and organizations actually want certain things and 
not others (Blanchard, 2008).  Attention to why individuals and organizations define 
items as desirable or not constitute the foundation of heterodox economics (F. Lee, 2008).  
Heterodox economics does not assume that individuals and organizations are 
automatically rational.  Instead, heterodox economics views behavior as derived from 
historical and current social conditions, which can prompt individuals and organizations 
to behave in ways that may or may not be consistent with the assumption of rationality (F. 
Lee, 2008).  The final distinction among economic sub-fields is between positive 
economics, which describes what is occurring, and normative economics, which suggests 
how things should be (Lipsey, 2008).  
 Overall, this research is situated across micro and macroeconomics, as RGGI's 
presence as a single market that individual organizations participate in is microeconomic, 
while its enactment and industry effects are macroeconomic.  Furthermore, as this market 
was designed to price and reduce an environmental externality, the emission of CO2 into 
ecosystems, it can be thought of as an example of environmental economics (Turner, 
Pearce, & Bateman, 1994).  With regard to the underlying assumptions, the economic 
component of this research is based on orthodox or mainstream economics.  More 
specifically, it treats all CO2-emitting organizations, whether they are owned by investors, 
municipalities, or co-ops, as rational; they all want to maximize the revenues they can 
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earn from producing electricity while minimizing the costs required to do so (Blanchard, 
2008).  This research also treats electricity consumers and PUCs as economically rational.  
Electricity consumers want to maximize the benefits they can achieve from using 
electricity while minimizing the costs required to do so (Blanchard, 2008).   PUCs want 
to maximize the benefits that consumers can get from using electricity while maintaining 
or minimizing the costs they have to pay(Blanchard, 2008).   
 Finally, this research's application of economic theory is primarily positive, 
although some aspects of the concluding chapter do represent normative economic 
statements.  In describing the observed effects of RGGI, this research represents an 
example of positive economics (Lipsey, 2008).  However, the underlying motivations 
behind this research are driven by a desire to develop and expand CO2-controlling 
policies and to stimulate the diffusion of and innovation in energy efficiency technologies 
and practices.  This makes suggestions about doing so normative statements (Lipsey, 
2008).  
When this conceptualization of economic theory is brought to bear on RGGI it 
offers a way to think about how electrical companies and consumers react to RGGI's 
initially proposed and then enacted price signals.  Based on the aforementioned definition 
of economic theory, higher prices for CO2 allowances control CO2 emissions better than 
low prices because they make emitting CO2 more expensive (Stavins & Whitehead, 
1992).  Higher prices equate to more “bad” things, which means that economically 
rational emitters will react to the higher price signals by trying to reduce the amount they 
have to pay or by limiting the CO2 that they emit to produce a unit of electricity 
(Blanchard, 2008; Stavins & Whitehead, 1992).  At the same time, higher priced CO2 
allowances increase the price of electricity for consumers, and these increased costs 
represent “bad” things.  Under the same definition of economic theory, higher electricity 
prices motivate consumers to use electricity more efficiently in order to reduce the costs 
they incur to get the services they desire (Blanchard, 2008).   
 This application of economic theory also suggests how electrical companies, 
consumers, and PUCs would react to the proposed and newly created resources generated 
by recycling RGGI’s revenues to support energy efficiency technologies and practices.  
When RGGI funding is allocated to create incentives that make reducing electricity 
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consumption lucrative it increases the benefits of deploying energy efficiency 
technologies and practices, while maintaining or reducing the costs of doing so.  This 
then motivates economically rational electrical companies to deploy increasing amounts 
of energy efficiency initiatives to (Blanchard, 2008).  Similarly, when RGGI revenues are 
used to fund energy efficiency initiatives it decreases the costs of reducing electricity 
consumption while maintaining or increasing the benefits of doing so.  This then 
motivates PUCs to enact further energy efficiency requirements, and encourages 
electricity consumers to adopt energy efficiency technologies and practices (Blanchard, 
2008).   
 
Institutional Framework           
 Although aspects of the institutional framework have previously been introduced, 
this section will aggregate these components and fill the conceptual gaps between them to 
establish a cohesive institutional framework.  This research uses components of the 
institutional framework to describe the alignment between formal and cultural 
mechanisms for controlling social behavior, and the effects a formal policy can have 
upon norms and cognitions, or a policy's(Caronna, 2004; Lindblom, 1977; Scott, 2001).  
These applications situate the institutional framework as a method for identifying and 
analyzing changes in meaning (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Scott, 2001).  These changes 
include how individuals and organizations interpret and utilize the physical materials and 
behavioral actions underlying a specific activity, as well as how they interpret and abide 
by the policies that are proposed or enacted to control it.  RGGI has been defined as a 
regulatory or formal institution that encapsulates meanings and utilizations of the 
physical materials and behavioral actions underlying the emission of electricity-derived 
CO2 (Lindblom, 1977; Schnaiberg, 1980; Scott, 2001).  These meanings and uses diverge 
from the ones that had previously conditioned how individuals and organizations 
produced and consumed fossil fuel-based electricity (Hulme, 2009; Schnaiberg, 1980).  
RGGI's ability to change how individuals and organizations produce and consume fossil 
fuel-based electricity depends on both the price signals it formally creates and the 
informal normative and cognitive shifts it can induce (Lindblom, 2001; Scott, 2001).  As 
the enactment and informal effects of RGGI revolve around changing how individuals 
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and organizations interpret and use the items and actions underlying the emission of 
electricity-derived CO2 it suggests analyzing the policy through institutional theory.  
 The underlying philosophy behind institutional theory is that while material items, 
such as CO2 and CO2-emitting technologies, and physical practices, such as the operation 
of CO2-emitting technologies and the consumption of electricity, objectively exist, their 
meaning to individuals and organizations, or how they are interpreted and utilized, is 
socially constructed (Berger & Luckmann, 1966).  The concept of social construction 
rests on the premise that individuals' and organizations' understandings and utilizations of 
materials and actions are not necessarily automatic, constant, or stable (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1966).  Rather, it posits that individuals' and organizations' understandings 
and utilizations emerge through collective negotiations whereby different interpretations 
and uses are positioned as more appropriate ways to define and engage with reality than 
others (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Fligstein, 1997).  This 
process is also ongoing.  Internal changes in the power and resource relationships 
between participants or external changes in the availability of resources, the composition 
of participants, or the salience of certain meanings can introduce different degrees and 
types of volatility into the negotiating processes (Brint & Karabel, 1991; Greenwood & 
Hinings, 1996; Hoffman, 1999; Scott, Ruef, Mendel, & Caronna, 2000). 
 Depending on the variability of the negotiating context and the networks of 
resources and power that tie negotiating participants together, the socially constructed 
meaning of a material or action can change quickly, dramatically, or both (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1966; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).  The social meaning of nuclear power 
plants represents one such example.  Over a relatively short operational history, the 
dominant understanding and use of these technologies have jumped from a safe source of 
electricity too cheap to meter, to a highly dangerous energy source, to a safe source of 
CO2-free electricity, back to a highly dangerous energy source.  As the above example 
suggests, changes in the socially constructed meaning of material items and behavioral 
actions can have dramatic effects upon the individuals and organizations involved with 
them.  These changes can transform economically and operationally valuable assets into 
potentially costly or dangerous liabilities.  
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 Circling back to the social construction of meaning, cognitive, normative, and 
regulative institutions, or bundles of ideologies, norms, and laws, represent conceptual 
building blocks that individuals and organizations use to construct or to negotiate social 
meanings for physical materials or behavioral actions (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Scott, 
2001).  However, the ways that individuals and organizations can interpret and utilize 
materials and actions are not predefined or inherently stable (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; 
White, 1992).  They can be derived from a variety of individual and hybridized 
institutional positions, and the importance and visibility of different institutions changes 
over time (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Scott, 2001; White, 1992).  Fluctuations in the 
stability and importance of different institutional positions and the associated volatility in 
how physical materials or behavioral actions can be interpreted and used enable the 
aforementioned negotiation processes (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992; Calhoun, 1993).  The potential to negotiate self-serving social meanings 
or to protect existing meanings from re-negotiation motivates participation in institutional 
negotiations (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Brint & Karabel, 1991).  It also encourages 
individuals and organizations to try to frame certain institutional positions or 
interpretations as more appropriate ways of understanding and utilizing physical 
materials and behavioral actions than others (Fligstein, 1997).  If the individuals and 
organizations initially subscribing to an institution can convince, coerce, or induce others 
to accept their meanings and interpretations, then these other individuals and 
organizations can use the propagated institutional meanings to define the materials and 
actions underlying the environmental activity or the activity itself for their own interests 
(Brint & Karabel, 1991; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Fligstein, 1997).  
 In the electrical industry, institutional negotiations over the meanings and uses of 
CO2, the operation of CO2-emitting technologies, energy efficiency initiatives, and the 
consumption of electricity are especially charged (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).  
Treating CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies as a controlled material and 
action can make it more difficult or costly for electrical companies to use certain 
technologies and practices to produce electricity, and for consumers to use electricity to 
get the services they desire.  Similarly, treating the use of energy efficiency initiatives 
that reduce electricity consumption as a desirable way to meet demand reconfigures the 
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connection between the electrical supply and demand.  These changes affect the 
profitability of the individuals and organizations that own generation equipment, the 
ongoing supply of electricity to the public, and how consumers use electricity.  When 
RGGI is embedded into the institutional framework, the policy design process represents 
an effort by state policymakers to highlight different meanings for how individuals and 
organizations can understand and utilize the physical materials and behavioral actions 
underlying the emission of electricity-derived CO2 (Fligstein, 1997; Scott, 2001).  By 
enacting RGGI, state policymakers are also engaged in an institutional negotiation over 
the meanings and uses of CO2, the operation of CO2-emitting technologies, energy 
efficiency initiatives, and the consumption of electricity in an attempt to change how 
individuals and organizations produce and consume electricity (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 
1992; Brint & Karabel, 1991).   
 RGGI is a policy for controlling and reducing electricity-derived CO2 emissions.  
The meanings that policymakers are trying to highlight through its enactment are very 
similar to the meanings that many environmental-based organizations currently employ to 
understand and use the physical materials and behavioral actions underlying the emission 
of electricity-derived CO2 (Fligstein, 1997).  Based on this similarity, environmental-
based organizations would not perceive very much misalignment between their pre-
existing cultural controls and the ones encapsulated within the RGGI policy (Caronna, 
2004; Lindblom, 1977).  However, the meanings that policymakers are trying to highlight 
through the design and enactment of RGGI are different from the ones that many 
electrical companies, consumers, and PUCs had been using (Fligstein, 1997).  
Specifically, if electrical companies treat CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting 
technologies as a controlled material and action it makes producing electricity more 
expensive.  Similarly, if electricity consumers and PUCs utilize the meanings embedded 
within RGGI it increases the cost of consuming electricity.  Electrical companies, 
consumers, and PUCs are economically rational so they would be especially sensitive to 
new meanings that make producing and consuming electricity more expensive 
(Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).   
 The meanings that policymakers are trying to highlight through the design and 
enactment of RGGI create additional costs for electrical companies, consumers, and 
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PUCs (Fligstein, 1997).  The higher costs associated with utilizing these meanings creates 
misalignment between the cultural controls that economically rational electrical 
companies, consumers, and PUCs had been using and the cultural controls underlying the 
formal RGGI policy (Blanchard, 2008; Caronna, 2004; Lindblom, 1977; Scott, 2001).  If 
RGGI had a very tight emissions cap, then the costs associated with treating CO2 and the 
operation of CO2-emitting technologies as controlled would be higher and more 
misalignment would occur.  The more misalignment that electrical companies, consumers, 
and PUCs perceive the more likely they are to contest the use of these meanings by 
contesting the existence of the policy itself (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Caronna, 2004).  
 Concurrently, by recycling a large portion of RGGI's auction revenues toward 
energy efficiency, policymakers are also involved in an institutional negotiation over how 
individuals and organizations interpret and use electricity and energy efficiency 
technologies and practices (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).  Policymakers are trying to 
change how electrical companies, consumers, and PUCs view and utilize electricity and 
energy efficiency practices and technologies, so that demand can be met by reducing 
consumption instead of by expanding the supply, which indirectly limits electricity-
derived CO2 emissions (Brint & Karabel, 1991).  Electrical companies, consumers, and 
PUCs had previously interpreted the operation of CO2-emitting generation technologies 
and the consumption of fossil fuel-based electricity as socially beneficial activities (Hirsh, 
2002; Hulme, 2009; Schnaiberg, 1980).  These pre-existing cultural controls motivated 
consumers to use more electricity, and encouraged electrical companies to meet this 
demand by producing and delivering increasing amounts of it (Hirsh, 2002; Schnaiberg, 
1980).  Under these cultural controls energy efficiency initiatives that reduced electricity 
consumption were interpreted by economically rational electrical companies as costs they 
incurred that did not result in additional profits or benefits (Blanchard, 2008; Hayes et al., 
2011; Kushler, York, & Witte, 2006; Scott, 2001).  Similarly, many economically 
rational consumers and PUCs interpreted energy efficiency technologies and practices 
that reduced the consumption of el(Blanchard, 2008; Jaffe & Stavins, 1994a; Scott, 2001; 
York et al., 2012; Zhao et al., 2012).  Under these interpretations, economically rational 
electrical companies, consumers, and PUCs would not be motivated to deploy or use 
energy efficiency technologies and practices to reduce electricity consumption because 
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they primarily understand the costs of doing so, and do not correctly interpret or value the 
benefits they can provide (Blanchard, 2008; Hayes et al., 2011; Jaffe & Stavins, 1994a; 
Kushler et al., 2006; Scott, 2001; York et al., 2012; Zhao et al., 2012).  
 However, by recycling the revenues from CO2 auctions to fund energy efficiency 
spending, standards, and incentives, RGGI policymakers are trying to position the 
deployment and adoption of energy efficiency technologies and practices that reduce 
electricity consumption (Fligstein, 1997).  Specifically, RGGI funds are being used to 
create incentives that make deploying energy efficiency technologies and practices to 
reduce electricity consumption a profitable activity.  RGGI revenues are also being used 
to fund energy efficiency initiatives so that PUCs can encourage consumers to adopt 
energy efficiency initiatives without increasing the costs they have to pay.  Electrical 
companies, consumers, and PUCs are economically rational, so would be less inclined to 
perceive the economically positive meanings for energy efficiency that RGGI 
policymakers are highlighting as misaligned (Blanchard, 2008; Caronna, 2004; Fligstein, 
1997; Scott, 2001).  This is because RGGI’s funds enable electrical companies to collect 
new profits from reducing electricity consumption, allow PUCs to reduce electricity 
consumption without increasing prices for consumers, and let consumers get the services 
they want at a lower cost.  The economically positive meanings for energy efficiency 
initiatives that policymakers are highlighting are also supported by the meanings 
encapsulated within the cap and trade component of RGGI (Fligstein, 1997).  Namely, if 
the operation of CO2-emitting technologies is treated as a socially detrimental activity 
that should not be indefinitely increasing then improving the efficient use of existing 
electrical supplies becomes more desirable and appealing.  If electrical companies, 
consumers, and PUCs interpret the use of energy efficiency initiatives that reduce 
electricity consumption as an economically positive endeavor it could make other 
positive meanings for energy efficiency, such as their ability to reduce CO2, more visible 
or appealing.  The increasing salience of positive economic and non-economic meanings 
may then collectively motivate electrical companies, consumers, and PUCs to actually 





Hypotheses about the Research Questions  
 
 The analytical perspectives encapsulated in the two theoretical frameworks are 
now combined to produce hypotheses about the enactment and effects of RGGI.  Data 
about the enactment and effects of RGGI are presented in the subsequent chapters of this 
research.  This information is used to test and evaluate these hypotheses.  In this section, 
each of the hypotheses to be tested is preceded by the research question it attempts to 
answer and the insights from the two theoretical frameworks that inspired its formulation.  
 
Enactment Research Questions and Hypotheses  
 Policymakers may be able to design enactable policies for uncontrolled 
environmental activities by aligning the cultural controls associated with the formal 
policy with the pre-existing cultural controls that condition how individuals and 
organizations interpret and use the physical materials and behavioral actions associated 
with the activity (Caronna, 2004; Lindblom, 1977; Schnaiberg, 1980; Scott, 2001).  If 
policymakers can identify the pre-existing cultural controls held by the individuals and 
organizations that are most involved with or affected by a potential policy then they can 
design the policy to align with them (Caronna, 2004).  If the individuals and 
organizations most involved or affected by a potential policy do not perceive significant 
misalignment between their pre-existing cultural controls and those embedded in the 
formal policy they will be more likely to support the enactment of the policy (Caronna, 
2004; Lindblom, 1977).  
 
Research Question 1: How were state policymakers able to enact RGGI? 
 
Hypothesis 1: Policymakers structured the design process to reveal the meanings 
that electrical companies, consumers, and environmental organizations employed 
to understand and use the physical materials and behavioral actions associated 
with the emission of electricity-derived CO2.  They then chose design features that 
aligned with these pre-existing understandings and interpretations, and used 
models to demonstrate the alignment.  
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 One way that policymakers may have reduced the misalignment associated with 
the enactment of RGGI was by appealing to the economic rationality of electrical 
companies and consumers.  Economically rational electrical companies are inclined to 
interpret and use the physical materials and behavioral actions associated with the 
emission of electricity-derived CO2 based on how they affect their costs and revenues 
(Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  This means that policymakers should structure the 
design process to highlight the effects that potential policy designs have on the costs and 
revenues of electrical companies (Fligstein, 1997).  Similarly, economically rational 
consumers are inclined to interpret the physical materials and behavioral actions 
underlying the emission of electricity-derived CO2 through their effects on the price and 
availability of the services that are produced through the use of electricity (Blanchard, 
2008; Scott, 2001).  This means that policymakers should structure the design process to 
highlight the effects that potential policy designs have on the cost and availability of the 
services that consumers get from using electricity (Fligstein, 1997).  When policies are 
designed in this way, electrical companies and consumers are likely to be more aware of 
how the formal policy features are aligned with the economic meanings they respectively 
hold, which would then make them more accepting of the policy (Blanchard, 2008; 
Caronna, 2004; Scott, 2001).  Specifically, electrical companies would be more receptive 
to new policies that minimize the price and effort of compliance and that create new 
benefits for them.  Similarly, electricity consumers would be more receptive to new 
policies that do not increase the price or decrease the availability of the electricity they 
use to produce the services they desire, or that result in additional, free benefits for them.  
 
Research Question 2: Did policymakers use innovative cap and trade features to 
help enact RGGI?  
 
Hypothesis 2: Policymakers used an intentionally weak cap, pre-existing 
compliance standards, and safety valves to minimize the costs and efforts of 
compliance, and their associated effects on the price of electricity. Policymakers 
used a revenue recycling feature and a price floor to create resources that benefit 
electricity companies and consumers.  
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Effects Research Questions and Hypotheses  
 Economically rational electrical companies are inclined to understand and 
interpret the materials and actions associated with electricity-derived CO2 according to 
their effects on their costs and revenues (Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  Economically 
rational electricity consumers are inclined to understand and use these materials and 
actions through their effects on the price and availability of the services that are produced 
by using electricity (Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  In fact, these economic 
considerations are so important to these companies and consumers that they may be 
willing to accept new meanings for materials and actions if policymakers can convince 
them that the cost of using the meanings is low or nothing or if the economic benefit of 
using them is high (Blanchard, 2008; Fligstein, 1997; Scott, 2001).  Following this 
argument, RGGI's low allowance price, use of existing compliance requirements, and 
revenue recycler would make electrical companies more willing to accept and use the 
meanings encapsulated in the policy because the cost of doing so would be low.  
Likewise, RGGI's low allowance price and financial support for energy efficiency 
initiatives would make electricity consumers more willing to accept the meanings 
embedded in the policy because the cost of using them is low and the potential benefits 
high.  Furthermore, as electrical companies and consumers experience the low costs and 
benefits associated with treating CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies as 
controlled it can make them more willing to use these meanings, which would enable 
policymakers to enact stronger or more widespread CO2 controls (Caronna, 2004).  
 
Question 3: Did RGGI change how electrical companies and consumers interpret 
and use CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies, and did these 
changes affect attempts to develop stronger or additional CO2-controlling policies? 
  
 Hypothesis 3: The limited costs and new resources associated with RGGI 
induced electrical companies and consumers to accept the new meanings 
embedded in the policy, which then created support for extending and tightening 




 For economically rational electrical companies the inability to profit from the use 
of energy efficiency initiatives that reduce electricity consumption can make deploying 
these technologies and practices unappealing, which can then make other non-economic 
meanings or benefits less visible or desirable (Blanchard, 2008; Hayes et al., 2011; 
Kushler et al., 2006; Scott, 2001).  Similarly, the upfront cost of deploying and adopting 
energy efficiency technologies and practices can make reducing electricity consumption 
through their use unappealing for PUCs and consumers, which can then make other non-
economic meanings or benefits less visible or desirable for them (Blanchard, 2008; Jaffe 
& Stavins, 1994a; Scott, 2001; York et al., 2012; Zhao et al., 2012).  If policymakers can 
remove the visibility or the salience of these negative economic meanings, it may make 
their positive, non-economic benefits more prominent and desirable to electrical 
companies, consumers, and PUCs.  The ensuing shifts in how electrical companies, 
consumers, and PUCs interpret the use of energy efficiency initiatives that reduce 
electricity consumption can then make these individuals and organizations more willing 
to use existing approaches and more open to identifying or developing new approaches 
(Brint & Karabel, 1991).  
 
Question 4: Did RGGI's revenue recycler help to change how electrical 
companies, consumers, and PUCs interpret and utilize energy efficiency 
technologies and practices, and did these changes influence innovation in or the 
diffusion of them? 
 
Hypothesis 4: Reducing the first cost and creating incentives for energy 
efficiency initiatives that reduce electricity consumption made other ways to 
interpret these technologies and practices more visible and valuable.  The positive 
economic meanings and the increasingly salient non-economic meanings made 
electrical companies, consumers, and PUCs more receptive to reducing electricity 
consumption, which helped facilitate the diffusion of and innovation in energy 









 Before California implemented AB 32 in January 2012, RGGI was the only 
mandatory CO2 policy in the United States (California Environmental Protection Agency: 
Air Resources Board, 2012).  When viewed alongside the many un-enacted domestic 
policies proposed during the mid to late 2000s, RGGI's initial enactment represents a 
political anomaly.  This chapter explores its occurrence.  The following analysis is 
directed by the two enactment research questions.  Specifically, it focuses on how 
policymakers were able to enact the first mandatory CO2 policy in the U.S., and whether 
specific cap and trade features facilitated this enactment.   
 The chapter employs the following structure to discuss and analyze the research 
questions.  First, the empirical context of the RGGI design process and its connection to 
the policy's eventual enactment are discussed and used to review the hypotheses.  Then 
the research methods used to collect the data are described.  Next, data on policymakers' 
efforts to design and enact RGGI are presented.  The data revolve around the approaches 
policymakers used to design the policy, the formal design features proposed, and how 
different stakeholders responded and reacted to these approaches and design features.  
The information is then used to analyze how RGGI came to be enacted and whether 
specific cap and trade features facilitated this enactment.  The analytical section of this 
chapter first summarizes the presented information, and then uses it to evaluate the 






The RGGI Design Process, Its Connection to Enactment, and Enactment 
Hypotheses  
 
 As introduced in the background chapter, the policymakers involved with RGGI 
aspired to make the design and implementation processes as inclusive and transparent as 
possible.  Towards these ends, the state energy and environmental policymakers involved 
with RGGI, collectively known as the Staff Working Group (SWG), invited different 
categories of stakeholders to observe and participate in the policy's design.  The main 
categories of stakeholders included: generating organizations; consumers; environmental 
organizations; public interest and legal organizations; energy efficiency organizations; 
and utilities (Chart 1).  Other individuals involved in RGGI's design included academic, 
public, and private sector experts who were brought in to inform the SWG and 
stakeholders about the nuances of different environmental market designs and policy 
features.  Over the course of three and a half years, the SWG, stakeholders, and 
acknowledged experts participated in twelve in-person meetings, during which different 
RGGI design features were discussed and evaluated as viable policy options (Chart 2).   
 The stakeholder-derived SWG recommendations that emerged from these 
meetings were fed to the state environmental and energy agency heads who leaned 
heavily upon them to finalize and implement RGGI's Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) and Model Rule.  The presentations and conversations that transpired during the 
stakeholder meetings were recorded, transcribed, and made available to the public 
through RGGI.org, the organization created to oversee the policy.  The specifics of this 
process and its role in influencing the enactment of RGGI were described by one of the 
experts who participated in the allocation component.  
 
Allocations Expert: “… thinking back, I think it was the multi-stakeholder process and the 
diligence of the state staff, who were kind of like the judge and jury in a 
way. I mean they'd sit there and be so contemplative, and so 
thoughtful … every month they'd have two day meetings, and one day 
they'd have a closed meeting and one day they'd have an open meeting 
for public dialogue, every four weeks.  And then in those open meetings 
they would have industry folks and everybody else coming in and saying, 
you know, if the topic is how allocation is going to occur, they would 
hear all this public dialogue about it and stuff, and then they would go 
to closed door and talk about it for a whole day at a snail's pace, but 
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really think through every aspect of this issue until they had 
fundamentally convinced themselves that, by far, the best policy design 
was to take this bold, make this bold step and change the way that 
allowance programs have ever been implemented, and so it was really 
historic in that sense.” 
 
 The SWG was responsible for designing a new, yet enactable policy to control the 
emission of CO2 from electrical facilities in New England and Mid-Atlantic states.  Given 
the dearth of pre-existing CO2 policies at the time as well as the economic and 
ideological controversies over whether and how CO2 should be controlled, the SWG 
needed to attract considerable support (Cohen & Miller, 2012; McCright & Dunlap, 
2010).  The categories of stakeholders whose support was most essential were electrical 
generators and consumers, which also included the public interest and legal organizations 
that advocated on their behalf.  Generators' and consumers' support was critical because 
the policy would be applied to generators and would affect all categories of electricity 
consumers.  More specifically, RGGI encapsulated an alternative way to interpret the 
operation of CO2-emitting technologies and how they could be used to meet consumers' 
demand (Lindblom, 1977; Scott, 2001).  The centrality of these actions to generators and 
consumers meant they would be the stakeholders most likely to perceive misalignment 
between their pre-existing cultural controls and the alternative ones embedded in the 
policy (Caronna, 2004; Lindblom, 1977).  Based on this sensitivity, the SWG had to 
propose a policy that generators and consumers could both support.  
 Generating organizations owned and operated CO2-emitting facilities and 
produced the CO2 emissions that RGGI aimed to control.  Furthermore, as a market-
based policy, RGGI would directly affect the economic health of generators by making it 
more expensive for them to operate CO2-emitting equipment to produce 
electricity(Lindblom, 2001).  Due to these considerations, generating organizations were 
especially sensitive to the alternative meanings for CO2 and the operation of CO2-
emitting facilities that the SWG was trying to highlight (Fligstein, 1997; Scott, 2001).  
The misalignment that generators could perceive between these meanings and their pre-
existing cultural controls meant the SWG had to propose a policy generators could 
support (Caronna, 2004).  The SWG needed the support of generators because many were 
large, powerful, and wealthy corporations that could put pressure on elected and 
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appointed officials in support of or against various legislative and regulatory policies 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).  
 Consumers purchased the electricity produced by CO2-emitting facilities to get 
the services that electrical energy provided.  By making it more expensive to operate 
CO2-emitting facilities, RGGI would directly affect consumers by modifying the price 
and the availability of the electricity they used to get the services they desired.  
Consumers would also directly experience these effects, whether in the form of price 
increases or blackouts.  This meant that consumers, and by extension public interest and 
legal organizations, were especially sensitive to alternative meanings for CO2 and the 
operation of CO2-emitting technologies whose use affected the price and availability of 
the electrical supply (Scott, 2001).  Due to potential misalignment, the SWG had to 
propose a policy that consumers, public interest, and legal organizations accepted 
(Caronna, 2004).  The SWG needed the support of consumers because nearly every 
person and organization in the region used electricity from the grid, which made 
electricity consumers an extremely large, powerful, and well-connected, if somewhat 
diffuse, political constituency (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).  When sufficiently united, 
electricity consumers, public interest, and legal organizations could mobilize a vocal and 
persistent opinion about the viability of policies that affected the electrical supply.   
 The SWG also needed the support of environmental organizations to enact RGGI. 
Environmental organizations were the stakeholders most concerned about changes in the 
concentration of atmospheric CO2, as well as those most motivated to control and then 
reduce CO2 emissions.  RGGI represented an effort to control and reduce CO2 emissions 
for the first time, so the alternative meanings and uses for CO2 and the operation of CO2-
emitting equipment the SWG was trying to highlight were well aligned with the cultural 
controls held by environmental organizations (Caronna, 2004; Fligstein, 1997; Lindblom, 
1977).  However, the SWG had to make sure the policy they proposed remained aligned 
with these cultural controls (Caronna, 2004).  To do so, the SWG had to demonstrate that 
RGGI would control and then reduce CO2 emissions from the electrical industry and 
stimulate future reductions.  Environmentalists' support for RGGI was important because 
they helped spearhead the development of CO2-controlling policies, and because many 
considered them to be experts on socially and environmentally ideal emission rates and 
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concentrations.  At the same time, environmental organizations represented a smaller, 
weaker, and more diffuse constituency than generators and consumers, which made 
widespread environmentalist support less important than selective environmentalist 
support (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).  This was also due to the fact that different 
environmental organizations supported different CO2 reductions, which made it difficult 
to appease all of them.  On the other hand, many environmental organizations just wanted 
any CO2 policy to be enacted, which allowed them to support various policy options. 
 Other categories of stakeholders, such as utilities and energy efficiency 
organizations, were only indirectly affected by RGGI, and this limited the misalignment 
they could perceive between their cultural controls and those embedded in the policy 
(Caronna, 2004; Lindblom, 1977).  As these categories of stakeholders were less likely to 
perceive misalignment they would be less likely to contest RGGI's enactment (Bourdieu 
& Wacquant, 1992; Caronna, 2004).  For instance, utilities did not produce electricity, 
and while RGGI would increase the cost of the electricity they purchased, PUCs allowed 
these costs to be passed onto consumers (Casazza & Delea, 2009).  Utilities could utilize 
the new meanings for CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies the SWG was 
trying to highlight without negatively impacting their profits (Fligstein, 1997).  This 
meant they were unlikely to perceive these new meanings as misaligned with their pre-
existing cultural controls (Caronna, 2004).  Energy efficiency was not initially a part of 
the RGGI policy, which limited the misalignment that energy efficiency organizations 
could perceive.  In fact, any misalignment they did perceive was due to energy 
efficiency's initial absence from the policy, but because RGGI was initially proposed as a 
CO2 policy, this misalignment would not have prompted energy efficiency organizations 
to contest its enactment (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Caronna, 2004).  However, if 
utilities and energy efficiency companies accepted the new meanings embedded in RGGI 
they could also help enact it by working to reduce the misalignment that generators and 
consumers could perceive (Caronna, 2004; Fligstein, 1997).  One way they could help 
align the new meanings the SWG was trying to highlight with the cultural controls held 
by generators and consumers was to show how existing electrical supplies could be more 
profitability used to meet demand though energy efficiency initiatives (Caronna, 2004; 
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Fligstein, 1997).  In this way, the support of utilities and energy efficiency organizations 
was useful but not essential. 
 As those most directly impacted by and desiring of a CO2 policy, generators, 
consumers, and environmental organizations had to support the SWG's policy proposal 
for it to be enacted, especially because it would be the first mandatory CO2 policy in the 
U.S (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).  Additionally, the support of less critical stakeholders, 
such as utilities and energy efficiency organizations, was useful.  They could help reduce 
the misalignment that generators and consumers could perceive, which would limit their 
desire to contest enactment (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Caronna, 2004; Fligstein, 
1997).  This reality motivated the SWG to invite different stakeholder groups to 
participate in the RGGI design process and to actually incorporate their opinions and 
perspectives about different designs into the enacted policy.  The importance and 
influence of stakeholder involvement in RGGI's eventual enactment was described by the 
allocation expert participant. 
 
Allocations Expert: “The RGGI process was amazing. I feel like the laws of gravity did not 
hold. I am surprised that they were able to come to an agreement, and 
implement it the way they did because there were so many cross 
currents going on, but the, and I think the reason that it happened, well 
a reason that it happened, was incredible, incredible persistence and 
diligence by the state staff.  Because they were having … two day 
meetings every four weeks for years … Where basically everybody had 
to sign off on every point before they could take a step forward …“ 
 
 The presentations, comments, and questions that occurred in the stakeholder 
meetings demonstrate how the SWG identified the pre-existing cultural controls held by 
different categories of stakeholders, and proposed different design features that aligned 
with them (Caronna, 2004; Fligstein, 1997; Lindblom, 1977; Scott, 2001) (Chart 2).  
Based on this process, the archival materials documenting the stakeholder design 
meetings can be used to describe how RGGI was enacted, even if the closed door 
discussions held by the SWG and the state agency heads about the actual enactment were 
not recorded.  In fact, nearly all of RGGI's enacted Model Rule maps onto the 
recommendations that emerged from the stakeholder meetings.   
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 Research on public participation in policy deliberations suggests that formal 
participation structures do not necessarily improve public satisfaction with policy 
outcomes (Lee, 2007).  When this perspective is extended to policy enactment, it could 
be argued that the stakeholder meetings did not affect the enactment of RGGI and were 
merely a way to acknowledge, but not address, public comments (Lee, 2007).  However, 
the nuances of the process suggest otherwise.  First, in addition to the stakeholder 
meetings, RGGI's design process also included a traditional period for public comments, 
which was held after the MOU and Model Rule had been initially developed.  Beyond 
their timing, the two had vastly different structures.  The stakeholder meetings included 
numerous expert and stakeholder presentations about various policy design options, 
extensive conversations about the modeled effects of different policy designs, and face-
to-face debates about stakeholder preferences for different design features.  Alternatively, 
the public comment period only included stakeholders' written opinions about the nearly 
final MOU and Model Rule.  Second, the archival materials documenting the stakeholder 
meetings trace the progression of RGGI from an unstructured political idea through 
various design options into a nearly final Model Rule.  Many of RGGI's final design 
features, such as an allowance auction and revenue recycling to energy efficiency, were 
not initially considered viable policy options.  Their eventual inclusion emerged from the 
stakeholder meetings.  Third, the SWG also created opportunities for stakeholders to 
directly influence the enactment of RGGI by soliciting their opinions about the following 
questions: “What Comprehensive RGGI Design Package Do You Recommend the States 
Adopt and Why?” (SWG: 5/19/05); “What suggestions do you have to ensure the 
successful implementation of RGGI?” (SWG: 9/21/05); “What are your top 3 to 5 
recommendations for the states in finalizing the model rule (other than the offsets 
component)?” (SWG: 5/2/06).  Lastly, the SWG repeatedly informed stakeholders that 
the final policy design would be determined by the results of the micro- and 
macroeconomic models.   
 The models were critical components of the design process.  They were designed 
and presented in the stakeholder meetings to show how different policy formulations 
aligned with the pre-existing cultural controls different categories of stakeholders held 
(Caronna, 2004; Fligstein, 1997).  The models were used to demonstrate to electrical 
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generators how different policy designs would impact the CO2 allowance price and the 
overall economic health of the region.  For consumers, utilities, public interest, legal, and 
energy efficiency organizations, the models depicted how different policy designs would 
impact the region's electricity prices, electrical reliability, and the economic health of the 
region.  Lastly, the models also showed environmental organizations how different CO2 
reductions would affect the region's electrical system and economy.  
 Reflecting the importance of the models and stakeholders' involvement in 
determining RGGI's ultimate design, the SWG invited all categories of stakeholders to 
participate in the modeling processes and to help set their underlying assumptions.  This 
was critical because models and their subsequent results could be interpreted as 
illegitimate and invalid if individuals and organizations did not accept the assumptions 
they were based on or think they accurately reflected the reality they inhabited.  In order 
to ensure that different categories of stakeholders accepted the models and their results as 
valid, the SWG encouraged extensive deliberation about their use and assumptions 
throughout the stakeholder meetings.  While not the exact same visualization tool, the use 
of economic modeling resembles the Structured Public Involvement approach for 
increasing stakeholder satisfaction with public decision-making processes (Bailey, 
Blandford, Grossardt, & Ripy, 2011).  Both employ strategies that allow individuals and 
organizations to visualize the context and effects of different policy designs, or their 
alignment with pre-existing cultural controls (Bailey et al., 2011; Caronna, 2004).  One 
effect of this approach was evident from a newspaper article that preceded the first RGGI 
auction.  It described how RGGI's weak cap and predicted low allowance price aligned 
generators' pre-existing cultural controls about the use of CO2-emitting equipment with 
the cultural controls underlying the policy, which then convinced generators to support its 
enactment (Caronna, 2004; Lindblom, 1977).  
 
 “Reggie's [sic] organizers, including New York and New Jersey, will offer more permits 
than generators are likely to need during the program's first seven years.  While that will 
initially reduce pressure to cut emissions, utilities have said that the strategy 
encouraged them to support the so-called cap-and-trade market by ensuring permit 





When utilizing RGGI's stakeholder meetings as a proxy for its eventual enactment, 
applying the theoretical frameworks to the stakeholder meeting data explains how the 
policy was enacted.  At the most basic level, RGGI represented an attempt to highlight 
different ways for individuals and organizations to interpret and utilize the physical 
materials and behavioral actions underlying the emission of CO2 (DiMaggio, 1988; 
Fligstein, 1997; Scott, 2001).  This chapter tests the hypothesis that policymakers were 
able to enact RGGI because they positioned the new meanings they were trying to 
highlight in alignment with the pre-existing cultural controls held by the most critical 
categories of stakeholders (Caronna, 2004; Fligstein, 1997; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).  
More specifically, this chapter evaluates whether the SWG was able to enact RGGI by 
identifying how different categories of stakeholders interpreted and used these materials 
and actions, designing the policy to align with them, and then demonstrating this 
alignment through models (Bailey et al., 2011; Caronna, 2004; Fligstein, 1997; Scott, 
2001).  
 This chapter also tests whether the SWG utilized innovative cap and trade design 
features to help enact RGGI.  Electrical generators and consumers were two categories of 
stakeholders whose support was essential to enactment.  Electrical generators have been 
defined as economically rational organizations who wanted to maximize their profits 
from producing and selling electricity (Blanchard, 2008).  This meant they interpreted 
and used the physical materials and behavioral actions underlying the emission of CO2 
through their effects on their costs and revenues (Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  
Consumers, likewise defined as economically rational, wanted to maximize the benefits 
they could get from using electricity while minimizing the costs to do so (Blanchard, 
2008).  Consumers interpreted the physical materials and behavioral actions underlying 
the emission of CO2 through their effects on the price and availability of the electricity 
they used to get the services they desired (Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  Based on the 
degree to which economic concerns resonated with generators and consumers, policy 
designs that addressed these concerns would align with their pre-existing cultural controls 
(Blanchard, 2008; Caronna, 2004).  This chapter evaluates whether designs that reduced 
the cost and effort of complying with the policy and its subsequent effects on the price of 
electricity reduced the misalignment that generators, consumers, public interest, and legal 
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organizations could perceive, and thus enabled them to support the policy (Caronna, 
2004).  These design features included an intentionally weak cap, pre-existing 
compliance standards and equipment, and safety triggers that would lower the 
compliance costs if the allowance auction price exceeded certain thresholds.  This chapter 
also evaluates whether the resources produced by combining a revenue recycler with a 
reserve price reduced the misalignment that generators, consumers, public interest, and 




 This chapter's data and analysis were drawn from the documents constituting the 
RGGI program design archive and from national newspaper and magazine articles that 
accompanied its initial enactment.  The archival documents were analyzed to identify the 
types of stakeholders participating, their opinions on CO2 policies in general, their 
positions on different design features, and the arguments they used to support or contest 
RGGI or specific design features.  The information was drawn from over 400 separate 
documents that comprised over 1000 pages of data.  For this chapter, the newspaper 
sources were drawn from the 'News and Updates' section of the RGGI website and 
represent a national perspective about the policy's initial enactment.  Like the policy 
design documents, the newspaper sources were analyzed to identify the type of 
organizations that commented on RGGI and the arguments used to support or to contest 
the policy.   
  Information about the design of RGGI is presented in chronological order by 
stakeholder meeting.  This ordering depicts the progression of strategies the SWG used to 
propose various policy designs, the arguments stakeholders used to support or contest 
various designs, and the subsequent inclusion or exclusion of design features.  Textual 
passages from RGGI's program design archive are the primary data sources used in this 
section.  They are prefaced by the date of the meeting in which the comment was made, 
and when available, the organizational affiliation of the speaker.  In initial meetings, the 
organizational identity of the speaker was not always included in the accompanying 
documents, but those associated with later meetings included this information more 
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frequently.  Except for the SWG, textual passages are attributed to general organizational 
types, such as generator or public interest organization, instead of specific organizational 
names to maintain the anonymity of these individuals and organizations.  The data at the 
heart of this chapter are available to the public and the research was not required to 
maintain the anonymity of these organizations; however, the data sources that form the 
basis of the next chapter were accessed and collected on the presumption of anonymity.  
As general organizational identifiers are more than sufficient for this chapter, they are 
used to keep the data and analysis chapters consistent.  
  
RGGI Enactment Data 
 
April, 2, 2004  
 RGGI was initially proposed by the governors of Mid-Atlantic and New England 
states in 2003, and on April 2, 2004, the SWG held the first stakeholder group meeting.  
To begin the meeting, the SWG asked stakeholders to respond to the following question: 
“If RGGI is successfully designed and implemented, what do you think would be a key 
indicator of success?” (SWG: 4/2/04).  All twenty-four responses included at least one 
specific goal, but some contained multiple goals.  The different goals that were identified 
reflected the desires of the various stakeholder groups participating in the process, and 
how they thought a CO2-controlling policy could affect them.    
 The most common goals touched on reducing emissions (11), minimizing 
economic costs and impacts (8), and inspiring future policies (6) (4/2/04).  Other, less 
commonly listed goals were based on maintaining system reliability (3) and stimulating 
the development and deployment of clean and renewable energy technologies (2) (4/2/04).  
The environmental goals rested upon making real reductions in CO2 emissions, while the 
diffusion goals were based on linking up with existing policies and stimulating the 
development of additional policies.  The economic goals were broader and included 
minimizing compliance costs, allowance prices, and the policy's effect on electricity 
prices in order to avoid the relocation of industry and the elimination of jobs. 
 




Stakeholder (4/2/04): “Simple, economically feasible.” 
 
Stakeholder (4/2/04): “This system links up with other carbon cap and trade systems in the 
world...” 
 
Stakeholder (4/2/04):  “Maintain reliability of transmission.” 
 
Stakeholder (4/2/04): “Achieve reductions in most cost effective manner, apply nationally.” 
 
Stakeholder (4/2/04):  “Environmental benefits, system reliability, not disadvantaging RGGI 
states, preserve jobs.” 
 
Stakeholder (4/2/04): “Real cap with real reductions from current emitters, trading scheme 
that provides net environmental benefits. Equitable allocation of costs.” 
 
Stakeholder (4/2/04): “Hitting carbon targets. Including energy efficiency as part of the goals, 
so net economic benefits are positive.” 
 
 During this meeting, the SWG also introduced the modeling systems that would 
guide RGGI's design. The two models included a microeconomic model (IPM) that 
depicted how different policy designs would affect the price of allowances and electricity, 
and a macroeconomic model (REMI) that indicated how different designs would impact 
the economic health of the region.  The SWG then positioned the models as critical 
determinants of the policy's ultimate design.  “The cap will be in relation to a 1990 base 
year emissions level, and ... modeling will be used to evaluate various cap options” 
(SWG: 4/2/04).  In introducing these models, the SWG faced a number of questions from 
stakeholders.  Reflecting the connection between the models and the final policy design 
and their concerns about the policy's effects, stakeholders asked about the models' outputs 
and the assumptions they would be based on.  Once informed about the modeling systems 
and their involvement in policy formulation, “Stakeholders also expressed … interest in 
providing input throughout the modeling processes” (SWG: 4/2/04).  Specifically, 
stakeholders wanted to improve the models' portrayal of the region's electrical system and 
economy.  The SWG then concluded the meeting and “encouraged members of the 
Stakeholder Group to contact the SWG sub-group chairs to provide input at this 
junction … the SWG heard many Stakeholders request additional involvement, especially 




Stakeholder (4/2/04): “Will the modeling be able to project plant closures and associated 
impacts on local communities and to include job losses?” 
 
Stakeholder (4/2/04): “What modeling should be done to determine the impact of the 
program on energy reliability, fuel diversity and security?” 
 
Stakeholder (4/2/04): “How will energy efficiency be accounted for?” 
 
 
May 20, 2004  
 The second stakeholder meeting occurred on May 20, 2004, and focused on the 
emission cap, potential flexibility mechanisms, and the assumptions of the 
microeconomic model.  To preface the discussion of cap size, the SWG brought in an 
expert on cap and trade policies.  The SWG then asked stakeholders: “What factors 
should RGGI Staff Working Group consider in selecting caps to model (and ultimately to 
recommend?)” (SWG: 5/20/04).  The critical factors stakeholders identified mirrored 
their initial goals for RGGI and demonstrated which policy effects each of them would be 
willing to accept.  Stakeholders wanted a cap size that would minimize the economic 
impacts of the policy, facilitate the enactment of and linkup with other CO2 policies, and 
maintain the reliability of the existing electrical system.  Dovetailing with the discussion 
on cap size, the SWG then asked stakeholders: “What are the most important flexibility 
mechanisms for RGGI to include?” (SWG: 5/20/04).  Almost all stakeholders indicated a 
desire for flexibility mechanisms and that they should be immediately available.  
Suggested examples included: credit banking; credit borrowing; offsets; caps on 
allowance prices; and allowing indirect emission reductions from energy efficiency.   
 
Stakeholder (5/20/04):  “Why do you assume that the initial cost of allowances would 
be low?” 
Cap & Trade Expert (5/20/04):  “Low prices are a result of the political reality of where the cap 
is likely to be set. Under the proposed McCain/Lieberman bill 
and the European trading program, costs are expected to be 
low. If allowances have a high price … it will be difficult for 
others to follow that example.” 
 
Stakeholder (5/20/04) “Caps shouldn't jeopardize the fuel diversity, reliability and affordability 




Stakeholder (5/20/04):  “What cap will not result in competitive disadvantage for generators in 
RGGI states?” 
 
Stakeholder (5/20/04):  “If the cap is too aggressive, it will be harder for other regions to join 
later.” 
 
 At this point, energy efficiency was not included under the proposed auspices of 
the policy.  Despite this, energy efficiency-inclined stakeholders championed its benefits 
and inclusion in the policy.  Support for energy efficiency also extended into subsequent 
conversations about the assumptions of the microeconomic model.  Efficiency-inclined 
stakeholders then volunteered to join the SWG subgroup involved with modeling in order 
to accurately build energy efficiency features into the model.  
 
Stakeholder (5/20/04): “Where do indirect emission reductions fit into the equation?” 
Cap & Trade Expert (5/20/04): “They (indirect emission reductions) don't generally fit in. If the 
objective is reducing electricity use, this isn't the right tool. This 
tool is about making reductions in carbon.”   
 
Stakeholder (5/20/04): “Indirect emissions should be included. Energy efficiency [EE] programs 
do have substantial impacts on state electricity loads …” 
 
Stakeholder (5/20/04): “How do you incorporate all of the data on energy efficiency programs 
and potential [into the model]?”  
SWG (5/20/04): “Counting on you [individual and efficiency organization] to help.” 
 
Stakeholder (5/20/04): “[We] would like to see at least one [model] scenario where system 
builds efficiency resources along with increased generation resources.” 
SWG (5/20/04):  “We would like to do that too.” 
 
 
June 24, 2004  
 During the June 24, 2004, meeting acknowledged experts in the allocation of 
allowances for environmental markets gave a presentation about allocation options.  The 
presentation was then followed by stakeholder questions and statements about the 
distributions they preferred.  The following statements reflected the economic concerns 
different categories of stakeholders held, their perceptions of the economic impacts of 
different allocation strategies, and how they affected their ability to support enactment.  
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The last statement also illuminated the outcomes that different stakeholder groups 
expected the policy to produce, and how they wanted to use allowances to achieve them.  
  
Stakeholder (6/24/04): “There is concern over economics, especially for the business 
community, as ratepayers have seen electricity prices increase over 
recent years ...”  
 
Stakeholder (6/24/04): “The effect of an auction is increasing energy prices significantly.”  
 
Stakeholder (6/24/04): “We need to figure out how to provide generators with allowances to 
stay whole without providing windfalls to generators.”  
 
 Acknowledging the primacy of cost considerations and the difficulty of balancing 
this desire with the environmental goals of the policy, stakeholders highlighted energy 
efficiency's ability to bring about the desired emissions reductions while minimizing the 
economic costs of the policy.  At the same time, stakeholders also recognized the inherent 
difficulties of inducing energy efficiency and building it into the policy.  Efficiency-
inclined stakeholders realized the results of the models would determine RGGI's final 
design.  Different categories of stakeholders would be able envision the multiple 
economic benefits that energy efficiency could provide and be motivated to include it in 
RGGI if the models accurately depicted these effects.  During a discussion about the 
assumptions of the models, stakeholders reiterated their support for building energy 
efficiency features into the models; however, correctly doing so remained difficult.  
 
Stakeholder (6/24/04):“It's important to get into an allocation scheme and include resources for 
energy efficiency. The price impact is a major barrier to getting to RGGI 
goals.  Energy efficiency is a major mitigation strategy of reducing price 
impacts and leakage.”  
 
Allowance Expert (6/24/04): “There is not much cost in demand reduction, as it enhances the 
program, but it's difficult to achieve in the real world because it 
is hard to design the institution to reward energy 
conservation … When we have allocated to conservation within 
the model it contributes importantly to helping achieve [the] 
overall goal of emission reductions. But how to build this 
institution in the real world is a challenge.”  
 
Stakeholder (6/24/04):“There's a link between the size of the cap, and the modeling process. 
Modeling will influence [the] size of the cap. If we limit modeling to 
neoclassical economic modeling, I fear that it will show huge price 
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increases are needed to get desired emission reduction[s].  So necessary 
cap targets may look politically and economically impossible, imposing 
unfair costs to generators and the regional economy.  [We] need to 
consider energy efficiency potential … we're missing a way to ensure 
the energy efficiency resource is fully captured in modeling, size of cap, 
and allocation.”  
 
Stakeholder (6/24/04):“Do you measure energy efficiency reductions as an input as opposed to 
a result?”  
SWG (6/24/04):  “There is an option to model it both ways, depending on what we 
decide. We expect to explore that.”  
 
Stakeholder (6/24/04): “Figure out a way to build energy efficiency in as a resource. We know 
we can meet growing demand with energy efficiency and renewables.  
Compare that cost to outcomes of what a cap gets us under various 
scenarios, to capture energy efficiency potential.” 
 
SWG (6/24/04):  “REMI won't model how much energy efficiency will be adopted. Energy 
efficiency adopted is an input into the REMI model. REMI is not built as 
[an] energy oriented model, so it has limitations.” 
 
 
September 13, 2004 
 At the September 13, 2004, meeting the SWG and stakeholders continued talking 
about the assumptions of the economic models, but also conversed about compliance and 
enforcement features.  The meeting also addressed the inclusion of offsets, or CO2 
reductions that occurred outside the policy's industrial or geographic scope, but counted 
as an allowance.  Overall, significant attention continued to be devoted to the economic 
models, as the “modeling results are a key ingredient to cap determination.  Modeling 
more than anything will help the SWG understand reductions that will play out” (SWG: 
9/13/04).  Befitting the importance of the economic models, stakeholders' involvement 
with them also increased.  One member of the SWG stated that “the modeling process is 
progressing with Stakeholder input” (SWG: 9/13/04).   
 
SWG (9/13/04): “We depend on Stakeholders and Resource Panelist feedback to … 
make sure we accurately represent everything in the model.”  
 
 One major stakeholder concern voiced throughout the modeling discussion was 
the cost of the policy, and which stakeholder groups ultimately would incur it.  
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Apprehension about the policy's costs colored much of this meeting, and policy designs 
were evaluated according to the benefits they provided and costs they imposed upon 
different categories of stakeholders.  Initially, it was difficult to balance the economic 
impacts that would be imposed upon generators and consumers.  Generators wanted to 
minimize the new costs they would have to pay to operate their CO2-emitting equipment.  
Consumers, public interest, and legal organizations wanted to prevent electricity prices 
from increasing, especially if generators would recoup the extra revenues as windfall 
gains from the policy.   
 
Stakeholder (9/13/04):  “Where in this analysis do you look at allocation of costs and benefits – 
who's paying and who's [sic] benefits? Where are the consumer 
burdens and economic benefits? Is there a stage where follow-up 
modeling will be available to measure those impacts?”  
 
Stakeholder (9/13/04):  “[We] want to evaluate who is getting windfalls and who is paying as 
we go along, as it may inform how we structure the rule.”  
 
Offsets expert (9/13/04): “I said offsets had the potential to allow for greater reductions at a 
lower overall program cost ...” 
 
 Despite these economic concerns, the underlying environmental focus of the 
policy made it difficult to present design features only according to their economic 
effects, especially when RGGI was viewed as model for future policies.  Some 
environmentally-inclined stakeholders attempted to frame design features solely through 
their environmental effects.  However, the economic implications of these design features, 
such as compliance and enforcement costs, could not easily be ignored.  Even the SWG 
could not entirely isolate the environmental effects of potential designs from their 
economic considerations. 
 
Stakeholder (9/13/04):  “We've seen dynamic changes in offsets around world recently. We 
would like to ensure criteria and environmental integrity are set right, to 
ensure source reductions. This is a precedent for the country, not only 
for RGGI.”  
 
SWG (9/13/04): “We want to create offsets of high environmental quality but without 




Stakeholder (9/13/04):  “The need for an enforceable program may lead toward having contours 
around an offsets program, as there are limits to administrative 
resources to verify and enforce offsets.” 
 
 The balancing act between environmental, economic, and practicality concerns 
was also evident in stakeholders' discussions about compliance and enforcement.  With 
regard to monitoring CO2 emissions, the Clean Air Act of 1990 had required electrical 
generators to report their emissions but had not defined a specific methodology (U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 2008).  This forced the SWG to develop a compliance 
protocol that regulated entities could use to monitor their emissions.  Many of the 
proposed approaches hinged on applying the methodologies and technologies associated 
with NOx and SO2 emissions to CO2.  As systems for monitoring NOx and SO2 emissions 
were already in place, using the same practices and equipment for CO2 would reduce 
both the compliance cost and effort for generators.  However, some generators were even 
concerned about the economic costs of using traditional monitoring and compliance 
strategies.  
 
Stakeholder (9/13/04):  “Are there ways RGGI could piggyback on existing monitoring systems 
from NOx or SOx?”  
 
Stakeholder (9/13/04):  “Why is CO2 reported with CEMs [continuous emission monitoring 
devices]?” 
SWG (9/13/04):  “Many companies have chosen to use CEMs because they need either a 
CO2 or an O2 monitor to calculate NOx emissions rates to meet their Title 
IV NOx requirements.”  
 
Stakeholder (9/13/04):  “I'd suggest changing part 75 CEM to monitoring systems. Methodology 
is good enough for NOx should be good enough for CO2.” 
 
Generator (9/13/04): “CEM data used in NOx and SOx is a great way to go as long as 
installations have CEMs.” 
 
Generator (9/13/04): “Cost of CEMs is significant for small units … [Our organization] has 22 
units in RGGI and no CEMs systems installed. Part of me would like 






November 12, 2004  
 During the November 12, 2004, meeting the first runs of the microeconomic 
model were presented, and the macroeconomic model was described and its assumptions 
discussed.  Afterwards, a stakeholder panel was convened to discuss the policy's cap size.  
In presenting the microeconomic model, one of the modeling consultants stated that, 
“The model is a cost minimization model, and set to optimize the system at least cost” 
(Modeler: 11/12/04).  Following this central focus, stakeholders questioned how different 
cost and benefit assumptions were incorporated into the model.  Cost considerations 
continued to be presented along with the policy's proposed environmental goals, but their 
respective prioritization reflected stakeholders' persistent focus on the policy's economic 
effects.  This focus also highlighted how stakeholders' perceptions of the policy's costs 
would determine whether they could support its enactment. 
  
Stakeholder (11/12/04): “You have internalized some transmission costs in renewable projects, 
but not others. I think you should consider this more carefully.”  
 
Stakeholder (11/12/04): “We need a 20% reduction from today's levels (similar to 1990) … 
There's a lot of uncertainty how we're going to achieve these results. 
Having a circuit breaker at a certain cost threshold makes sense to us, as 
we understand we can't break the bank trying to implement this.” 
 
Stakeholder (11/12/04): “Flexibility measures may make or break the program … Compliance 
flexibility or circuit breaker process is important.” 
 
 As in earlier modeling discussions, the economic tilt of the discourse instigated a 
parallel conversation about energy efficiency's inclusion in both the models and the 
policy.  Energy efficiency supporters continued to expound on the multiple benefits it 
could provide, including its abilities to stimulate economic growth and to reduce the costs 
of RGGI.  However, capturing these benefits by actually expanding the use of energy 
efficiency remained difficult.  
 
Stakeholder (11/12/04): “The model does not look at energy efficiency as a resource that the 
model may call upon. Perhaps this should be considered.” 
 




Stakeholder (11/12/04): “For energy efficiency, consider how we can incentivize economically 
advantageous programs that make businesses more competitive, and 
reduce the costs of implementing RGGI.”   
 
Stakeholder (11/12/04): “Everyone recognizes [the] value of energy efficiency, but no one has 
come up with [the] perfect way to incorporate energy efficiency into the 
system.” 
 
 The development of the macroeconomic model mirrored that of the 
microeconomic one.  The modeling consultants, “will continue to involve Stakeholders in 
the process” (SWG: 11/12/04).  A number of stakeholders then asked questions about the 
assumptions the model would be based on.  Like previous conversations, stakeholders 
questioned the model's economic assumptions and inclusion of energy efficiency 
resources.  
 
Stakeholder (11/12/04): “Are we making unrealistic assumptions on the amount of gas capacity 
we can add to the system?” 
 
Stakeholder (11/12/04): “I suggest we revisit ... financing costs of new generation across the 
country.”  
 
Stakeholder (11/12/04): “I'm concerned that energy efficiency doesn't seem to be incorporated 
into the analysis.”   
 
 Lastly, the SWG offered three generating stakeholders, one environmental 
stakeholder, and one large electricity consumer the opportunity to present their thoughts 
on three questions:  “What are the major factors/principles that should be taken into 
consideration when setting the cap levels?; Where does this lead you in terms of 
recommending where the actual cap should be set?; How should the cap change over time, 
and what other cap-related mechanics do you think are important?” (SWG: 11/12/04).  
The comments that were made reflected the most important concerns of each stakeholder 
category, and revealed what perceived effects might prompt them to accept or contest the 
policy.  With regard to setting the cap level, the generators and consumer indicated the 
policy should motivate broader CO2 policies, minimize the economic impacts associated 
with enactment and compliance, and maintain the reliable functioning of the current 
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electrical system. This contrasted with the purely environmental position held by the 
environmental stakeholder.  
 
Generator (11/12/04):  “Did RGGI pave the way towards a national program that includes 
multiple sectors and multiple GH [greenhouse] gases?”  
 
Generator (11/12/04):  “Develop a program that protects the electrical system reliability, fuel 
diversity and energy affordability needs of each control area (NYISO, 
NEISO and PJMISO) involved.”  
  
Generator (11/12/04):  “Ensure the program design does not jeopardize the short and long 
term competitive position of the Northeastern United States.”  
 
Consumer (11/12/04):  “Minimize the administrative burden and support a speedy 
implementation.”  
 
Generator (11/12/04):  “Would the RGGI ratepayer agree that the effort was worth the price?” 
 
Environmental (11/12/04):  “Recent climate models and impact assessments show a 
stabilization target of appx. 450 ppm would help avoid the 
worst impacts [of climate change].” 
 
 Generators' responses to the latter two questions were aligned with their initial 
answers and suggested more conservative caps with more gradual enactment periods.  
The consumer also suggested the “cap should be gradually phased in to provide adequate 
time for transition...”, but wanted to see the modeling results before committing to a 
specific figure (Consumer: 11/12/04). The environmental stakeholder pushed for a more 
immediate and aggressive policy schedule. 
  
Generator (11/12/04):  “Phase II [of RGGI]: HIGHLY AGGRESSIVE – PROBABLY NOT ACHIEVABLE 
[.] DEFINITELY NOT SUSTAINABLE.”  
 
Generator (11/12/04):  “Initial phase recommendation. 2010: Stabilize emissions at current 
levels (equates to a regional ~7% reduction since 1990), with emissions 
grown in some manner to reflect load growth over the next 5 years.”  
 
Consumer (11/12/04):  “Evaluate modeling and conservation impact/potential before 
determining if additional efforts are required.” 
  
Environmental (11/12/04):  “Recent modeling shows 'wait-and-see' approach is not a viable 
near-term policy … Committing to meaningful early reductions 
(e.g., 'smooth' or 'aggressive' pathway) is our best insurance 
policy against uncertainty.” 
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February 16, 2005 
 Much of the February 16, 2005, meeting focused on the updated microeconomic 
model runs.  The microeconomic model was updated to show how different cap sizes 
would affect the region's emissions, electricity prices, and allowance prices.  These model 
outputs reflected the policy outcomes that different categories of stakeholders were most 
concerned about. The modelers then described how different cap sizes would affect the 
region's emissions and electricity prices. 
 
SWG (2/16/05): “Now that there are cap scenario results, the Stakeholder Group can 
have real discussions about this … It is important for Stakeholders to 
understand that we haven't made any decisions yet based on the 
modeling results.” 
 
Modeler (2/16/05): “[Modeling Consulting Organization] modeled 5%, 10%, 15% and 25% 
below 1990 by 2020. The caps implemented in the model assume a 
linear decrease from 2008 to 2020 and then maintain that level thru [sic] 
2024.  The 2008 starting point was based on an average of 2000 to 2002 
RGGI unit emissions.”  
 
Modeler (2/16/05): “5% below 1990 Case is not binding due to banking of early allowances 
that represents the gap between the reference case projection in the 
early years and the starting cap level.”  
 
Modeler (2/16/05): “There is only a $2.48 rise in 2024 in wholesale electricity prices in the 
25% reduction Case.”   
 
 After the model was presented one stakeholder expressed concern that the 1990 
emission figure was too high and using it as the baseline would limit overall reductions.  
The subsequent conversation highlighted the divide between environmental organizations 
and other categories of stakeholders, and the different outcomes they expected RGGI to 
produce.  The conversation also illustrated that the potential weakness of the policy was 
identified relatively early in the design phase, and that the SWG was fully aware and 
accepting of it.  This prompted environmental stakeholders to request more significant 
emission reductions be modeled.  
 
Stakeholder (2/16/05): “Should look at actual emissions … we're not seeing emissions 
reductions …Using 1990 as a reference point, which was highly inflated 
due to a unique set of circumstances in NY in 1990, makes no sense. We 




SWG (2/16/05): “The SWG recognized when we chose the starting point that it is higher 
than what emissions are currently.”  
 
Stakeholder (2/16/05):  “Based on results we'd like to see more aggressive CO2 policies 
modeled.”  
 
Environmental (2/16/05):“All environmentalists would likely support a more aggressive carbon 
policy than those modeled.”  
 
 In response to stakeholders' earlier requests to build energy efficiency into the 
model, the next set of runs included a 15% emission reductions scenario with a 30% 
reduction in load growth.  When the model included a reduction in load growth the 
amount of electricity-derived CO2 emissions fell below the proposed cap and created an 
oversupply of allowances.  The discussion of energy efficiency's role within RGGI 
continued into the next experts' presentation on environmental markets.  However, doing 
so reignited the question about whether energy efficiency should be hardwired into the 
policy.  While admitting to overlapping political responsibilities, the same market experts 
also acknowledged the multiple benefits that energy efficiency could provide, as well as 
the barriers that could prevent them from being achieved.  The conversation then revealed 
potential strategies and approaches for building energy efficiency into the policy. 
 
Modeler (2/16/05): “Turns out that when you reduce demand by this amount you end up 
with zero allowance prices and the cap is non-binding … this was meant 
as a rough proxy for increased end-use efficiency.” 
 
Stakeholder (2/16/05):  “Many of us think that energy efficiency should be integral to RGGI and 
funded. Is it core or ancillary?”  
 
Market Expert (2/16/05): “When I think of RGGI, I think of a regulatory program. That could just 
be me, but if it does not go beyond air regulators, that would be core.”  
 
Stakeholder (2/16/05):  “You identified fuel diversity and fuel neutrality as one of the most 
important points … So if resource diversity is a core issue, how can 
energy efficiency not be core?”   
 
Market Expert (2/16/05): “RGGI success depends upon ability to develop non-traditional 
resources (renewables, efficiency, and other distributed resources) ...”  
 





Market Expert (2/16/05):“need for additional RGGI design issues to overcome these barriers 
(e.g., allocations of credit to those resources) …”  
 
Market Expert (2/16/05):“I can conceive of allowance mechanisms going to energy efficiency.”  
 
Market Expert (2/16/05): “need for other policy remedies (e.g., ISO transmission policy, ISO 
stand-by rates for alternative resources, system benefit charge 
enhancements) to address barriers.” 
 
Stakeholder (2/16/05):  “There is a tremendous overlap between ISO and environmentalists, 
and their goals should be aligned.”  
 
 
April 6, 2005  
 The April 6, 2005, meeting included additional microeconomic model runs, 
stakeholders' opinions about the connection between the models and the policy, and an 
expert on allocation distributions.  Reflecting the desires that were voiced by 
environmentally-inclined stakeholders, the modelers presented a scenario with a 35% 
emissions reduction.  In response to the large economic impacts of this cap size, 
stakeholders requested more detailed cost information and more rigorous energy 
efficiency scenarios.  Stakeholders' desire to include a more sophisticated treatment of 
energy efficiency in the models demonstrated that they and the SWG were increasing 
appreciative of its ability to reduce the economic impacts of the policy.  To accommodate 
these and earlier requests, the modeling consultants drew on the expertise of an efficiency 
stakeholder, as the model was not built to include a sophisticated treatment of energy 
efficiency. 
 
Modeler (4/6/05): “Under the 35% reduction case with a national program, the projected 
RGGI region electricity price is about 30% higher than [the] reference 
case in 2024 ...”  
 
Stakeholder (4/6/05):  “Do you consider DSM programmatic costs in modeling?” 
Modeler (4/6/05):  “No.”  
 
Stakeholder (4/6/05):  “We should model a Reference Case with 0% load growth.”  
 




Modeler (4/6/05):  “Yes, we would expect to run high efficiency as a policy, perhaps a 
complementary policy.”  
 
Modeler (4/6/05): “On energy efficiency, we're looking at how to treat energy efficiency as 
a supply source. [Energy efficiency stakeholder] has worked up a block 
of prices and quantities so that energy efficiency can be treated in a way 
that costs and benefits are captured by the model. But this requires a 
lot of work, so it is taking a lot of time. At this point, we've just reduced 
demand by a simple fixed percentage.” 
 
 The SWG then posed two questions to stakeholders: “Given what you know from 
modeling to date, what would be a reasonable approach to the cap, and why?; What 
additional modeling and analysis do you believe are needed to inform a final decision on 
the cap, and why?” (SWG: 4/6/05).  The responses indicated that all categories of 
stakeholders accepted the use of the models, and that they wanted more design features 
built in and more scenarios modeled.  Stakeholders also commented about the cost of the 
policy and wanted to see how different flexibility mechanisms could affect the economic 
outputs of the models.  
 
Stakeholder (4/6/05): “We all have a list of things that we haven't discussed enough. If you are 
in need of a lot more runs can you ask [the] commissioners for more 
money to do more runs? We think a lot more runs need to be done.”  
 
Stakeholder (4/6/05): “Have you considered looking at a circuit breaker that would delay or 
reduce the cap if it is not working (e.g., allowance prices increase to 
unacceptable levels)?”  
 
 Energy efficiency-inclined stakeholders also reiterated their thoughts on its role in 
the policy and its potential environmental and economic effects.  In doing so, they 
highlighted the various benefits that energy efficiency could provide to different 
categories of stakeholders.  In particular, they emphasized energy efficiency's ability to 
reduce the economic effects that RGGI would impose on different categories of 
stakeholders, which could then enable them to support its enactment.  These and earlier 
comments reflected a growing desire to merge CO2 and energy efficiency policies.  This 
position was further supported when, “[a SWG member] replied that our governors have 
been saying that [too]” (SWG: 4/6/05).  An efficiency stakeholder then identified another 
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stakeholder group that could also support merging energy efficiency with RGGI and 
presented a strategy for convincing them. 
 
Stakeholder (4/6/05): “In selling this to the public, it's important to look at assumptions we're 
making about infrastructure development so people understand where 
rate impacts are coming from. I think that DG [distributed generation], 
DSM and energy efficiency will help address load growth over time, and 
that needs to be part of the calculus of doing this. Need to look at [a] 
scenario of zero load growth and impacts on emissions, capacity costs. 
Otherwise it will be hard for us to support.”  
 
Stakeholder (4/6/05):  “If it can be shown that RGGI becomes cheaper if there's a mechanism 
to build in efficiency, we need to build in those mechanisms as discrete 
policy choices.”  
 
Stakeholder (4/6/05): “I agree we need a cap. But, how much of a cap can we afford? Some of 
the prices look scary. I see energy efficiency as the key for dealing with 
this puzzle so we see mitigation of price impacts.” 
 
Stakeholder (4/6/05): “The most obvious outcome of this process is some confirmation that 
the best possible outcome is a national carbon policy and energy 
efficiency.  Maybe this should be the message coming from the 
northeast.” 
 
Efficiency (4/6/05): “Utility commissioners may find it helpful to see some of the energy 
efficiency implementation figures.  For example, if a state is increasing 
SBC [special benefits charge.  A charge placed on electrical customers' 
bills and how energy efficiency was traditionally funded] funds, it would 
be helpful to have some analytical back-up early on. If they can see 
there is an easier path to reach carbon reductions with lower rate 
increases by using an efficiency component than [sic] that would be a 
big help. [Energy efficiency stakeholder] is willing to do whatever they 
can to help provide the data.”  
 
 Interest in building energy efficiency into the policy continued to grow.  A 
number of efficiency inclined-stakeholders were adamant that the best way to attract 
further support for doing so was to build energy efficiency features into the models so the 
results could be used as evidence of its benefits. Another stakeholder also brought up 
how formally building energy efficiency into the policy could enable institutional 
changes in how efficiency programs and technologies were funded and deployed.  The 




Efficiency (4/6/05): “The data [energy efficiency stakeholder] has looked at in existing 
programs is energy efficiency reduces load growth by 0.5-1% annually, 
and average load growth is about 1% annually. But what we need is an 
IPM run to show more quantitative data to say that's true.”   
 
Stakeholder (4/6/05): “If we think a regional [CO2] program should include an efficiency 
component, we should present the two as intertwined, especially if it 
decreases the cost. One piece of analysis we haven't seen is if you get a 
different reduction in demand with efficiency market transformation 
programs.” 
 
Stakeholder (4/6/05): “I would like to see a scenario with zero load growth, choosing 
efficiency resources.  How you pay for it is the question, maybe with 
allowances and other sources.”  
 
 The stakeholder meeting then shifted as an allocations expert presented different 
allocation strategies.  The expert presented three approaches: a historical, free allocation; 
an updated, free allocation; and an auction.  These were evaluated according to their 
economic and distributional efficiencies.  With regard to auctions, the expert did not 
specify where the revenues should be directed, but stakeholders were already thinking 
about how they could be used to address the economic concerns of different categories of 
stakeholders.  
 
Stakeholder (4/6/05): “What percent of auction revenues would it take to completely 
compensate generators, and what's left for consumers?”  
 
 After the presentation stakeholder groups were given the opportunity to present 
their thoughts on the following question: “What should States take away from this study, 
and generally how should they approach allowance allocation?” (SWG: 4/6/05).  The 
following discussion addressed the economic and distributional efficiencies of each 
approach.  It also reflected the goals of different stakeholder groups and which potential 
policy effects they would be willing accept.  However, many stakeholder groups were 
hung up on whether they were selecting on the basis of a regional policy or a national 
policy.  Much of this conflict centered on the political and economic palatability of using 




Generator (4/6/05): “Allocation is the most important issue that will determine whether 
RGGI will expand to a national policy … Auctioning approach could be 
perilous, and that a historical allocation approach, potentially with long-
term updating is best.”  
 
Stakeholder (4/6/05): “There is little on the table at national level for now, and we have a real 
opportunity to develop national policy and make program more 
saleable [sic].”  
 
Stakeholder (4/6/05): “Will RGGI be a model for federal policy? We'll be waiting a long time 
for federal policy. Agencies should focus on regional policy.” 
 
Allocation expert (4/6/05):“If RGGI is to serve as a model for a national program, then the 
auction precedent is valuable.” 
 
 Stakeholders also commented on the electrical, regulatory environment the policy 
would be applied in and the distributional consequences of different allowance 
allocations.  In terms of regulatory environment, early cap and trade policies for NOx and 
SO2 emissions were designed for and enacted within regulated systems, whereas RGGI 
would exist in a restructured electrical system.  The distributional effects of a particular 
design would determine which categories of stakeholders would be most affected by the 
policy, which would then influence whether they could support its enactment.  Due to this, 
the allocation of allowances was viewed as a tradeoff between the economic concerns of 
generators and consumers.  
  
Stakeholder (4/6/05): “When SO2 and NOx programs were created before restructuring in the 
northeast, wholesale markets were very different. We are no longer 
able to look at units and recapture windfall profits through the 
ratemaking process. The value of allowances is different under 
deregulation.”  
 
Stakeholder (4/6/05): “Some folks are comparing old allocation schemes under cost of service 
regulation to today under competitive pricing.  Under competition, 
allocations should be to consumers, and we've let them slip away in the 
past. We need to figure out how generators do not obstruct this too 
much.”  
 
 Public interest stakeholders played a large role in this discussion and advocated 
for consumer-friendly distributions and other strategies that limited the policy's economic 
impact on consumers.  Some stakeholders even identified consumer costs as the 
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economic impact that would determine whether they could support the enactment of the 
policy.  Alternatively, generators claimed that using auctions would be economically 
detrimental and would negatively affect the reliability of the region's electrical system.  
 
Public Interest (4/6/05): “Consumers should get the value of the allowances as they are paying 
for the program in terms of higher electricity prices.”  
 
Stakeholder (4/6/05):  “We don't advocate auctions specifically, as long as there is a direct 
allocation to consumers.”  
 
Stakeholder (4/6/05):  “This boils down to [the] implications of an auction: who benefits, and 
who gets harmed.”  
 
Stakeholder (4/6/05): “Main argument to kill or make this happen will be the program cost. 
Two ways to make the program cheap: 1. do nothing, 2. mitigate cost to 
consumers.” 
 
Generator (4/6/05): “Cap will have a 5-10% impact on financial result for generators.  
Auctioning allowances could have a significantly greater impact.” 
 
Generator (4/6/05):  “Auction model will lead to negative effects in each of these areas: 
Places significant financial strain on units critical to maintain fuel 
diversity in the region.”  
 
 Generators' economic claims were countered by both the allocation expert and a 
public interest stakeholder.  They said generators would pass the costs of the allowances 
onto consumers whether they bought them or received them for free, and that giving 
generators free allowances would allow them to recoup economic gains that consumers 
ultimately paid for.  The economic costs imposed on consumers continued to be viewed 
as a critical consideration that would determine whether RGGI could be enacted.  This 
motivated stakeholders to suggest allocating allowances directly to consumers or to 
energy efficiency programs that would reduce the price they would pay for electricity.  
Public interest organizations then increased the aggressiveness of their requests, or 
argued for distributing more of the allowances to benefit the public.  Stakeholders ended 
the discussion by asking for allocation scenarios to be built into the models, which further 
demonstrated their support for using the models and their trust in the results.  
 
Allocation expert (4/6/05):“Firms charge consumers for using emission allowances, whether the 




Public Interest (4/6/05): “There is no 'economic efficiency' reason or 'equity' reason to give any 
allowances to generators. Consumers, who pay the price increases, 
should receive the proceeds of allowances sales. Generators, as a class, 
should not financially benefit from this program at the direct additional 
expense of consumers. In keeping with the new competitive markets for 
wholesale electricity, allowances should be sold through an efficient, 
transparent market for buying and selling allowances.”  
 
Stakeholder (4/6/05):  “There are two ways to reduce the cost of a CO2 cap and trade 
program … 1) Rebate proceeds of allowance sales back to the 
consumers that are paying the increased prices created by the program, 
thus reducing ... consumers' cost for any level of CO2. 2) Invest a 
significant portion of the proceeds of allowance sales in strategies that 
will reduce the long-term impact of CO2 reduction programs on energy 
prices, such as energy efficiency and clean energy programs.” 
 
Stakeholder (4/6/05): “[Public interest stakeholder] was asked why earlier he advocated 50% 
allocations to consumers, but now [is] advocating 100%. Why has his 
position changed?” 
Public Interest (4/6/05): “That [allocations expert] helped us see that the generators as a whole 
come out neutral.” 
 
Stakeholder (4/6/05): “We would like more time to understand how this model works. You 
talked about doing modeling runs with allocations. We'd like to see 
those modeling runs before using results to set policy.”  
 
Stakeholder (4/6/05): “Our coalition needs time to see modeling runs with allocations built in.”  
 
 
The meeting concluded with the SWG's presentation of the initial framework for 
RGGI's MOU and Model Rule.  The SWG then said they would present the stakeholder 
feedback to the state agency heads who would use them to determine the final policy 
design.  One section that prompted further questioning was 'complementary energy 
policies'.   
 
Stakeholder (4/6/05): “What is under the umbrella of complementary energy policies?” 
SWG (4/6/05):  “Energy efficiency is a major driving force.” 
 






May 19, 2005  
 The May 19, 2005, stakeholder meeting featured further conversations about the 
newly updated micro-and macroeconomic models, as well as a formal stakeholder 
discussion about RGGI's potential design.  Before these topics were broached, the SWG 
reported the agency heads had made a number of decisions regarding the structure of 
RGGI.  Paramount amongst these concerned the cap's baseline. 
 
SWG (5/19/05): “We recommended setting the initial cap at current emissions. What 
constitutes 'current emissions' at the start of the program must be 
estimated because there is a time lag in receiving emissions data. We 
will have good data for the years leading up to 2004, but if the program 
launches at the start of 2009, there will still be a data gap. Certain 
adjustments needed to be made to our emissions data in determining 
the cap start points, based on how IPM projects emissions.  We need to 
apply the results that come from the model using some analogy.  25% 
below 1990 is not a perfect projection of a stabilization case, but it is 
reasonable close – and probably a bit conservative.”  
 
SWG (5/19/05): “If the decision is to start the cap at emissions levels at the time the 
program starts, then we will need to estimate what those levels will be. 
The most recent data we have are from 2000-2002 and the average 
annual emissions from RGGI units during that period was 143 million 
tons.” 
 
 Beyond demonstrating the SWG's justifications for using both historical emission 
figures and a conservative cap, the above statement also emphasized the role the models 
played in determining RGGI's ultimate design.  Overall, the SWG stressed the need to 
find a cap size that, if not ideal, was at least acceptable to multiple categories of 
stakeholders.  The update also touched on the use of auctions and complementary energy 
policies. Though various stakeholders had suggested giving allocations to consumers, this 
marked the first explicit mention of formally recycling auction revenues to benefit the 
public.  
 
SWG (5/19/05): “We've had discussions on what cap you want and what cap others 
want – the trick is to find a middle ground.”  
 
Stakeholder (5/19/05): “Did the issue of auctions come up in how states do their allocations?” 
SWG (5/19/05):           “We've been using the term 'public benefits allocations' and yes, it did 
come up.”  
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 Another topic that sparked further conversation was the inclusion of 
complementary energy efficiency policies.  However, the statements made about doing so 
demonstrated that integration issues between environmental and energy policies 
continued to exist.  This reflected the prior disconnect between the two, but also potential 
opportunities. The SWG also commented on RGGI's scalability, given its emerging 
domestic uniqueness.  Stakeholders remained concerned about the program's costs and 
whether flexibility mechanisms would be included.  This focus reinforced the fact that 
stakeholders' support for enactment would hinge on the perceived economic impacts of 
RGGI.  
 
Stakeholder (5/19/05):  “I'm glad to see part of MOU is on complimentary [sic] energy policies.” 
 
SWG (5/19/05):  “There is a legal dynamic regarding what has to be in the rule, what 
should be in the rule, and what should be in the rule but isn't ready yet. 
Some aren't appropriate for the program ... complementary energy 
policy is a moving target at this point, etc. Also, energy policies may not 
be within the purview of the environmental agencies.”  
 
SWG (5/19/05):  “There are complementary policies that have been discussed that are 
not part of the model rule. Some things are outside the jurisdiction of 
the environmental agencies and we'll need to rely on our counterparts 
in other agencies.  But we are not developing a separate model rule for 
energy policies at this time.”   
 
SWG (5/19/05): “Recommendations on Complementary Energy Policies: We are looking 
beyond public benefit allocation for potential complementary energy 
policies. It was unusual to have both environmental and energy 
regulatory agency heads all in one room. One focus is on the notion that 
there are real connections between this program and others ... RGGI 
might be used to leverage something greater in the area of energy 
efficiency.”  
 
SWG (5/19/05): “Link with other Trading Systems: Since there are no other domestic 
trading programs now we'd probably wait and take that up post - MOU - 
if opportunity for linking came up.” 
 
Stakeholder (5/19/05):  “Will there be a sunset provision if there is a national program? The cost 
impact to constituents should be embodied in a circuit breaker.” 
 
Stakeholder (5/19/05): “Was there discussion about how the Agency Heads can communicate 




 The meeting then shifted to a discussion of the macroeconomic model, which 
portrayed RGGI's potential economic impact upon the adopting states.  Specifically, 
“ 'impact' means the difference between how the economy performs in a given year in a 
reference scenario and a policy (carbon cap) scenario.  Performance is gauged by 
changes in: Gross State (or Regional) Product, Employment, Personal Income” (Modeler: 
5/19/05).  The model also looked at the policy's effect on electricity and natural gas 
prices.  The economic effects of weaker caps were found to be fairly small, but more 
significant emissions reductions, or tighter caps, had more significant economic impacts.  
 
Modeler (5/19/05): “Economic impacts are small – generally well below one-tenth of 1% 
change in economic indicators.” 
  
Modeler (5/19/05): “Impacts increase with cap size.”  
 
Modeler (5/19/05): “Under the straight 25% and 35% caps, retail electricity prices rise with 
carbon allowance prices; the increases range from 1% to under 6%.”  
 
 As in earlier conversations about the microeconomic model, stakeholders 
questioned the assumptions of the macroeconomic model and suggested alternatives.  
These versions of the macroeconomic model also did not include energy efficiency 
features or their potential effects.  The macroeconomic modeling experts stated that 
energy efficiency would be included in the next runs, and stakeholders had a number of 
thoughts about how to best do so.   
 
Stakeholder (5/19/05):  “Wholesale to retail ratios seem high. How do you deal with volatility 
particularly in gas? ... you might be overestimating retail gas prices.”  
 
Stakeholder (5/19/05): “If we look only at the state level when averaging out, we miss some of 
the impact on regional [,] like downstate vs. upstate New York. Is there 
a way to look at sub-state areas?”  
 
Stakeholder (5/19/05): “The later run that will include the energy efficiency scenario.  Will that 
take into account the lower price impact if you have more efficiency ... ” 
 
Stakeholder (5/19/05):  “How are you planning to characterize inputs for energy efficiency and 
is there any way for the Stakeholders to have input and will this be done 




 The microeconomic modeling experts then gave a quick update on their model.  
The newer version included an increasingly sophisticated treatment of energy efficiency, 
but stakeholders wanted this treatment to be improved even further.  The attention that 
stakeholders devoted to the microeconomic model reflected the trust they had in its 
results, and the fact that these results represented the best estimate of the policy's 
potential economic impacts.  However, one stakeholder did voice his concern about the 
amount of time and stakeholder attention that was devoted to the microeconomic model 
at the expense of the macroeconomic one.  The SWG countered this claim and said that 
compared to the design of other environmental policies their use of modeling was quite 
extensive.  This comment further reflected the central role that economic modeling 
played in the design of RGGI, as well as the relative novelty of using this approach to 
design environmental policies. 
 
Modeler (5/19/05): “Working on energy efficiency runs with the assistance of [energy 
efficiency stakeholder] looking at what would happen if you add a 
carbon cap with energy efficiency reductions as a backdrop.” 
 
Stakeholder (5/19/05): “I'm very glad you are moving forward with energy efficiency modeling. 
I have some concerns that you are rushing to a decision in early July 
without the analysis on energy efficiency done. The three big arguments 
are: 1. Is it doing enough to solve the problem? 2. What's the impact on 
jobs? 3. What's the impact on cost of power? These factors need to be 
incorporated into the decision-making process.” 
 
Stakeholder (5/19/05): “I feel like I'm in Wonderland. Is this modeling all just for show? I'm 
confused and frustrated.  We spent six months on IPM and one hour on 
REMI ... You have barely started the REMI modeling, but you are going 
to have this meeting in July with the Agency Heads.”  
 
SWG (5/19/05): “I challenge you to find an environmental process that's gone through 
this level of modeling at this stage in a rulemaking process. There has 
been a huge amount of modeling. You need to look at it according to 
other programs.”  
 
 The meeting concluded with an open forum in which different stakeholders 
voiced their thoughts about the following question: “What Comprehensive RGGI Design 
Package Do You Recommend the States Adopt and Why?”(SWG: 5/19/05).  The 
stakeholders were queried about the policy design they wanted to be enacted, so their 
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responses indicated which designs and outcomes different categories of stakeholders 
could support.  Generators and consumers reiterated their position that the economic 
impact of the final policy design would determine whether they could support its 
enactment.  However, generators and consumers were concerned about different 
economic effects, which meant an enactable policy design would have to balance their 
respective concerns in order to address them both.  
 
Environmental (5/19/05):“It has to be good for the states. We are trying to demonstrate a smart 
way to reduce CO2 that will help the region, and help jobs … The 
package has to be good for consumers, as they will pay the price.”  
 
Generating (5/19/05): “The modeling suggest that the price increase is modest, but we should 
be careful to make sure that allowance prices don't skyrocket. We 
should have circuit breakers.”   
 
Public Interest (5/19/05): “What we're seeing is that the actual cost of achieving reductions is 
reasonable … We must focus on an appropriate role for this sector 
[electrical], which has extremely large sources that are regulatable [sic] 
and small costs.”  
 
Consumer (5/19/05):  “It all comes down to business[es] and the consumer and how they will 
react.”  
 
Generating (5/19/05): “New England states were hurt by the CAIR [Clean Air Interstate Rule for 
NOx and SO2] because they were early movers. We have to use caution 
so we don't set ourselves up for similar damage in a national program 
by being too aggressive.” 
 
Consumer (5/19/05):  “Don't make a decision about the cap until both IPM and REMI modeling 
are complete and you've looked at what the cost and regional results 
are when you include efficiency.”  
 
 On the other hand, environmental organizations indicated the policy should 
actually reduce CO2 emissions in the region. Other stakeholders also brought up another 
initial goal, that of inspiring other policies, but their opinions about expansion and the 
fate of RGGI following the enactment of a broader policy varied.  Within this discussion, 
the most consensus emerged around the use of energy efficiency.  Due to the many 
benefits that energy efficiency could provide, particularly its ability to reduce the 




Environmental (5/19/05): “We agree that we have to have an emissions cap that goes down 
from current levels, not just from 1990 levels.”  
 
Environmental (5/19/05):“This is an experiment. We want to see actual CO2 reductions in the 
region from [the] electric sector.”  
 
Environmental (5/19/05): “Our goal is creating momentum for an effective national program.  
We have to remember to step back and look at the goal.”  
 
Public Interest (5/19/05): “We need to make sure this package is replicable to other states.”  
 
Generator (5/19/05):  “This needs to be a stepping stone to a national program, and once that 
end game is achieved, RGGI should go away.”  
 
Environmental (5/19/05): “If we reduce demand we can do this in a cheap way.  Complementary 
energy programs and what we do with allowances is important … We 
should use allowances for energy efficiency and other clean energy 
technologies.” 
 
Consumer (5/19/05):  “I would like to encourage incorporating energy side policies into this. 
We need demand-side reductions and energy efficiency.  Reduced 
demand would be a positive outcome. Incentives for energy efficiency 
and demand side reduction could be included through the offsets 
program.” 
 
Generator (5/19/05): “Efficiency is the best way to keep costs down.” 
 
Efficiency (5/19/05):  “Energy efficiency is a key tool in dealing with leakage. Public benefits 
allocation to energy efficiency will help pay for energy efficiency.” 
 
Public Interest (5/19/05):“This cap can reduce compliance costs through energy efficiency and 
that's unique.” 
 
Consumer (5/19/05):  “Complementary energy policy will be a very important aspect of the 
program … We have to make sure to maximize energy efficiency.” 
 
Generator (5/19/05):  “We strongly feel that if we fund energy efficiency programs it will help 
in terms of demand side.” 
 
Public Interest (5/19/05):“Energy efficiency should be hardwired into the cap as much as 







September 21, 2005  
In the September 21, 2005, meeting the SWG presented an update from their 
latest meeting with the state agency heads.  Then the modelers presented their latest 
micro-and macroeconomic modeling runs.  The meeting concluded with an open forum 
where stakeholders could voice their opinions about the latest RGGI designs.  In addition 
to indicating that certain design features had not been decided, the agency head update 
included initial decisions on the size of the cap, the inclusion of a review period, the 
allocation method, and the portion of allowances allocated to benefit the public.  The 
initial cap size that was selected was loose and the predicted allowance prices were low.  
This addressed the economic concerns of generators, although environmental and public 
interest stakeholders questioned the policy's ability to achieve significant emissions 
reductions.  
 
SWG (9/21/05):  “There will be a two phase cap with stabilization at approximately 150 
million tons through 2015, followed by a 10% reduction by 2020 and a 
built-in review of the program in 2015 …” 
 
Environmental (9/21/05): “You indicated that 150 million tons was approximately current 
emissions.  When we've been looking at the data that doesn't appear to 
be where current emissions are. Could you quickly describe the 
discrepancy there. It seems like going from the mid-140's to the 150's, 
we're a little worried about that.”  
 
Environmental (9/21/05):“Our concern is that the cap really deliver change and actually have an 
allowance price.”  
 
Public Interest (9/21/05): “It's just that some of us who are looking at those one dollar 
allowance prices and thinking this is getting close to not having much 
impact …” 
 
 The discussion then shifted to the allocation method and the amount of 
allowances distributed to benefit the public.  The SWG proposed giving 20% of the 
allowances to the public. “The idea was that every state, as part of its rulemaking or 
proposal to its legislature would have a 20% public benefit, no smaller, and some states 
have talked about doing more than 20%” (SWG: 9/21/05).  Before opening this design 
feature to stakeholder discussion, the SWG acknowledged, “this is one of the more 
controversial aspects of the proposal” (SWG: 9/21/05); however, the amount and tone of 
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stakeholder concern about the use and size of the public benefits fund was limited.  
Instead, stakeholders primarily asked clarifying questions, such as how and when it 
would be implemented.  
 The micro-and macroeconomic modeling experts then returned to present the 
latest runs.  The microeconomic modelers indicated that new features were included to 
improve the model's realism.  Additionally, the model now included a constant source of 
funding for energy efficiency programs.  The more sophisticated treatment of energy 
efficiency had a significant effect.  It predicted that larger amounts of energy efficiency 
funding would produce effects that benefited all categories of stakeholders.  These 
benefits included reducing the economic impact of RGGI and limiting the need for 
additional transmission and distribution infrastructure. 
 
Modeler (9/21/05): “The Package Scenario, based on the new RGGI Reference Case, which 
includes the following: End Use Efficiency – Technology costs, load 
shapes, load factors, and potential supply by sector are based on data 
provided by [energy efficiency stakeholder]. Program cost to implement 
measures are based on average of RGGI states' actual expenditures 
through 2005 to implement public benefit programs.”  
 
Modeler (9/21/05): “... in many of the forecasts we received, some of that funding, or some 
of those programs were continued for specific amounts of time and 
then essentially were dropped off. And what this does in the package 
case was continue those spending levels and the EE reductions resulting 
from those levels.”  
 
Stakeholder (9/21/05):  “I think it gets back to the question of what the impact of the energy 
efficiency is – it's the critical factor.”  
Modeler (9/21/05):  “When we looked at the impacts, about a third of the price reduction in 
terms of the allowance price was due to EE and two thirds due to 
bringing offsets in to the system. Together those lead to a reduction in 
the allowance price which results in the lessening of the power cost 
impact ...”  
 
Modeler (9/21/05):  “We don't address the distribution issues per say but it is addressed 
indirectly because of the EE and the lower load that therefore needs to 
be met and lower peak demand, you have less pressure to build.”  
 
 The modelers then presented the revised macroeconomic model.   Like the 
microeconomic model, a major change involved its treatment of energy efficiency.  This 
was followed by a stakeholder request for larger amounts of energy efficiency funding to 
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be included in the model.  Efficiency-inclined stakeholders wanted to include larger 
amounts of energy efficiency funding in the model because they believed the results were 
accurate and wanted to use them to convince other stakeholders to include energy 
efficiency in RGGI.  
 
Modeler (9/21/05):  “... the big addition from May's presentation is the incorporation of how 
energy efficiency will affect the regional economies … The concept of 
the basic package was recast, so the underlying wholesale price changes, 
capacity addition predictions, and then the energy efficiency is all new 
material.”  
 
Stakeholder (9/21/05):  “You've modeled the original policy package which has continued 
energy efficiency investment at historic levels, is that correct? But you 
haven't modeled the last IPM package with the doubled efficiency? Are 
you planning to do that? 
Modeler (9/21/05): “Yes.” 
 
Stakeholder (9/21/05):  “My concern is that the efficiency modeling has only really been 
completed in the last few weeks and that the commissioners got their 
first exposure to this in July with a set of data that was extremely weak 
when it came to energy efficiency.  So for the Commissioners to make 
good decisions and to support the best conclusions in the MOU it is 
absolutely essential that the IPM and REMI runs be completed and be 
fully presented to the principals before they make any final decisions. 
You were just looking at the difference between extending the 
programs and not extending the programs rights? You weren't looking 
at any additional efficiency that might result from a program like this 
[RGGI], right? 
Modeler (9/21/05):  “Correct.” 
 
 After the presentations, the SWG gave stakeholders the opportunity to respond to 
the following questions: “How fairly balanced is the RGGI SWG proposal, and what 
suggestions, if any, do you have for enhancing its balance?; What specific feedback do 
you have on key aspects of the RGGI design?; What suggestions do you have to ensure 
the successful implementation of RGGI?” (SWG: 9/21/05).  Initially, all categories of 
stakeholders indicated their general satisfaction with both the proposed structure of the 
policy and the inclusive and transparent nature of the design process.   
 
Environmental (9/21/05):“The program, as it's been modeled, is reasonable … Overall this is a 




Efficiency (9/21/05):  “I've been through other processes before and rarely seen such public 
access, good analysis and really hashing through the tough issues.”  
  
Public Interest (9/21/05): “The question is really, does this proposal do the trick in terms of 
meeting the objectives of the RGGI process to begin with.  We are 
optimistic because of the regional scope and where it is headed in the 
short term …”  
 
Generator (9/21/05):  “We are focused on how to make this work ...”  
  
Public Interest (9/21/05):“Lots of good work has been done by the SWG and the modelers.”  
 
Generator (9/21/05): “We support the proposal as submitted. We think this is a cautious and 
good approach to start.”  
 
Environmental (9/21/05): “We want to commend the SWG and all the states that are 
participating in the program. Many in Maryland hope our state will be a 
full participant soon.”  
 
Legal (9/21/05):  “We commend the SWG's work and hope this will become a model for 
the nation.”  
 
Generator (9/21/05):  “We commend the SWG for the amount of work and thought that was 
put into this and generally support it.” 
 
Industry Group (9/21/05): “We commend the SWG for having such a public process and allowing 
others to observe.” 
  
 Environmental organizations readily acknowledged the weakness of the proposed 
cap, and a number of them suggested tightening it.  In response, generators and industry 
group stakeholders urged caution in doing so.  The different opinions about the cap size 
reflected the divide between the positions held by environmental organizations and 
generators.  It also demonstrated that the cap size would strongly influence whether 
generators could support the policy.  
 
Environmental (9/21/05): “The current cap level is inflated above what has been modeled … Cap 
should be back at the 143/145 million ton range.” 
 
Environmental (9/21/05): “[There is] concern that the baseline is inflated. [This] creates [the] 
unfortunate perception that [the] program is not actually reducing 
emissions ...” 
 
Environmental (9/21/05): “This program is very modest … it needs to be bigger than it is if we 




Environmental (9/21/05): “Don't inflate baseline. Current emissions should be current 
emissions.”  
 
Legal (9/21/05):  “You can structure this program with a tighter cap, a lower cap that 
provides greater benefits without significant harm to [the] public.”  
 
Generator (9/21/05):  “The target which was set was judicious. We wouldn't support a 
substantial reduction at least at this time because we don't want to bet 
the economy or risk radical problems that could come if we pick too 
large a target.” 
 
Industry Group (9/21/05): “Don't set too restrictive a cap … Program should not punish 
generators ...” 
 
 Stakeholders as a whole continued to emphasize the need to minimize the 
economic impacts of the policy; however, individual categories of stakeholders were 
primarily concerned about how the policy affected their specific economic concerns.  
Generators were concerned about how the allowance price would affect their economic 
health.  On the other hand, non-generating stakeholders were primarily concerned about 
increasing electricity prices and their effects on consumers.  Furthermore, it remained 
difficult to identify policy designs that could address the economic concerns generators 
and consumers both held.  Generators felt the design features consumers wanted would 
increase the costs they would have to pay to operate their equipment.  Consumers felt 
generators wanted design features that would increase the price of electricity and allow 
them to reap windfall profits from the policy.  
 
Generator (9/21/05):  “There needs to be a circuit breaker if the load continues to grow or if 
allowance prices go to high.” 
 
Generator (9/21/05):  “We believe if you really want [the] program to have integrity there 
should be a circuit breaker if load continues growing too fast or 
allowance prices go too high, to be able to step back, suspend it for a 
time, and tweak it.” 
 
Generator (9/21/05):  “Eliminate the 20% EE set aside. We feel it is a tax imposed on fossil 
generators. It will increase the cost of program implementation ...” 
  
Public Interest (9/21/05): “Right now there is too much deference to generators and not enough 
to the people who are buying their product either directly or indirectly 
through distributors.  In order to for us to sell this product to the public 
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we need to be able to look small customers, low income customers and 
large customers in the eye and tell them they are getting a fair shake ...” 
 
Legal (9/21/05):  “...the total consumer costs of this program should be kept to a 
minimum and that a windfall to the generators should be avoided.”  
 
Environmental (9/21/05): “We are trying to achieve reductions in the energy generating sector 
at little or no cost to consumers.” 
 
Consumer (9/21/05):  “We want a circuit breaker in order to keep the price of electricity 
down in the Northeast.” 
 
Consumer (9/21/05):  “The consumer sector, the industrial sector and commercial companies 
I represent are really concerned about the potential risks inherent in 
this proposal … The cost of electric power is a grave concern to us.”   
  
The positional divide between generators and consumers partially turned on 
whether or not generators would pass along the costs of the allowances to consumers. 
The divide was also apparent in how generating and non-generating stakeholders wanted 
the allocations to be distributed.  Generators interpreted policy designs that gave more 
allowances to consumers as economically detrimental for them.  While consumers felt 
that giving more allowances to generators would create new costs for them and enable 
generators to earn additional revenues at their expense.  
 
Public Interest (9/21/05): “Whatever the price and cost of the allowances turns out to be, 
whether it's given away to the generators or sold or auctioned, that 
market price is going to be reflected in the price of energy, which means 
that, effectively, consumers pay 100% of the cost.”   
 
Legal (9/21/05):  “Actually I think the concern is that more than 100% of the cost will be 
passed onto consumers.”  
 
Generator (9/21/05):  “Certainly the price of allowances is going to be reflected in the 
wholesale prices. That doesn't mean that all of that is profit to the 
generators.” 
 
Distributor (9/21/05):  “We are an electric T&D company. We are not a generator … and as I 
like to say, we're always at the sharp end of the stick in terms of energy 
increases … we hear it because we're the ones that send out the bills … 
we do think the bid prices will reflect the cost of the allowances 




 Efficiency (9/21/05):  “There should be a larger public benefit. Increase the consumer 
program beyond the 20%.”  
 
Legal (9/21/05):  “The 20% public allocations number needs to be raised.”  
 
Environmental (9/21/05): “Increase consumer allowance allocation to 50% instead of 25%.” 
 
Generator (9/21/05):  “Public benefit fund should be less than 20%.”  
 
 Despite these differences, all categories of stakeholders were able to agree on the 
value of energy efficiency and its role within the policy.  Motivations and rationales for 
hardwiring energy efficiency into RGGI varied, but its many benefits enabled all groups 
of stakeholders to come together to support it.  The consensus emerged because energy 
efficiency could provide benefits to all categories of stakeholders without hurting any one 
particular category.  Widespread support for energy efficiency also revealed innovative 
approaches to using it and to building it into RGGI. 
 
 Efficiency (9/21/05):  “There needs to be a doubled commitment to EE as part of the final 
RGGI package. EE doesn't automatically happen in the power sector 
within a Cap and Trade program, it's an indirect emissions reduction … 
so it has to be addressed explicitly.” 
 
Legal (9/21/05):  “We need to show that this program addresses the very serious 
problem of global warming and pollution but does it in a way that 
produces a benefit people can get their arms around. A consumer 
allocation that produces a tangible benefit in terms of efficiency can 
advance the long-term goals of the program in terms of energy 
efficiency”  
 
Public Interest (9/21/05):“We hope that as new information about the benefits of efficiency and 
its ability to both help meet the cap and lower the cost of the program 
comes out that that will reflect how the SWG thinks about the 
allowances and also about the equity issues.”  
  
Generator (9/21/05):  “Capping load growth is very important.”  
 
Environmental (9/21/05):“Maximizing commitment to EE and renewable energy through the 
power of the allowance value helps a lot in dampening the risk of 
leakage getting out of control and undermine[ing] the program.”  
 
Efficiency (9/21/05):  “Efficiency offers additional benefits to the RGGI program in its total 
goals. Both offsets and EE will help reduce leakage.  Both will help 
reduce allowance prices or at least keep allowance prices down; 
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however EE does a lot more, on the margin, for energy prices in the 
region. It does a lot more for total economic benefits, as the REMI 
modeling showed us … EE is available and cost effective at ANY 
allowance price today… The problem is, if it can't be hardwired into the 
cap it's going to take this extra policy commitment on the margin to 
make it happen.” 
 
Generator (9/21/05):  “It is true, however that all ratepayers would benefit to some extent, 
from the reduced cost of wholesale power because EE brings you down 
on the curve … it's also cost effective now but not being taken up ...”  
 
Legal (9/21/05):  “We need to foster systematic efficiency as a long-term solution.” 
 
Legal (9/21/05):  “Under some ways of allocating the proceeds from [the] allowance 
distribution, there could actually be no costs of this program to the 
economy as a whole.  The consumers can benefit from efficiency 
improvements that will result from use [of] the public benefit fund.”   
 
Efficiency (9/21/05):  “MOU should focus on a resource acquisition approach to EE and 
specifically encourage states to set resource targets for efficiency. CT 
and NJ already going in this direction. This approach can actually give 
you the resources at lower costs … This has to go in parallel with and 
outside the cap, and will take some inter-agency cooperation.  
 
 
May 2, 2006  
 The SWG spent the next eight months crafting the final structure of the policy.  In 
accordance with this progression, the entirety of the May 2, 2006, meeting was devoted 
to stakeholder comments on the following questions: “What are your top 3 to 5 
recommendations for the states in finalizing the model rule (other than the offsets 
component)?; What are your top 3 to 5 recommendations for the states in finalizing the 
offsets component?” (SWG: 5/2/06).  Stakeholder comments strongly mirrored their 
earlier ones, and revolved around which policy features they wanted, which then reflected 
which policy outcomes they would be able to accept.  Generators wanted self-benefiting 
allocations and argued against any feature that made the policy more rigorous, expensive, 
or difficult to comply with.  Environmental stakeholders believed the cap was too loose 
and wanted to limit the use of safety triggers that further restricted the amount of 
reductions the policy would achieve. Consumers wanted design features that would limit 
the policy's impact on electricity prices.  
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Generator (5/2/06): “Cautions against 100% auction of allowances, reducing flexibility, 
making the cap tighter, making penalties tighter, and reducing the 
operation of safety valves.”   
 
Environmental (5/2/06): “Initial cap levels are too high – about 6% above the 2004 emissions. If 
you extrapolate from current trends you end up having a non-binding 
cap at the start of the program.”  
 
Environmental (5/2/06): “Strongly oppose the safety valve triggers for offsets.”  
 
Consumer (5/2/06):  “... on behalf of 55 large industrial and commercial enterprises, as well 
as the Connecticut industrial alliance.  These businesses are very 
concerned about the cost impacts of the program.”  
 
 RGGI's tentative structure included an auction, and some stakeholders lobbied to 
use more of the auction revenues to benefit consumers and some even proposed 
auctioning all of the allowances.  Energy efficiency and legal stakeholders seconded 
these opinions and argued that the auction revenues should be used to support energy 
efficiency because it would benefit multiple categories of stakeholders.  Widespread 
stakeholder support for energy efficiency was also used to argue for bridging the gap 
between energy and environmental policies. 
 
Environmental (5/2/06): “They want to see the use of funds evaluated through a screen of some 
sort, and to focus on lowering program costs to consumers.”  
 
Public Interest (5/2/06): “Concern about the use of public benefit funds. Funds should be spent 
in ways that maximize the value of the program to consumers.”  
 
Consumer (5/2/06):  “Program should minimize the cost to consumers, and therefore the 
program should auction 100% of the allowances and rebate the costs on 
a per KWh basis to ratepayers.” 
 
Legal (5/2/06):  “The allocation methodology should minimize the burdens on the public 
at large by auctioning off 100% of the allowances.”  
 
 Efficiency (5/2/06):  “Power sales go down when you invest in EE; Reducing energy 
consumption helps reduce emissions; Investments in EE result in net 
positive to the economy; Every customer class saves money with these 
investments.” 
 
Legal (5/2/06)  “Resources should go to clean technology and energy efficiency.  




Legal (5/2/06):  “[We] need to formalize cooperation between the energy regulators 
and environmental regulators.”  
 
 
May 31, 2007 
 The SWG spent the next year finalizing RGGI's Modal Rule and MOU.  
Following the nearly final policy structure, the May 31, 2007, meeting revolved around 
implementation and addressed the allowance auctions.  The SWG brought in auctions 
experts to educate stakeholders about the designs and effects of different auction 
mechanisms, as well as to conduct research on different auction approaches.  In doing so, 
the experts identified certain criteria the auction design should achieve.  One desired 
effect was to promote competitive conditions. Another criterion embodied the position 
held by numerous categories of stakeholders, that the policy's economic impacts should 
be minimized and compliance streamlined.  
 
Auction Expert (5/31/07): “Auction Research Criteria: Promote price discovery; guard against 
collusion and/or market manipulation; Promote efficiency (results in 
allowances being owned by those who value them the most); Be 
perceived as open, fair, and transparent.” 
 
Auction Expert (5/31/07):“Auction Research Criteria: Minimize price volatility; Promote a liquid 
allowance market; Minimize administration and oversight requirements 
and costs.”  
 
 Reflecting the desired attributes, different auction designs were evaluated on their 
ability to induce efficient and competitive outcomes.  The connection between an 
efficient market and lower abatement costs linked the proposed auction designs to the 
previously voiced stakeholder positions.  Competitive markets also produced more 
revenues.  One design feature aligned with both goals was a reserve price, or price floor.  
In introducing this design feature, the auction experts spoke to efficiency and competitive 
goals, as well as the need to minimize the economic impacts that would be imposed on 
stakeholders.  
 
Auction Expert (5/31/07): “Efficiency is high if allowances are purchased by firms with the 




Auction Expert (5/31/07): “Revenue is high if the auction is competitive; firms are not able to 
collude to pay less than the market price.” 
 
Auction Expert (5/31/07): “Set firm reserve price: Very important element of auction design; 
Protects against collusion; May help to reduce volatility.”  
 
 
November 7, 2007  
 The specifics of the auction design were finalized at the November 7, 2007, 
stakeholder meeting when the auction experts presented the results of their experiments 
and their final recommendations.  One critical design feature that emerged from this 
meeting was the inclusion of a reserve price.  A second was the contingency bank.  A 
contingency bank is a form of the safety trigger mechanism that was requested by 
numerous stakeholders.  It enabled additional allowances to be released if the auction 
price exceeded a certain point.  Together the contingency bank and the reserve price 
represented two sides of a price collar, which functioned to reduce the potential economic 
impacts imposed on both generators and consumers.  
 
Auction Expert (11/7/07): “Recommendations: Reserve Price. Reserve price at each auction: 
Reserve based on recent market activity; minimum reserve price. No 
Allowances sold at prices below reserve price. A reserve price is 
essential to good design: clear support in auction design theory; ample 
evidence from actual auctions. Combined with contingency bank helps 
reduce costly price volatility.”  
 
 
September 25, 2008 
 The first RGGI auction was held on September 25, 2008, but prior to this 
RGGI.org released a number of information sheets.  These described the policy, its 
potential environmental effects, and its anticipated economic effects.  An excerpt from 
one of these information sheets underscored the role modeling played in establishing 
RGGI's ultimate design.  It also demonstrated how the SWG was able to combine 
different design features to address the economic concerns held by generators and 
consumers.  Specifically, the cap size and price triggers that restricted the allowance price 
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would allow generators to continue earning profits from the operation of their equipment.  
Similarly, the cap size, price triggers, and revenue recycler limited the policy's effects on 
the price and availability of electricity.  This would allow consumers to continue using 
the electricity produced by CO2-emitting technologies to get the services they desired and 
they would not have to pay significantly more to do so.   
  
 “Economic modeling projects that RGGI will have a very modest effect on 
electric rates, probably retail rate increases of between one and three percent; 
price triggers built into the program allow flexibility if electric rates should rise 
higher than predicated. In fact, consumer benefits from the strategic 
reinvestment of CO2 allowance auction proceeds are expected to largely offset 




 Other design features reduced the compliance cost and effort even more.  These 
features included allowance banking and other safety triggers that limited the costs that 
generators would have to pay to use their equipment.  They also included generous 
compliance periods and monitoring and compliance guidelines that were largely derived 
from pre-existing requirements and regulations.  Including these policy features reduced 
the work generators would have to do to abide by the policy, limited the costs of 
compliance, and gave them ample time to comply with the policy.    
 
 “The Model Rule provides for the banking of allowances with no restrictions … 
banking should provide allowance price stability while providing an incentive to 
hedge future year emissions uncertainty.” 
(http://www.rggi.org/docs/program_summary_10_07.pdf;  pg. 6). 
  
 “A stage-one trigger event occurs if the twelve-month rolling average CO2 
allowance price is equal or greater than … $7 in 2005 prices.  In the event that a 
stage-one trigger event occurs, CO2 budget units will be able to expand their use 
of CO2 offset allowances from 3.3% of their compliance obligation to 5% … A 
stage-two trigger event occurs if the twelve-month rolling average CO2 
allowance price is equal or greater to … $10 in 2005 dollars.  If a stage-two 
trigger event occurs: CO2 budget units will be able to use CO2 offset allowances 
to satisfy 10% of their compliance obligation; The compliance period will be 
extended to four years ...” 




 “The emissions monitoring and reporting provisions contained in the Model 
Rule are primarily based upon the US EPA monitoring provisions at 40 CFR Part 
75 …  the physical equipment necessary to monitor emissions of oxides of 
nitrogen on an annual basis is also capable of monitoring for CO2 mass 
emissions ...”(http://www.rggi.org/docs/program_summary_10_07.pdf; pg. 8). 
 
 “The Model Rule provides for a three-year compliance period.  This compliance 
period can be extended to four years in the event of a stage-two trigger event … 
This design component was included in lieu of allowance borrowing, as it allows 
for de facto borrowing within a three-year compliance period.” 
(http://www.rggi.org/docs/program_summary_10_07.pdf; pg. 6). 
 
 The RGGI project sheets also depicted how the economic impacts of the policy 
were mitigated by setting the initial cap size so the amount of emissions reductions would 
be limited.  The SWG's decision to minimize the economic effects of the policy instead 
of making deeper emission reductions reflected their need to attract the support of 
generators and consumers, even if it came at the expense of some environmental 
organizations.  In order to enact RGGI, the SWG had to utilize a weak cap to reduce the 
cost that generators would have to pay to operate their equipment and to reduce the price 
that consumers would have to pay for the electricity that was produced with this 
equipment.  In fact, RGGI's initial cap remained loose even after environmental 
organizations repeatedly identified its weakness throughout the design process.  
 
“This phased approach with initially modest emissions reductions is intended to 
provide market signals and regulatory certainty so that electricity generators 
begin planning for, and investing in, lower-carbon alternatives throughout the 
region, but without creating dramatic wholesale electricity price impacts and 
attendant retail electricity rate impacts.” 





 The remainder of this chapter analyzes the information presented about the 
enactment of RGGI to evaluate the hypotheses.  First, the previously presented 
information is briefly summarized.  Then it is used to answer how RGGI came to be 
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enacted, and whether particular design features for a cap and trade policy facilitated this 
enactment.  
 The strategies the SWG used to design RGGI attracted a diverse array of 
stakeholder support and ultimately facilitated its enactment.  Stakeholder participation 
facilitated enactment because it allowed the SWG to identify how different categories of 
stakeholders interpreted and used the physical materials and behavioral actions associated 
with CO2 emissions(Scott, 2001).  With this information, the SWG understood the types 
of misalignment stakeholders could perceive between their pre-existing cultural controls 
and those encapsulated in different policy designs (Caronna, 2004; Lindblom, 1977).  
The SWG also ascertained whether the misalignment different categories of stakeholders 
could perceive would prompt them to contest the policy (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; 
Caronna, 2004).  The SWG leveraged this information to identify design features that 
would reduce the misalignment that multiple, critical categories of stakeholders could 
perceive because they had it while the policy was being crafted instead of afterwards 
(Caronna, 2004; Fligstein, 1997). 
 The conversations held during the stakeholder meetings revealed that generators 
and consumers primarily interpreted and used the physical materials and behavioral 
actions underlying the emission of CO2 through economic meanings.  Generators 
understood and used these materials and actions through their effects on their costs and 
revenues (Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  Consumers interpreted these materials and 
actions based on the price they paid to get the services that electricity provided 
(Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  Furthermore, the economic basis of these pre-existing 
cultural controls meant they could easily misalign with alternative meanings and 
interpretations whose use increased the price of producing and consuming electricity 
(Blanchard, 2008; Caronna, 2004; Scott, 2001).  RGGI's effects on the price of producing 
and consuming electricity would determine whether generators and consumers perceived 
enough alignment between their pre-existing and the proposed cultural controls to 
support its enactment (Caronna, 2004).  With these concerns in mind, the SWG reduced 
misalignment by identifying design features that minimized the economic impacts of the 
policy for generators and consumers (Caronna, 2004).  The SWG then utilized economic 
models to portray the allowance price, the electricity price, and the economic health of 
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the region under a policy with these design features.  This enabled generators and 
consumers to see how RGGI's treatment of CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting 
technologies would align with the ways they both interpreted and used these materials 
and technologies (Bailey et al., 2011; Caronna, 2004; Lindblom, 1977).  Furthermore, 
generators and consumers were willing to accept the alignment predicted by the models 
because they actively contributed to their design, which led them to believe the results 
were legitimate predications of the policy's effects.  Drawing on this legitimacy, the SWG 
used the results of the models to alleviate generators' and consumers' concerns about the 
economic impacts of the policy and to attract their support for it. 
 The SWG used the stakeholder-designed and-vetted models to identify the 
economic impacts of various policy designs and to communicate these effects to 
stakeholder groups.  When the SWG built the proposed, weak cap sizes into the models 
the resulting low allowance prices convinced generators that purchasing CO2 allowances 
through an auction would not make their generation equipment economically unviable.  
This reduced the misalignment that generators could perceive between how they 
interpreted and used their equipment and RGGI's treatment of them (Caronna, 2004; 
Lindblom, 1977).  Likewise, when the SWG built an increase in energy efficiency 
spending into the models the results convinced consumers that controlling CO2 emissions 
and the operation of CO2-emitting equipment would not lead to significantly higher 
electricity prices.  This reduced the misalignment that consumers could perceive 
(Caronna, 2004).  The same modeling results also convinced generators, consumers, 
public interest, and legal organizations that controlling CO2 and the operation of CO2-
emitting equipment with an auction-based cap and trade policy would not hurt the 
economic health of the region or impede the reliability of the electrical system.  This 
further reduced the misalignment that these stakeholders could perceive (Caronna, 2004).  
These results emerged because the emission caps being considered and modeled were 
weak.  Many environmental organizations perceived misalignment between their pre-
existing interpretations of the atmosphere and RGGI's treatment of it because the 
potential cap sizes limited emission reductions and produced low allowance prices 
(Caronna, 2004; Lindblom, 1977).  However, many environmental organizations also 
supported the meanings and interpretations for CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting 
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technologies embedded in the RGGI policy, so this misalignment did not motivate them 
to contest enactment. 
 With the stakeholder-designed economic models, the SWG identified design 
features that increased the alignment between the anticipated effects of the policy and 
how the most critical stakeholder groups interpreted and utilized the existing electrical 
system (Caronna, 2004).  The SWG then attracted support for enactment by 
implementing design features that aligned with generators' and consumers' pre-existing 
cultural controls and that were not too misaligned with environmental 
organizations'(Caronna, 2004; Fligstein, 1997; Lindblom, 1977).  The combination of a 
weak cap, allowance auction, price collar, and revenue recycler allowed generators, 
consumers, and environmental organizations to support enactment.  Generators and 
consumers supported RGGI because its design minimized the costs of controlling CO2 
and the operation of CO2-emitting equipment and created new resources that benefited 
them.  Environmental organizations supported RGGI because it controlled CO2 and the 
operation of CO2-emitting equipment, even though the reductions it would achieve were 
relatively small.  
 
Question 1: How Were State Policymakers Able to Enact RGGI? 
 RGGI was the first mandatory CO2 policy enacted in the U.S., so it was not 
guaranteed that the SWG could design and enact a controversial new policy to regulate a 
previously uncontrolled environmental activity.  The subsequent difficulties in enacting 
domestic CO2-controlling policies outside of California made RGGI's enactment even 
more impressive (Cohen & Miller, 2012).  Reviewing the initial hypothesis about this 
question, enacting a new, formal policy hinges on identifying how critical stakeholder 
groups understand and use the materials and actions underlying the activity and then 
selecting design features that align with them (Caronna, 2004; Lindblom, 1977; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 2003; Schnaiberg, 1980; Scott, 2001).  To test this hypothesis, the analysis 
answers how the SWG brought about this alignment. 
 The SWG intentionally structured RGGI's design process to be as inclusive and 
transparent as possible.  To these ends, they invited numerous stakeholder groups to 
participate in nearly every stage of the design process.  Stakeholder involvement ranged 
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from helping to define the initial goals of the policy to contributing to the economic 
models to commenting on particular design features.  The SWG preemptively developed 
the conditions that enabled alignment to occur by explicitly seeking out stakeholder 
participation from the beginning (Caronna, 2004).  These conditions emerged when 
different categories of stakeholders were able to voice their impressions about different 
facets of the policy directly to the SWG, and then when their concerns were reflected in 
later meetings and design proposals.  Based on these exchanges, stakeholders felt their 
perspectives and considerations were important and valuable to the policy's ultimate 
design.   
 Moreover, the SWG also induced stakeholders to speak candidly and freely about 
different policy designs by establishing a safe, inclusive, and open forum for public 
participation.  This included generators that would potentially be regulated by the policy, 
and who could be antagonistic or uncooperative towards the individuals and 
organizations seeking to control their behavior.  The transparency, inclusion, and 
respectfulness of the design process were critical components to achieving alignment 
(Caronna, 2004).  Different stakeholder groups honestly revealed how they interpreted 
and used CO2, the atmosphere, and most importantly, CO2-emitting behaviors and 
technologies.  In other words, the structure of the design process motivated stakeholders 
to reflect upon the ways they interpreted and used the materials and actions underlying 
the emission of CO2 and to honestly convey them to both the SWG and other categories 
of stakeholders (Scott, 2001).  From these exchanges, the SWG identified the pre-existing 
cultural controls different groups of stakeholders held and whether they aligned with the 
cultural controls encapsulated in different policy permutations(Caronna, 2004; Lindblom, 
1977).  The SWG then identified design features that minimized the misalignment that 
critical stakeholders, such as generators, consumers, and environmental organizations, 
could perceive (Caronna, 2004).  These exchanges also enabled different stakeholders to 
learn about the cultural controls underpinning other stakeholders' positions, which 
revealed the misalignments they could perceive and design features that would mitigate 
them (Caronna, 2004; Scott, 2001).  
 Due to RGGI's inclusive design process, the SWG quickly learned how critical 
categories of stakeholders interpreted and used the materials and actions underlying the 
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emission of CO2.  This allowed the SWG to understand the alignment, or lack thereof, 
between these meanings and they ones they were trying to highlight (Caronna, 2004; 
Fligstein, 1997).  Generators largely interpreted and used the physical materials and 
behavioral actions underlying electricity-derived CO2 through their effects on their cost 
and revenue streams (Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  This positioned the new meanings 
for CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting equipment the SWG was trying highlight by 
creating CO2 allowances as new economic costs that affected generators' ability to earn 
profits from producing electricity.  Alternatively, consumers and the public interest and 
legal organizations that represented their interests primarily interpreted these materials 
and actions according to their effects on the price and the availability of the electricity 
that consumers used (Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  This positioned the new meanings 
for CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies the SWG was trying to highlight 
as a new burden on consumers that increased the price and affected the availability of 
electricity.  Unlike generators and consumers, the pre-existing cultural controls that 
environmental organizations held were not primarily derived from economic 
considerations (Scott, 2001).  Although many accepted and acknowledged that the pre-
existing cultural controls that generators and consumers held were.  Environmental 
organizations primarily interpreted the materials and actions associated with electricity-
derived CO2 through their effects on atmospheric concentrations of CO2 (Scott, 2001).  
These meanings were very similar to the ones the SWG was trying to highlight through 
the enactment of RGGI (Fligstein, 1997).  Both sets of cultural controls treated CO2 
allowances as a tool for restricting CO2 emissions, in that the initial allocation defined the 
atmosphere as a finite sink, and their distribution controlled the operation of CO2-
emitting equipment (Scott, 2001).  
 The SWG was able to identify the misalignments that would prompt different 
categories of stakeholders to contest the policy, because the design process induced them 
to reflect upon their pre-existing cultural controls (Caronna, 2004; Scott, 2001).  From 
this, the SWG saw that generators and consumers could perceive economically-based 
misalignment between their pre-existing cultural controls and those embedded in RGGI 
(Blanchard, 2008; Caronna, 2004; Lindblom, 1977; Scott, 2001).  In other words, 
generators' and consumers' perceptions of RGGI's economic effects would influence 
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whether they could support it.  The SWG likely knew this beforehand as economic 
modeling was initially included in the design process, but explicitly and repeatedly 
hearing it from generators and consumers heightened its salience.  The pervasiveness of 
the message also prompted the SWG to conduct a more thorough investigation of the 
policy's economic impacts as well as potential strategies to minimize them.  The SWG 
included design features, such as a weak cap, that reduced the economic impact imposed 
on generators and consumers to minimize the economically-based misalignment they 
both could perceive (Blanchard, 2008; Caronna, 2004; Scott, 2001).  The SWG included 
these features even though they limited the amount of CO2 reductions the policy would 
achieve, and caused environmental organizations to perceive misalignment between the 
policy's treatment of the atmosphere and their pre-existing understanding of it (Caronna, 
2004; Lindblom, 1977).  
 Based on the prominence of economic meanings within the pre-existing cultural 
controls of generators and consumers, micro-and macroeconomic models represented 
ideal design tools for RGGI (Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  To begin with, the models 
dovetailed with generators' and consumers' pre-existing cultural controls.  The models 
treated CO2 emissions as a cost that was borne by generators that affected their ability to 
produce electricity at certain quantities at certain prices, which impacted the economic 
health of the region.  The SWG based the RGGI design process on these models, instead 
of non-economic ones or alternative approaches, because they recognized the policy's 
economic effects on generators and consumers would determine whether they could 
support it.   
 Secondly, the models translated abstracted cap and trade design features into 
recognizable effects that were salient to generators and consumers.  They did so by 
depicting the effects that various policy designs would have on allowance prices, 
electricity prices, and the region's economic health.  Generators and consumers were able 
to use the models to envision the alignment, or lack thereof, between different policy 
designs and their pre-existing interpretations and uses of the materials and behaviors 
associated with electricity-derived CO2 (Bailey et al., 2011; Caronna, 2004).  From this, 
the SWG was able to identify potential misalignments while design features were being 
evaluated and before the specifics of the policy had solidified (Caronna, 2004).  This 
123 
 
offered opportunities to discard certain design features early in the process, such as a 
tighter cap, in addition to revealing new features not initially considered, such as an 
energy efficiency revenue recycler.  
 The SWG and stakeholders successfully used the economic models to experiment 
with different design features because their development and use were both inclusive and 
transparent.  Models as a whole and economic models in particular do not automatically 
produce objective results.  They rest upon a number of assumptions, and the choice of 
assumptions introduces subjectivity into the results they generate.  This subjectivity 
offers opportunities to frame the models and their results as incorrect or unrepresentative 
of reality.  If this view was widely held the models would not be considered appropriate 
tools for policy design.  Within the context of RGGI's intentionally open design process, 
the SWG got stakeholders to accept the veracity of the models and their results by 
allowing them to join the modeling team that was hired, criticize the inclusion of certain 
assumptions, and suggest that additional ones be added.   
  The SWG ensured the models accurately reflected the world the stakeholders 
inhabited by allowing them to participate in the modeling process and to help set the 
underlying assumptions.  More specifically, different categories of stakeholders helped to 
define the assumptions of the models and included the output parameters they were most 
concerned with.  Due to this, the SWG was able to establish an initial alignment between 
the models' settings and stakeholders' pre-existing cultural controls before building in any 
of the more contentious policy features (Caronna, 2004).  This allowed stakeholders to 
accept the models as appropriate tools for evaluating different policy designs.  Beyond 
improving the realism of the models, soliciting a variety of stakeholder contributions also 
lent the results a certain legitimacy.  If the SWG had treated the models as an 
unmodifiable black box, the results could have been contested as incorrect or unrealistic 
by any category of stakeholder.  However, the SWG insulated themselves and the models 
from these arguments by incorporating a diverse array of stakeholder participation from 
the beginning.  This approach enabled the results of the models to be treated as close to 
fact, and the SWG used them to convincingly portray the potential effects of various 
policy designs to different categories of stakeholders (Bailey et al., 2011; Fligstein, 1997).  
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 The SWG used the stakeholder-designed and-vetted economic models to assuage 
different categories of stakeholders' concerns about the impacts of the policy.  Doing so 
reduced the misalignment that generators and consumers could perceive between their 
pre-existing cultural controls and those encapsulated in RGGI (Caronna, 2004; Lindblom, 
1977).  The SWG used the models to alleviate generators' concerns about how different 
policy structures would affect CO2 allowance prices.  When the model included the 
proposed cap sizes it indicated the resulting allowance prices would be low.  This 
outcome reduced the misalignment that generators could perceive (Caronna, 2004).   
When allowance prices are low generators would be able to continue using and earning 
profits from their existing, CO2-emitting facilities.  Additionally, after larger amounts of 
energy efficiency spending were built into the model, the results indicated the allowance 
prices would be even lower and there would be systemic improvements in reliability and 
congestion.  Generators contributed to the development of the models so the results were 
sufficiently credible to align their pre-existing interpretations and utilizations of CO2-
emitting technologies with RGGI's treatment of them (Caronna, 2004; Lindblom, 1977).  
 The SWG used the same modeling results to assuage consumers' and public 
interest and legal organizations' concerns about how RGGI would affect electricity prices, 
system reliability, and the economic health of the region.  The results of the models 
indicated the proposed cap sizes would minimally impact the region's electricity prices, 
system reliability, or economic health.  Furthermore, when the SWG increased the energy 
efficiency funding included in the models the results predicted a net positive impact due 
to stabilized electrical prices, improved system reliability, and more robust economic 
growth in the region.  The results reduced the misalignment that consumers, public 
interest, and legal stakeholders could perceive between their pre-existing interpretations 
of CO2-emitting technologies and those embedded in the policy (Caronna, 2004; 
Lindblom, 1977).  When the proposed cap sizes were combined with larger amounts of 
energy efficiency funding the resulting low allowances prices would not impede 
generators' ability to use existing fossil fuel facilities to reliably and cost effectively meet 
the region's demand.  Consumers would be able to continue using electricity to produce 
the services they desired, and they would not have to pay more to do so.  Consumers, 
public interest, and legal organizations participated in the development of the models, so 
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the results were legitimate enough to align their pre-existing interpretations and uses of 
CO2-emitting technologies with those of RGGI (Caronna, 2004; Lindblom, 1977).  
 In some ways, the misalignment that could be perceived by environmental 
stakeholders was both the easiest and hardest to resolve and was not significantly 
influenced by the models.  Environmental organizations approached this process with the 
goal of regulating CO2 emissions for the first time.  If the SWG proposed a policy that 
limited the misalignment that generators and consumers could perceive, then 
environmental organizations would achieve their goal(Caronna, 2004).  However, the 
SWG's best option for reducing the misalignment that generators and consumers could 
perceive was to design RGGI with a weak cap that did not produce high allowance prices.  
The inclusion of a weak cap caused environmental organizations to perceive 
misalignment between the policy's treatment of CO2 and the atmosphere and their pre-
existing interpretations of them (Caronna, 2004; Lindblom, 1977).  They did not believe 
that RGGI's cap size would significantly reduce the region's emissions.  Despite 
environmental organizations' vocal but not strident opinion about the emission cap, they 
were willing to accept or ignore this misalignment.  Environmental organizations 
appeared willing to accept the misalignment that resulted from using a weak cap because 
it reduced the misalignment that generators and consumers could perceive, which allowed 
them to support RGGI (Caronna, 2004).  Environmental organizations were still able to 
support the enactment of RGGI despite the misalignment they perceived because the 
misalignment was directional instead of contextual.  More specifically, environmental 
organizations' pre-existing interpretation of the atmosphere as a finite sink for CO2 was 
aligned with RGGI's treatment of it, but they diverged around how much CO2 the 
atmosphere could safely accept (Caronna, 2004; Lindblom, 1977).  By using a weak 
emissions cap, the SWG exploited environmental organizations' tolerance for directional 
misalignment to increase the alignment that generators and consumers perceived 
(Caronna, 2004; Fligstein, 1997).  This enabled all three categories of critical 
stakeholders to support the enactment of RGGI.  
 The structure and processes the SWG used to design RGGI revealed how different 
categories of stakeholders interpreted and used the materials and actions underlying the 
emission of electricity-derived CO2 (Scott, 2001).  Due to this, the SWG was able to 
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propose a policy that aligned with the pre-existing cultural controls generators, 
consumers, and environmental organizations held (Caronna, 2004; Fligstein, 1997).  The 
alignment these critical stakeholders perceived between their pre-existing cultural 
controls and those associated with RGGI enabled them to support the policy, which then 
facilitated its enactment (Caronna, 2004; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).   
 
Question 2: Did Policymakers Utilize Innovative Cap and Trade Features to Help Enact 
RGGI?  
 Over the past thirty years, cap and trade policies have been used to control a 
variety of environmental activities, and most existing and proposed policies to control 
CO2 emissions employ them (Freeman & Kolstad, 2007).  In practice, a variety of cap 
and trade designs have been deployed to control different environmental activities at 
different scales and with different degrees of stringency (Tietenberg, 2007).  Despite their 
pervasiveness, it is still difficult for policymakers to enact cap and trade policies to 
control CO2 emissions, but certain design features may facilitate their efforts (Cohen & 
Miller, 2012).  Reviewing the initial hypothesis associated with this question, the SWG 
attracted support for RGGI by limiting the economic and operational costs of compliance 
and their subsequent effects on the price of electricity, and by using the auction revenues 
to create new resources.  The design features that produced these effects included: pre-
existing monitoring and compliance requirements; a weak cap; an allowance auction; an 
allowance price collar; and a revenue recycler that supported energy efficiency.  The 
collective inclusion of these design features limited the economically-based misalignment 
that different categories of stakeholders could perceive between their pre-existing cultural 
controls and those underlying RGGI (Blanchard, 2008; Caronna, 2004; Lindblom, 1977; 
Scott, 2001).  In order to evaluate this hypothesis, the analysis identifies the innovative 
cap and trade features RGGI included and how they reduced the misalignment that 
generators, consumers, environmental, energy efficiency, public interest, and legal 
organizations could perceive (Caronna, 2004).  
 RGGI's weak cap was innovative because it was intentionally put into place to 
facilitate enactment.  The previous analytical section presented how RGGI was 
intentionally designed to minimize its economic impacts.  The initial weakness of the cap 
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was both a critical and known component in mitigating perceived economic impacts.  
Furthermore, over the course of the design meetings, environmental organizations 
repeatedly commented about the weakness of the cap, and that current emission levels 
were already below it.  Yet the initially proposed and weak emissions cap remained in 
place.   
While a weak cap's ability to significantly reduce CO2 emissions is rightly 
questioned, it did represent an effective tool for reducing the misalignment that 
generators and consumers could perceive between their pre-existing cultural controls and 
those embedded in a new policy (Caronna, 2004; Lindblom, 1977).  The benefit of a 
weak cap was especially apparent when the SWG attempted to enact a new policy to 
control CO2 emissions for the first time.  The misalignment that economically rational 
generators and consumer could perceive when a new formal policy was proposed to 
control CO2 emissions would be mitigated by making compliance inexpensive, and by 
limiting the policy's effects on the price of producing and purchasing electricity 
(Blanchard, 2008; Caronna, 2004; Scott, 2001).  Furthermore, any additional 
misalignment that emerged from using a weak cap instead of a stronger one would likely 
only be perceived by environmental organizations(Caronna, 2004).  As described in the 
previous analytical section, the lack of existing CO2 policies motivated environmental 
organizations to overlook this misalignment if doing so resulted in an enactable policy.  
 Along with making compliance inexpensive, policy designs that made compliance 
easy also reduced the misalignment that generators could perceive between their pre-
existing cultural controls and those of the policy (Caronna, 2004).  Expanding 
compliance periods and designing the monitoring and reporting requirements so they 
could be met with pre-existing or established equipment and procedures made 
compliance both easier and less expensive for generators.  In designing RGGI, the SWG 
asked generators about the types of equipment and procedures they were using to manage 
other emissions.  The SWG then selected CO2 monitoring and compliance strategies that 
piggybacked on top of these.  By giving generators ample time to utilize their pre-
existing skills and equipment to manage their CO2 emissions, the SWG reduced the 
misalignment they could perceive between their pre-existing interpretations and uses of 
CO2 and RGGI's treatment of it (Caronna, 2004; Fligstein, 1997; Lindblom, 1977).  
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 Putting aside the intentionally weakened cap and use of established monitoring 
requirements, the most innovative features of RGGI revolved around its distribution 
strategy.  RGGI pioneered a number of innovative cap and trade features by using a 
nearly-full auction to distribute allowances whose prices were bound by a reserve price 
and various safety triggers and whose revenues were then recycled.  On their own, these 
features did not lead to the enactment of RGGI.  However, when combined with the 
aforementioned weak cap, their collective effects did significantly reduce the 
misalignment that critical stakeholders could perceive, which then facilitated the 
enactment of RGGI (Caronna, 2004; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).  
 Prior to RGGI, auctioning most of the allowances associated with a cap and trade 
policy had been political anathema.  During the RGGI design process, generators 
expressed concern about purchasing most of their allowances through an auction.  They 
thought it would make it much more expensive to produce electricity, which would then 
increase the price for consumers.  However, alternative distribution strategies that 
minimized the economic costs imposed on generators, such as giving allowances away 
for free, enabled CO2 emitters to reap windfall profits from the policy.  Consumers, 
public interest, legal, and environmental organizations perceived significant 
misalignment between their pre-existing interpretations of CO2 and policy designs that 
allowed generators to profit from emitting CO2 (Caronna, 2004).  Non-generating 
stakeholders interpreted CO2 emissions as a benign, naturally-occurring material or as a 
pollutant needing regulation.  Neither of these pre-existing cultural controls involved 
treating CO2 as a material that generators should be rewarded for emitting.  If allowances 
were given to generators then RGGI would inherently position CO2 emissions as a new 
revenue stream for them.   
 Each of these distribution strategies caused a critical category of stakeholder to 
perceive misalignment between their pre-existing cultural controls and those 
encapsulated in these particular policy designs (Caronna, 2004; Lindblom, 1977).  In fact, 
during the RGGI design meetings it was initially difficult to find a policy design that 
could fairly balance the economic costs imposed upon generators and consumers.  
However, because the SWG had a good understanding of the pre-existing cultural 
controls held by different categories of stakeholders, they could re-position the allocation 
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of allowances in a way that satisfied generators and consumers (Fligstein, 1997).  
Specifically, the SWG was able to address the concerns of both generators and consumers 
by combining a weak cap with a nearly full allowance auction.  When the proposed cap 
sizes were built into the model, they demonstrated that auctioning the allowances 
associated with a weak cap resulted in low allowance prices.  These findings reduced the 
misalignment that generators could perceive between their pre-existing interpretations 
and uses of CO2-emitting equipment and RGGI's treatment of them (Caronna, 2004; 
Lindblom, 1977).  When allowance prices were low, generators could continue using and 
earning profits from the operation of their CO2-emitting technologies.  The combination 
of a weak cap and a nearly-full auction also reduced the misalignment that consumers, 
public interest, and legal organizations could perceive (Caronna, 2004).  The resulting 
low allowance price allowed generators to continue using their CO2-emitting 
technologies to ensure a reliable and cost effective supply of electricity, but prevented 
them from directly profiting from their CO2 emissions.  Lastly, the use of an auction did 
not prompt environmental organizations to perceive any misalignment between their pre-
existing cultural controls and those underlying RGGI, because the auction both priced 
and controlled CO2 emissions (Caronna, 2004). 
 When the SWG supplemented RGGI's allowance auction with a price collar it 
further reduced misalignment.  In particular, a reserve price was an especially critical 
feature when combining an auction with a weak cap.  Without it, the oversupply of 
allowances would quickly depress the price to zero.  Having a nearly zero auction price 
for allowances equated to giving them away for free.  Environmental stakeholders who 
believed that CO2 emissions need to be priced at some level, and non-generating 
stakeholders who did not view CO2 emissions as a new revenue stream for generators, 
would perceive misalignment with a policy design that gave allowances away for free 
(Caronna, 2004).   
 The SWG also included a number of safety triggers that allowed generators to use 
increasing amounts of offsets if the auction price exceeded certain thresholds.  Offsets 
enabled emission reduction requirements to be achieved outside the auction system, at a 
potentially lower cost.  The use of offsets also indirectly expanded the supply of 
allowances and pushed down their price.  Due to these considerations, the offset safety 
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triggers effectively functioned as a price ceiling.  For generators concerned about the 
price they would have to pay to emit CO2 and for consumers, public interest, and legal 
organizations who wanted to avoid electrical price spikes and reliability concerns, safety 
triggers reduced misalignment (Blanchard, 2008; Caronna, 2004).  The safety triggers 
capped the amount that generators would have to pay to operate their CO2-emitting 
technologies, which then guaranteed readily available and reasonably priced electricity 
supplies for consumers.  Different categories of stakeholders supported opposing sides of 
the price collar.  Including one side and not the other would have caused some 
stakeholders to perceive misalignment between their pre-existing cultural controls and 
those associated with RGGI (Caronna, 2004).  However, by including both sides of the 
price collar in the policy, the SWG was able to reduce misalignment altogether (Caronna, 
2004).  For generators and consumers concerned about operating costs, electricity prices, 
and reliability concerns, reasonably set reserve prices represented a fair trade for safety 
triggers.  On the other hand, environmental organizations and energy efficiency 
organizations concerned about an oversupply of allowances or the amount of revenue for 
recycling were willing to trade moderate safety triggers for a reserve price.  
 The SWG was further able to address the concerns of all categories of 
stakeholders without alienating any individual category by combining a price restricted 
auction with a revenue recycling mechanism that incentivized energy efficiency.  A large 
portion of RGGI's potential auction revenues were initially earmarked for energy 
efficiency.  When energy efficiency organizations built a corresponding increase in 
energy efficiency spending into the models, the results demonstrated that benefits would 
accrue to all categories of stakeholders.  The predicted benefits further reduced the 
misalignment that all categories of stakeholders could perceive between their pre-existing 
cultural controls and those underpinning RGGI (Caronna, 2004). 
 For generators, the benefits of recycling auction revenues to energy efficiency 
were twofold.  First, in suppressing the demand for electricity, energy efficiency would 
reduce the amount of CO2 emitted in the region, which would then suppress the demand 
for and the price of CO2 allowances.  Like those associated with a weak cap and safely 
triggers, the lower allowance price that would be induced by energy efficiency spending 
reduced the economically-based misalignment that generators could perceive (Blanchard, 
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2008; Caronna, 2004; Scott, 2001).  They could continue using and earning profits from 
the operation of their CO2-emitting technologies.  Second, if existing electrical supplies 
were used more efficiently, generators and utilities would not have to spend time and 
money constructing new generation, transmission, and distribution capacity.  Once RGGI 
explicitly supported a more efficient and cost effective use of the existing electrical 
system, its cultural controls became more aligned with how generators and utilities 
interpreted and utilized their own systems (Blanchard, 2008; Caronna, 2004; Lindblom, 
1977; Scott, 2001). 
 Consumers, energy efficiency, public interest, and legal organizations were also 
attracted to the reliability and economic benefits of energy efficiency.  Higher electricity 
prices and supply disruptions that led to brown-or blackouts would be minimized by 
suppressing demand.  Suppressing demand for electricity would also reduce the need to 
expand transmission and distribution capacity, which would further limit rate hikes and 
legal and permitting issues.  Jobs would also be created and economic health improved 
by increasing the efficient use of existing electrical supplies.  By recycling RGGI's 
revenues to energy efficiency, the SWG was able to exploit its many benefits to reduce 
the misalignment all categories of stakeholders could perceive without increasing the 
misalignment that any individual category could perceive (Caronna, 2004).   
 The concerns energy efficiency organizations held were the easiest to address.  
Hardwiring complementary policies that targeted energy efficiency into RGGI was 
enough to reduce the misalignment they could perceive (Caronna, 2004).  Increasing the 
use of energy efficiency also ensured that existing generation, transmission, and 
distribution technologies would more reliably and cost-effectively meet the region's 
electrical demand.  This benefit reduced the misalignment that consumers, public interest, 
and legal organizations could perceive between their pre-existing cultural controls and 
those underlying RGGI (Caronna, 2004; Lindblom, 1977).  Lastly, increasing energy 
efficiency spending would create jobs and spur further economic growth, which reduced 
the economically-based misalignment that all categories of stakeholders could perceive 
(Blanchard, 2008; Caronna, 2004; Scott, 2001).  Recycling auction revenues towards 
energy efficiency ensured that controlling CO2 emissions and the operation of CO2-
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emitting technologies would not eliminate jobs or put the region at a competitive 
disadvantage.  
 To ensure that RGGI would be enacted the SWG had to design a policy that 
generators, consumers, and environmental organizations could all support.  To attract 
their support the SWG had to design a policy aligned with their pre-existing cultural 
controls (Caronna, 2004).  This task was complicated by the diversity of pre-existing 
cultural controls these categories of stakeholders held.  This initially made it difficult to 
identify policy formulations that limited the misalignment that generators and consumers 
could both perceive (Caronna, 2004).   However, by building certain design features into 
RGGI the SWG was able to align the cultural controls underpinning the policy with the 
pre-existing ones held by all categories of stakeholders without prompting any individual 
category to perceive significant misalignment (Caronna, 2004; Fligstein, 1997; Lindblom, 
1977).  Specifically, by combining a weak cap, an allowance auction, a price collar, and a 
revenue recycler the SWG was able to design RGGI so that all categories of stakeholders 
could support its enactment.  Individually, many of these design features caused 
individual groups of stakeholders to perceive misalignment, but by combining them the 
SWG reduced the misalignment that all categories of stakeholders could perceive 
between their pre-existing cultural controls and those associated with RGGI (Caronna, 
2004; Fligstein, 1997; Lindblom, 1977).  This resulted in a policy design that was 
acceptable to generators, consumers, environmental, public interest, and legal 





























After nearly four years in existence and eighteen allowance auctions, RGGI is the 
longest running, mandatory CO2-controlling policy in the United States (Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 2012a, 2012b).  Due to RGGI's presence, regulated and non-
regulated organizations in New England and Mid-Atlantic states have been the first, and 
until AB 32's recent enactment, the only organizations in the U.S. to be directly affected 
by a mandatory CO2 policy that creates new resources for energy efficiency (California 
Environmental Protection Agency: Air Resources Board, 2012a).  This chapter explores 
the effects RGGI is having on these individuals and organizations.  The following 
analysis is directed by the two effects research questions.  Specifically, it focuses on 
whether RGGI is changing how individuals and organizations interpret and use CO2, the 
operation of CO2-emitting equipment, electricity, and energy efficiency technologies and 
practices.  The analysis is then extended to identify whether these changes are affecting 
the development of additional CO2 policies or innovation in or the diffusion of energy 
efficiency technologies and practices.  
The chapter proceeds as follows.  First, the operations of RGGI to date and the 
ways that different individuals and organizations can be affected by the policy are 
described and used to preview the hypotheses to be tested.  Then the methodologies used 
to collect the data are discussed.  Next, data about RGGI's effects on the electrical 
industry are presented and analyzed. Beyond its cap and trade component, RGGI's most 
influential design feature is its revenue recycler.  As the majority of RGGI's auction 
revenues are being recycled to support energy efficiency, this chapter analyzes the effects 
that are being induced by this new funding source along with those that are being brought 
about by the cap and trade component of the policy.  Data about RGGI’s CO2 allowances 
137 
 
are presented and analyzed first. They are followed by a second section that presents data 
and analysis about RGGI's energy efficiency revenue recycler.  
The CO2 allowance and energy efficiency data are based on regulated and non-
regulated organizations' interpretations and opinions about RGGI, CO2 emissions, CO2-
emitting technologies, electricity, and energy efficiency.  Presented data were also 
collected from popular and industry publications that describe the relationship between 
CO2 emissions and the electrical system and that discuss the development and use of 
energy efficiency technologies and practices. Lastly, data from the 2012-13 RGGI review 
meetings are also included in this chapter.  In the CO2 allowance section, multiple data 
sources are aggregated together to analyze whether RGGI is shifting individual and 
organizational interpretations of CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies.  In 
the energy efficiency section, the data sources are combined to evaluate whether RGGI is 
shifting individual and organizational interpretations of electricity consumption and 
energy efficiency technologies and practices.  The chapter concludes with a short 
analytical section that combines the insights that emerged from each of the two lines of 
inquiry.  
 
RGGI's Current Operations, Affected Organizations, and Effects Hypotheses 
 
As introduced in the background chapter, RGGI's initial cap size was based on the 
region's historical emissions and was set at 188 million short tons of CO2 (Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 2009). However, in the year before RGGI became operational 
regulated organizations in the region only emitted 153 million short tons of CO2  
(Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 2009).  Due to the difference between the two 
emission levels, there was and continues to be an oversupply of emissions allowances. 
Furthermore, during RGGI's first years of operations two external events reduced the 
amount of CO2 emitted in the region, which made the oversupply of allowances even 
larger. The first event was the economic recession that began in the mid to late 2000s 
(Stavins, 2012).  The recession suppressed the demand for electricity in the region, and 
prompted generators to restrict the operation of their CO2-emitting equipment, which led 
to lower CO2 emissions (Stavins, 2012).  The second event revolved around the 
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emergence of increasingly inexpensive natural gas supplies (Stavins, 2012).  Newly 
applied hydraulic fracturing extraction technologies opened up non-conventional reserves 
of natural gas and the expanded supply caused prices to fall (Stavins, 2012).  When 
situated alongside the newly enacted allowance price for CO2, the emergence of 
increasingly inexpensive natural gas supplies prompted many generators to accelerate the 
replacement of older coal- and oil-fired facilities that were nearing the end of their 
operational lives with new natural gas-fired facilities (Stavins, 2012).  The combustion of 
natural gas releases about half as much CO2 as the combustion of coal and about a third 
as much as the combustion of oil so the transition from oil- and coal-fired facilities to 
natural gas-fired facilities reduced the amount of CO2 emitted in the region (U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 2007). 
RGGI's initial cap size and the CO2 reductions that were brought about by these 
external events resulted in an oversupply of emission allowances.  As of the end of 2012, 
this oversupply has pushed the current period allowance price to the reserve price for the 
last eight, out of a total of sixteen, RGGI auctions (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 
2012d).  However, even with this oversupply, the presence of a reserve price has enabled 
RGGI auctions to raise over 1 billion dollars to date (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 
2012d).  Of these billion dollars, approximately 500 million have been allocated to 
support energy efficiency (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 2011b).  Given RGGI's 
design, its effects upon individuals and organizations in the region primarily stem from 
the CO2 allowances it creates and prices, and from the resources it creates and distributes 
to support energy efficiency.  The effects that are being induced by RGGI's CO2 
allowances are evaluated through the first hypothesis to be tested, while those associated 
with the energy efficiency revenue recycler are evaluated through the second.  
 
The Effects of RGGI's CO2 Allowances  
Generators who operate qualified CO2-emitting electrical facilities in the RGGI 
states have to purchase an emission allowance for every ton of CO2 they want to emit.  
This means that RGGI's emission allowances are having the greatest effect on generating 
organizations.  However, other individuals and organizations in and outside the region are 
also being affected to lesser degrees by RGGI's emission allowances.  These include the 
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consumers that purchase electricity, because the price they pay now includes the price of 
the CO2 allowances.  They also include policymakers inside the region that are working 
to extend or strengthen RGGI, and policymakers outside the region that are working on 
CO2 policies for other geographic or industrial sources.  Different policymakers are 
observing and evaluating the effects the price and availability of allowances are having 
on generators and electricity supplies because RGGI represents the first mandatory CO2 
policy that utilizes a nearly-full allowance auction.  Within the region, these evaluations 
and observations are informing policymakers' efforts to strengthen and to extend RGGI.  
Policymakers outside the region are also using them to ascertain the viability of including 
allowance auctions in other geographically or industrially distinct CO2 policies.  
Historically, generators and consumers had primarily interpreted CO2 as a benign, 
naturally occurring material and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies as a clean, 
safe, and desirable activity (Hirsh, 2002; Hulme, 2009; Schnaiberg, 1980).  Under these 
meanings, generators could freely emit as much CO2 as they wanted and their use of 
CO2-emitting equipment was not constrained by the amount of CO2 they released.  
However, by enacting RGGI, policymakers are trying to highlight alternative meanings 
and uses for CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies (Fligstein, 1997).  More 
specifically, policymakers deployed RGGI to get individuals and organizations to 
interpret and use CO2 as a dangerous material that needs to be controlled and the 
operation of CO2-emitting equipment as a less clean, safe, and desirable activity that 
needs to be controlled (Fligstein, 1997).  The difference between the two sets of 
meanings is significant because it directly impacts how generators use their equipment to 
produce the electricity that consumers demand.  
As a market-based policy, RGGI affects how generators use their CO2-emitting 
equipment to produce electricity because they now have to purchase an allowance for 
every ton they emit (Lindblom, 2001).  In other words, using the meanings for CO2 and 
the operation of CO2-emitting technologies that RGGI encapsulates creates new costs for 
generators that affect their ability to use their equipment to meet the demand for 
electricity.  Generators have been defined as economically rational.  In the context of this 
research, this means generators primarily interpret and use the physical materials and 
behavioral actions associated with electricity-derived CO2 emissions according to their 
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effects on their costs and revenues (Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  Accordingly, 
generators are inclined to interpret CO2 emission allowances, and the alternative 
meanings for CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting equipment that underlie them, as 
new costs that decrease the revenues they can earn from producing electricity (Blanchard, 
2008; Scott, 2001).  Furthermore, as economically rational organizations, generators are 
motivated to reduce the costs they have to pay to produce electricity in order to maximize 
the revenues they can earn (Blanchard, 2008).  In fact, the formal effects of the RGGI 
policy hinge on this response, as its ability to reduce CO2 emissions is based on 
generators' rational reaction to new allowance prices (Blanchard, 2008; Lindblom, 2001).  
The higher the allowance price the greater the motivation to reduce CO2 emissions 
(Stavins & Whitehead, 1992).  
However, because generators primarily interpret physical materials and 
behavioral actions through their effects on their costs and revenues, they can view new 
meanings whose use increases the cost of producing electricity as illegitimate or invalid 
(Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  Under this perspective, higher priced CO2 allowances 
and more costly CO2 compliance requirements make it more expensive for generators to 
use the meanings for CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies underlying the 
policy.  The higher the cost of using these meanings the more likely generators would 
contest their use by contesting the existence of RGGI (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).  In 
reality, RGGI's low allowance prices and easy compliance requirements make it 
inexpensive for generators to use the new meanings encapsulated within the policy.  
Generator's interpretations are primarily influenced by the costs and revenues associated 
with using different meanings, so they would be more accepting of these new meanings 
and the policy that is conveying them because the cost of using them is low (Blanchard, 
2008; Lindblom, 1977; Scott, 2001).  Similarly, RGGI's use of a revenue recycler allows 
generators to benefit from using the new meanings embedded in the policy, so they 
would be even more inclined to accept their use and to support the policy they underlie 
(Blanchard, 2008; Lindblom, 1977; Scott, 2001).  It does not cost generators much to use 
the new meanings for CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting equipment associated with 
RGGI so they would be more willing to accept them and to use them to describe and 
organize their operations (Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  
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Consumers of electricity have also been defined as economically rational.  This 
means consumers primarily interpret the physical materials and behavioral actions 
underlying CO2 emissions through their effects on the price and availability of the 
electricity they use to produce the services they desire (Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  
Based on these pre-existing cultural controls, consumers are inclined to view CO2 
allowances and the alternative meanings for CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting 
technologies associated with them as new regulations that impact the price and 
availability of electrical supplies (Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  If the use of these new 
meanings drastically increases the cost or restricts the availability of electricity then 
consumers would be more likely to contest their use by contesting the existence of RGGI 
(Blanchard, 2008; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Scott, 2001).  
In practice, consumers would be willing to interpret CO2 and the operation of 
CO2-emitting equipment through the meanings encapsulated in RGGI because the low 
allowance price ensures that doing so does not affect the price or availability of electricity 
supplies (Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  Similarly, RGGI's revenue recycler would also 
allow consumers to support the meanings underlying RGGI because its use is stabilizing 
the price and improving the availability of electrical supplies in addition to creating other 
consumer benefits (Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  Consumers can benefit from using the 
meanings embedded in the RGGI policy so they would be more accepting of their use 
and supportive of the policy that is conveying them (Blanchard, 2008; Lindblom, 1977; 
Scott, 2001).  
This research does not assume the policymakers observing RGGI and its effects 
on generators and consumers are motivated by economic rationality.  Rather this research 
posits that if policymakers are monitoring RGGI they are involved with the extension of 
RGGI or the development of other existing or potential CO2 policies.  However, much 
like the initial enactment of RGGI, policymakers' ability to enact new or to strengthen 
existing CO2 policies is predicated on generators' and consumers' support for them.  If 
generators and consumers accept the new meanings for CO2 and the operation of CO2-
emitting technologies, and by extension RGGI, they would be more willing to support 
stronger or additional CO2 policies (Caronna, 2004).  This chapter tests the hypothesis 
that RGGI's low compliance costs and newly created resources are inducing generators 
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and consumers to accept the new meanings embedded in the policy and the policy itself 
(Blanchard, 2008; Lindblom, 1977; Scott, 2001).  It then extends this analysis to evaluate 
whether generators' and consumers' support for a CO2 cap and trade policy with a nearly-
full auction is affecting the extension of RGGI and the development of additional CO2 
policies.  
 
The Effects of RGGI's Energy Efficiency Revenue Recycler  
By creating new funds that are being allocated to support energy efficiency, 
RGGI's revenue recycler is affecting electrical companies, consumers, electricity 
regulators or PUCs, and energy efficiency organizations.  With regard to electrical 
companies, utilities deliver the electricity consumers use and are the main source of 
information about electricity consumption (Casazza & Delea, 2009).  They are also the 
primary propagator of energy efficiency information, programs, technologies, and rebates 
(York et al., 2012).  Due to their involvement with the diffusion of energy efficiency 
technologies and practices, utilities are being affected by the creation of new energy 
efficiency resources.  Consumers utilize the electricity utilities provide and they adopt 
and use energy efficiency technologies and practices, which means they are also being 
affected by new energy efficiency resources.  Electricity regulators or PUCs implement 
energy efficiency requirements and incentives and determine the costs and revenues that 
utilities incur or receive from the deployment of energy efficiency initiatives (Casazza & 
Delea, 2009; York et al., 2012).  PUCs' role in determining the use and economic 
viability of energy efficiency technologies and practices means they are also being 
affected by new energy efficiency resources.  
Despite their obvious connection to new energy efficiency resources, energy 
efficiency organizations are only indirectly being affected by them.  Energy efficiency 
organizations are not being directly affected by RGGI's new energy efficiency resources 
for a number of reasons.  First, unlike utilities, consumers, and PUCs, energy efficiency 
organizations are not tied to a particular geographic location (Casazza & Delea, 2009).  
This means they can choose whether they operate in RGGI states, and thus whether and 
how they are affected by these new resources.  Second, by definition energy efficiency 
organizations already appreciate the benefits energy efficiency technologies and practices 
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can provide and unlike many generators and consumers are already motivated to increase 
the use of them (Hayes et al., 2011; Jaffe & Stavins, 1994a; Kushler et al., 2006; Zhao et 
al., 2012).  This limits the degree that new energy efficiency resources could change how 
these organizations are interpreting and using these technologies and practices.  Third, 
energy efficiency organizations are not directly regulated by PUCs (Casazza & Delea, 
2009; York et al., 2012).  This means that energy efficiency standards are not applied to 
them and their revenues are not determined in rate cases.  Instead, utilities typically hire 
energy efficiency organizations to help their customers reduce their electricity 
consumption, which then enables the utility to achieve its efficiency requirements (York 
et al., 2012).  The utility then pays the energy efficiency organization according to the 
savings it achieves.  Due to the relationships between utilities, PUCs, consumers, and 
energy efficiency organizations, the effects that new energy efficiency resources are 
having upon energy efficiency organizations are first mediated by their effects on utilities, 
consumers, and PUCs.  In other words, new energy efficiency resources are affecting 
utilities, consumers, and PUCs, and the subsequent shifts in how these individuals and 
organizations interpret and use energy efficiency initiatives are then affecting energy 
efficiency organizations.  Energy efficiency organizations regularly communicate and 
interact with electrical companies, PUCs, and consumers, and this relational position 
enables them to directly observe how these individuals and organizations are interpreting 
the use of energy efficiency technologies and practices (York et al., 2012).  This research 
draws upon the expertise of energy efficiency organizations to help identify the effects 
that new energy efficiency resources are having on utilities, consumers, and PUCs.  
Historically, generators, consumers, and PUCs viewed the production of fossil 
fuel-based electricity as a socially beneficial activity that should be encouraged (Hirsh, 
2002; Hughes, 1993; Schnaiberg, 1980).  This led generators, consumers, and PUCs to 
interpret the consumption of fossil fuel-based electricity as a socially beneficial activity 
that should be encouraged as well (Hirsh, 2002; Hughes, 1993; Schnaiberg, 1980).  
Under these meanings, the best way to meet consumers' demand for electricity was by 
expanding the supply (Hirsh, 2002).  However, by enacting RGGI and recycling its 
revenues to energy efficiency, policymakers are trying to emphasize alternative meanings 
and uses for electricity and energy efficiency technologies and practices (Fligstein, 1997).  
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More specifically, policymakers deployed RGGI to get individuals and organizations to 
interpret and use electricity as an energy source whose production and consumption 
should not be continuously increasing (Brint & Karabel, 1991).  As part of this, 
policymakers are trying to shift how individuals and organizations interpret energy 
efficiency technologies and practices so demand can be met by reducing electricity 
consumption instead of just by expanding the supply (Brint & Karabel, 1991; Fligstein, 
1997).  
Electrical companies or utilities have been defined as economically rational, 
which means they interpret and use electricity and energy efficiency initiatives according 
to the profits they can earn from them (Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  Traditionally, 
utilities could not earn profits from reducing electricity consumption (Hirsh, 2002; 
Kushler et al., 2006).  This meant they interpreted energy efficiency initiatives that 
reduced electricity consumption as unprofitable expenditures, which made their use 
unappealing (Blanchard, 2008; Kushler et al., 2006; Scott, 2001).  Furthermore, because 
utilities considered energy efficiency initiatives unprofitable and undesirable endeavors 
they were less likely to appreciate or value the other benefits they can provide, such as 
their ability to reduce CO2 emissions or to limit the construction of new supply resources 
(Blanchard, 2008; Kushler et al., 2006; Scott, 2001).  However, RGGI is creating new 
resources that are being used to make reducing electricity consumption through energy 
efficiency initiatives a profitable activity for utilities.  Once utilities view reducing 
electricity consumption through energy efficiency as a profitable activity they would be 
more inclined to interpret the deployment and adoption of energy efficiency technologies 
and practices favorably (Blanchard, 2008; Hayes et al., 2011; Scott, 2001).  This would 
then make the other benefits that energy efficiency technologies and practice can provide 
more valuable.  As utilities come to appreciate the different benefits that energy 
efficiency technologies and practice can provide they would be more motivated to 
actually deploy them to reduce electricity consumption.  
Electricity consumers have also been defined as economically rational, which 
means they interpret and use electricity and energy efficiency initiatives through the costs 
they have to pay to get the services they desire (Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  
Traditionally, consumers had to pay the upfront cost of adopting energy efficiency 
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technologies and practices, either directly by purchasing them or indirectly by paying 
system benefit charges (Hirsh, 2002; Jaffe & Stavins, 1994a; York et al., 2012).  Under 
this approach, energy efficiency technologies and practices represented an additional 
upfront cost that consumers had to pay to get the services they desired, which made 
adopting them to reduce electricity consumption unappealing  (Blanchard, 2008; Jaffe & 
Stavins, 1994a; Scott, 2001).  Moreover, because consumers interpreted energy efficiency 
initiatives as undesirable new costs, they were less inclined to perceive the benefits they 
can provide, such as their ability to reduce CO2 and to provide the services that 
consumers desire with less electricity (Blanchard, 2008; Jaffe & Stavins, 1994a; Scott, 
2001; Zhao et al., 2012).  However, RGGI is creating new resources that are being used 
to reduce the upfront costs that consumers have to pay to reduce their electricity 
consumption through the use of energy efficiency technologies and practices.  Once it is 
free or inexpensive for consumers to reduce their electricity consumption through energy 
efficiency initiatives they would be more inclined to interpret the use of them favorably 
(Blanchard, 2008; Jaffe & Stavins, 1994a; Scott, 2001; Zhao et al., 2012).  This would 
then make consumers more aware and appreciative of the other benefits that energy 
efficiency technologies and practices can provide.  As consumers become more aware 
and desiring of the different benefits energy efficiency initiatives can provide they would 
become more interested in actually adopting them to reduce the amount of electricity they 
are consuming.  
Electricity regulators or PUCs determine the price consumers pay for electrical 
service (Casazza & Delea, 2009).  In this role, they try to limit rate hikes and supply 
disruptions to minimize the price consumers have to pay to get the services they desire 
from using electricity (Casazza & Delea, 2009).  As a result, PUCs can also be defined as 
economically rational.  More specifically, PUCs interpret electricity and energy 
efficiency initiatives through their effects on the costs consumers pay to get the services 
they desire (Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001). Traditionally, energy efficiency initiatives 
have been funded by applying a small system benefit charge to each consumers' 
electricity bill (York et al., 2012).  This meant that PUCs primarily interpreted energy 
efficiency initiatives as a new cost imposed on consumers (Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  
When electricity supplies were inexpensive and readily available the upfront cost 
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associated with deploying energy efficiency initiatives limited PUCs’ desire to accelerate 
the diffusion of them (York et al., 2012).  Furthermore, when PUCs primarily interpreted 
energy efficiency initiatives as upfront costs they would be less inclined to view and 
value the other benefits energy efficiency can provide, whether saving consumers money 
over time, limiting new construction, or reducing CO2 emissions (Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 
2001).  However, parts of RGGI's revenues are being recycled to reduce the upfront costs 
that PUCs have to impose on consumers to fund energy efficiency initiatives.  Once 
PUCs view reducing electricity consumption through energy efficiency as an activity that 
does not impose new costs on consumers they would be more inclined to interpret the use 
of these technologies and practices favorably, even when electricity is inexpensive and 
readily available (Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  This would then make the other 
benefits energy efficiency initiatives can provide more visible and valuable to PUCs.  As 
the benefits energy efficiency technologies and practices can provide become more 
apparent to PUCs, they would be more motivated to accelerate the diffusion of them in 
order to reduce electricity consumption.  
This chapter tests the hypotheses that the new resources being created by RGGI 
make the many benefits of energy efficiency more visible and valuable to generators, 
consumers, and PUCs.  More specifically, it evaluates whether these resources are 
making consumers and PUCs more receptive to reducing electricity consumption through 
energy efficiency technologies and practices by reducing the upfront costs of adopting or 
deploying them.  It also evaluates whether these resources are making utilities more 
receptive to reducing electricity consumption through energy efficiency by making the 
deployment of these technologies and practices profitable endeavors.  These analytical 
positions are then combined to analyze whether changing consumers', utilities', and 
PUCs' interpretations of energy efficiency technologies and practices affects the diffusion 




This chapter analyzes whether and how enacting a new formal policy for an 
uncontrolled environmental activity is affecting how regulated and non-regulated 
147 
 
individuals and organizations interpret and use the physical materials and behavioral 
actions underlying CO2 emissions.  Part of the data included in this chapter was directly 
collected, through surveys and interviews, from regulated and non-regulated individuals 
and organizations in the region. Another type of data included in this chapter was drawn 
from newspaper and industry publications.  The industry publications depict how 
organizations involved in the electrical sector, both generators and utilities, view the 
physical materials and behavioral actions associated with CO2 emissions. The newspaper 
publications include the perspectives of consumers, PUCs, and electrical companies in 
the region, and show how they view these materials and activities, as well as RGGI itself.  
These data sources are used to ascertain how these individuals and organizations had 
been interpreting and using these materials and actions and whether and how the 
enactment of RGGI is changing them.  
Multiple types of data were collected.  Data were collected from a variety of 
different organizations in order to provide a regional and an industry analysis of RGGI, 
and to identify how the policy is affecting different types of individuals and organizations.  
Additionally, the diversity of data types and data sources allowed points or findings that 
came up in the archival analysis or interviews to be triangulated for verification and 
accuracy.  The variety of data types also enabled the initial archival analysis to inform the 
content of the surveys and interviews, and their results were then used to refine the codes 
used in the archival analysis.  Within the surveys and interviews, it is possible that 
participants exaggerated or misrepresented their organization's environmental culture and 
activities to inflate their image or to impress the researcher; however, three 
considerations make this type of response unlikely.  First, the topics covered revolved 
around the treatment of CO2 emissions, RGGI, CO2 monitoring equipment, and energy 
efficiency programs and initiatives.  As many organizations actively discussed and 
promoted their environmental efforts in corporate reports, newspapers, and websites, 
significantly distorting their interpretations and initiatives would have been both difficult 
and somewhat transparent.  Second, the surveys and interviews were introduced and 
conducted under the promise of anonymity, which limited the benefits that could accrue 
to organizations from misrepresenting their responses, as well as their motivations for 
doing so.  Lastly, popular and industry publications and the RGGI review process often 
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reference the largest organizations in the region and their environmental activities by 
name, which created opportunities to confirm the accuracy of responses through further 
triangulation. 
In terms of the changes that are occurring within the electrical industry, survey 
and interview participants had even less ability and motivation to distort their responses.  
First, given that all the survey and interview data were collected under the promise of 
anonymity, it is unlikely that respondents over-or under-reported the emerging and novel 
practices and initiatives they are undertaking.  Second, the electrical industry is a large 
and interconnected system that exhibits technical and geographic redundancies.  This 
means that even if some organizations were withholding or exaggerating information 
about their newest initiatives, other similar, but technologically or geographically distinct 
organizations could also be engaging in them more openly and honestly.  To this end, 
survey and interview responses about changes in the electrical system were confirmed by 
asking multiple respondents about an emerging technology or practice and then 
comparing their responses for accuracy.  Finally, certain electrical industry publications 
are specifically tasked with identifying and reporting on new technical and procedural 
innovations.  Their coverage of these subjects enabled survey and interview responses to 
be further triangulated, and this offered an additional check on possible exaggerated 
claims.  
To evaluate the effects of RGGI, the names and types of organizations owning 
generation facilities in the RGGI states were identified by combining the data found in 
the RGGI.org database of regulated facilities with the OneSource Global Business 
Browser and company websites.  Next, environmental or sustainability personnel in these 
organizations were identified through the OneSource Global Business Browser, company 
websites, and personal phone calls.  Once identified, a short survey (Appendix A) about 
their companies' involvement with CO2 emissions and emission allowances was 
electronically mailed to these individuals.  The survey was accompanied by an 
information letter that described the scope and goals of the research, the type of data 
being collected, how it would be used, the IRB approval codes, as well as the anonymity 
policies of the research.  The survey also asked whether the individual would be willing 
to participate in a follow-up interview.  Thirteen surveys were completed and emailed 
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back.  The responses came from a variety of different generating organizations, including 
several of the largest in the region.  A number of survey questions and comprehensive 
responses to them are presented in the following data sections.  Questions that address the 
analytical topics covered in the section and clear or detailed responses to them were 
selected for presentation.  
Many individuals replied that they preferred to discuss the questions during a 
phone interview rather than filling out the survey.  The resulting interviews and follow-up 
interviews from the returned surveys revolved around the companies' involvement in CO2 
monitoring and management, compliance with RGGI, and other environmental or 
sustainability initiatives that touched on CO2 emissions.  Particularly, demand-side 
management was often brought up as a strategy for reducing CO2 emissions and 
improving environmental performance.  At the end of the interviews the respondents 
were asked if they could recommend other individuals within or outside their 
organization who would be willing to talk about their involvement with CO2 emissions, 
their impressions of RGGI, or their involvement with demand-side management.  This 
snowball approach illuminated a number of individuals and organizations that were 
associated with RGGI, the region's electrical system, and CO2 emissions, but were not 
regulated emitters.  These included companies involved with renewable energy, 
transmission, distribution, demand-side management, and energy efficiency, as well as 
NGOs, research agencies, environmental agencies, and policy think tanks.  An 
introductory letter was then sent to individuals in these organizations asking if they 
would be willing to be interviewed for this research project.  This letter was accompanied 
by the aforementioned project information sheet.  Following these interviews, the same 
snowball approach was applied to identify additional individuals and organizations for 
interviews.  
Overall, 51 interviews were conducted with individuals associated with the New 
England and Mid-Atlantic electrical systems (Chart 3).  48 interviews were conducted on 
the phone, two were conducted in person, and one involved a series of email exchanges.  
The interviews ranged from 15 minutes to one and a half hours and averaged 
approximately 30 minutes.  The participants were asked if the interview could be 
recorded and if direct quotations could be used in the research.  All but two agreed to 
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these conditions.  Those two allowed notes to be taken of the conversation, but not direct 
quotes.  All of the recorded interviews were transcribed, and they and the conversational 
notes were coded by content with Nvivo qualitative software.  Various quotations from 
these interviews are included in the following data sections.  Quotations that address the 
analytical topics covered in this chapter in a clear and detailed fashion were selected for 
presentation.  
An archival search was also conducted to provide both a regional and an industry 
perspective.  A regional perspective, which includes the views held by regulated and non-
regulated electrical companies, consumers, and PUCs in the region, was achieved by 
collecting articles from newspapers from two large cities under the auspices of RGGI, 
New York City and Boston.  These sources depict a regional perspective because they 
cover the major events that are affecting the inhabitants of these cities, states, and region, 
such as the enactment of RGGI.  Furthermore, these newspapers’ coverage of CO2 
emissions and energy efficiency initiatives primarily draws upon and reflects the opinions 
and impressions of the companies, consumers, and PUCs that reside within the region.  
ProQuest historical records of The New York Times from January 1988 to 
December 2010 and Access World News historical records of the Boston Globe from the 
same range of dates were searched for articles that include text on CO2 emissions and the 
electrical industry.  1988 was chosen because this was the year the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was created, which helped to establish the initial 
connection between CO2 emissions and global climate change (Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change, 2012).  Within the archival sources, articles that contain one of these 
terms (CO2, climate change, greenhouse gases, global warming, RGGI, carbon cap, 
carbon tax, or carbon policy) and one of these terms (electricity, electrical generation, or 
electrical industry) were collected.  During this search it became clear that these filters 
were not picking up all of the articles referencing RGGI, so a separate filter for only 
RGGI articles was applied to the New York Times and Boston Globe.  This search 
included articles from January 1988 to October 2012, a period which includes the first 
four full years of RGGI auctions.  All of the articles were then imported into Nvivo and 
coded.  The CO2 specific set of newspaper articles was first coded according to the 
technologies each article mentions and then by the meanings or arguments that were used 
151 
 
to describe these technologies (Chart 4). The RGGI specific articles were coded 
according to the meanings or arguments that were used to describe the policy (Chart 5). 
An industry perspective was achieved by collecting articles from electrical 
industry journals and a green energy internet publication.  The industry journals and time 
periods searched include: Power Systems (PS), from 1988 to 2010; Power Engineering 
Review (PER), from 1988 to 2002; and Power and Energy Magazine (PEM), from 2003 
to 2010.  PER ended publication in 2002, and PEM was first published in 2003.  As these 
journals explicitly dealt with the electrical sector, articles that mention CO2, climate 
change, greenhouse gases, global warming, RGGI, carbon cap, carbon tax, or carbon 
policy were collected.  For PS and PER only abstracts are available for the entire range of 
dates, though complete articles are available for PEM.  The abstracts and articles 
identified in the search were then coded in Nvivo according to the types of electrical 
technologies and topics they discuss, and then by the characteristics used to describe or 
define them (Chart 6).  Additionally, Green Tech Media (GTM), a leading green energy 
internet publication, was monitored every day from November 2010 to December 2011 
for articles that describe innovation in and around the energy efficiency space.  These 
articles were also imported into Nvivo and were coded with the industry journal codes.  
The codes that were selected and utilized are specific to particular sources and 
topics.  This means that some codes are applied to a large number of articles while others 
are only applied to a few.  In particular, the industry journals published approximately 
100 to 200 articles per year, of which one third to one half were usually devoted to 
administrative topics, such as industry events, awards, leadership profiles, and book 
reviews.  The significance of the effects that are illuminated by a code applied to a 
relatively small number of articles in an individual year may be limited.  However, 
analyzing the chronological pattern of articles that reference a particular code can reveal 
significant effects even if the raw number of articles referencing a particular code at one 
particular period of time is relatively small.  For instance, a code that is only applied to a 
few articles in one particular year may appear insignificant, but if these are the only 
articles that include the code over a period of years then their appearance represents a 
significant change in coverage or attention.  In fact, some of the topics that are presented 
in the following data sections were not referenced for many years, but then were 
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discussed much more frequently.  Due to these patterns, shifts in the number of articles 
referencing a code over time can reflect significant effects even if the number of articles 
referencing a particular code in an individual year is relatively small.  
Lastly, over the course of 2012-13 RGGI has been undergoing its first review 
period. Similar to the initial design process, the documents from the meetings comprising 
this review period have been made available to the public via RGGI.org.  These 
documents were analyzed to identify the types of organizations participating in the 
review and the topics being reviewed. These topics include organizations’ impressions 
about RGGI's performance thus far, their opinions about whether the policy should 
continue, and if so, whether and what types of changes should be made.  Like those 
associated with the surveys and interviews, passages from these meetings that address the 
analytical topics covered in this chapter in a clear and detailed manner were selected for 
presentation.  
 
Introducing RGGI’s Effects 
 
The data presented in this chapter are separated into two sections, which are each 
followed by a corresponding analytical section.  The first data and analysis section 
focuses on CO2 allowances and RGGI, while the second looks at RGGI’s energy 
efficiency revenue recycler. Both sections employ similar structures.  The archival data 
that were collected from newspapers and industry journals are presented first to situate 
RGGI's effects within the broader regional and industrial context they are occurring 
within.  The information drawn from the aggregated archival documents focuses on the 
number of articles that include a particular technology or descriptive code over time.  For 
CO2 emissions and RGGI, these data sources depict how the relationship between CO2 
emissions and the electrical system was presented in newspaper articles and industry 
journals prior to and following the enactment of RGGI. These articles also show how 
individuals and organizations in the region have interpreted and reacted to the RGGI 
policy itself.  For energy efficiency technologies and practices, the archival sources 
demonstrate how newspaper and industry journal articles that connect CO2 emissions and 
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electricity had been depicting the use of energy efficiency technologies and practices 
prior to and following the enactment of RGGI.  
After these trends are presented, individual and organizational-level information 
about RGGI, CO2 emissions, and energy efficiency are presented to determine whether 
and how individuals’ and organizations’ interpretations and uses of these topics are 
shifting.  In the CO2 and RGGI section, survey and interview data focus on consumers’ 
and organizations’ interpretations and uses of CO2 emissions and the operation of CO2-
emitting technologies.  In the energy efficiency section, survey, interview, and industry 
publication data about electrical organizations’, consumers’, and PUCs’ uses and 
impressions of electricity and energy efficiency technologies and practices are described.  
In both sections, textual passages are the main data sources that are presented.  Per the 
research's anonymity conditions, generic identifiers, such as environmental employee for 
a generator, are used to define the individual and organization being referenced.  
The two data sections then return to a broader regional and industry perspective.  
For the CO2 and RGGI section, this perspective addresses RGGI’s regional and industry 
effects and its extension and contestation.  The data are drawn from interviews, 
newspaper articles, and the RGGI 2012-13 review meetings, and include textual passages 
from these sources.  In the energy efficiency section, an industry perspective is used to 
identify changes in the use of energy efficiency technologies and practices, the types that 
are deployed, and their integration into broader electrical systems.  This data include 
textual passages from interviews as well as from articles that were published in industry 
publications.  The interview data in these sections are described with generic identifiers, 
while the archival data include the source that published it and the date when it was 
published.  
 
Data and Analysis about CO2 Allowances and RGGI  
 
This section presents and analyzes data about the effects the creation and 
distribution of RGGI’s CO2 allowances are having on individuals and organizations.  
Archival data that describe regional and industrial interpretations and uses of CO2 and the 
operation of CO2-emitting technologies are presented first. They are followed by survey 
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and interview data that describe whether and how RGGI is changing individual and 
organizational interpretations and uses of CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting 
technologies.  Next, data that describe the regional and industrial implications of RGGI, 
including efforts to extend and contest the policy, are presented.  Following, the 
information is analyzed to answer whether RGGI is changing how electrical companies 
and consumers interpret and use CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies, 
and then if these changes are affecting attempts to develop stronger or additional CO2 
policies. 
  
Regional and Industry Level Data about CO2 and RGGI  
Articles from The New York Times and Boston Globe depict how electrical 
companies and consumers in the region interpret CO2 emissions and RGGI.  The 
newspaper archival sources show that individuals and organizations in the region are 
increasingly connecting CO2 emissions with the electrical system.  Furthermore, the 
increasing coverage in the region is well aligned with the enactment and ongoing 
presence of RGGI.  This pattern shows that electrical companies and consumers in the 
region are increasingly identifying CO2 emissions as a byproduct of producing electricity, 
and that RGGI accentuated this awareness even further.  The number of articles in 
industry journals that reference CO2 emissions has fluctuated over time.  However, 
PEM’s and PS’s coverage of CO2 emissions has increased, and this does map onto the 
development, enactment, and presence of RGGI.  The pattern demonstrates that electrical 
companies had been historically aware of CO2 emissions and their association with the 
electrical system, but their attention to the connection between the topics varied 
significantly.  This suggests that electrical companies were not consistently treating CO2 
and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies as controlled but that they are now doing 
so more frequently.  
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Figure 4       Figure 5 
  
 
In the RGGI region, newspaper articles that address the CO2 emissions associated 
with the electrical system increasingly describe generation equipment according to their 
CO2 emissions.  This trend is apparent for both emitting technologies, such as natural gas 
and coal facilities, and for non-emitting technologies, such as nuclear plants and wind 
turbines.  This shows that electrical companies and consumers in the region are 
increasingly interpreting the operation of generation technologies according to the CO2 
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Figure 6       Figure 7 
  
Figure 8       Figure 9 
  
 
The New York Times and Boston Globe articles also depict how the electrical 
companies and consumers inhabiting the region view the RGGI policy.  Articles that 
reference RGGI peaked during its design and initial enactment and have gradually 
tapered off.  The same coverage pattern is also visible in articles that contain arguments 
in favor of and against RGGI. However, the number of articles that contain arguments 
against RGGI has declined at a much faster rate than the number of articles that contain 
arguments in favor of it.  When articles in favor of and against RGGI are directly 
compared it is clear that positive references to RGGI outweigh negative references.  This 
shows that individuals and organizations in the region primarily have a positive 
impression of the policy and its treatment of CO2 emissions and the operation of CO2-
emitting technologies.  The arguments used against RGGI have also shifted over the 
course of the policy’s existence.  Prior to implementation, these arguments primarily 
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touched on the potential costs of the policy and their impact on the region’s economic 
competitiveness.  After RGGI was enacted these arguments declined, and a different 
argument, that the policy was weak, was used more frequently.  
Figure 10      Figure 11 
 
Figure 12    Figure 13    Figure 14 
 
 
These results indicate that electrical companies and consumers in the RGGI 
region had thought the policy would be economically detrimental, but that after 
experiencing its operations their concerns were alleviated.  In fact, the emergence of the 
new argument against RGGI demonstrates that electrical companies and consumers are 
willing to treat CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies as controlled and that 
they are amenable to stronger CO2-controlling policies.  To gain a more focused 
perspective about how individuals and organizations in the region perceive RGGI and 
how they are being affected by the policy, individual and organizational level data that 
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Individual and Organizational Level Data about CO2 and RGGI  
To evaluate RGGI's effects on individuals and organizations in the region, 
surveys were sent to individuals working for regulated generators to identify whether and 
how its passage is affecting them.  Many of these surveys led to follow-up interviews.  
The surveys included a variety of questions about CO2 emissions, monitoring 
methodologies, and emissions trading, some of which are not relevant to the line of 
analysis this section addresses.  Similarly, the interviews touched on a broad array of 
electrical and environmental topics and only a portion of their content are pertinent to this 
analytical focus.  Questions and statements that reflect regulated individuals’ and 
organizations' interpretations and treatments of CO2, the operation of CO2-emitting 
technologies, and CO2 allowances and that were answered or described in a clear and 
detailed manner are presented as data in this section.  
All respondents reported their organizations are monitoring their CO2 emissions, 
but they varied in how long they had been doing so.  Some organizations indicated they 
had been monitoring their CO2 emissions prior to RGGI.  However, their reasons for 
doing so varied. Others indicated that RGGI prompted them to begin monitoring their 
emissions or to utilize more sophisticated procedures.  These responses indicate that 
some electrical companies had been interpreting CO2 as a controlled material, but that the 
enactment of RGGI standardized this interpretation for electrical companies throughout 






The surveys also asked which individuals are tasked with collecting information 
about CO2 emissions and which individuals and departments receive this information.  
Overall, environmental-based employees are tasked with identifying the amount of CO2 
released by their facilities.  These employees then pass this information to various 
individuals and departments within their organization, including high-level executives 
and individuals involved in strategy. These responses show that treating CO2 as a 
controlled material is becoming more pertinent to electrical companies' overall operations, 
not just to their environmental departments.  
Surveys: How long have CO2 emissions been managed (measuring and/or attempting to reduce or minimize)?
Emissions “The CT DEP [Department of Environmental Protection] has required GHG [Greenhouse
Compliance  Gases] information as part of its Emission Statement process for four years.”
Env. Strategy “Our baseline accepted and verified with the EPA Climate Leaders [a voluntary program]
is from 2001.”
Env. Analyst “CO2 emissions have been managed since commencement of operation for each facility.”
Env. Manager “Since RGGI required reporting in 2009.”
Env. Manager “Since 2009.”
Manager “I believe that installation of CEMs took place around 1993. However … these monitors
were used for boiler performance and not to minimize CO2 emissions. With the 
upcoming REGGI [sic] requirements, the CEMS will now be used to help minimize CO2.”
Org.'s treatment of CO2  
and CO2-emitting tech.
Was treating CO2 as 
a controlled material
Was treating CO2 as 
a controlled material
Was treating CO2 as 
and the operation of
CO2-emitting tech. as 
a controlled material
as controlled material
Is now treating CO2 
a controlled material
Is now treating CO2 as
as controlled material







 Respondents were also asked why they chose to select and then use specific types 
of CO2 measurement methodologies and monitoring equipment.  Almost all respondents 
indicated that regulatory requirements are the primary consideration, but reliability and 
cost were also mentioned.  More specifically, respondents indicated that federal 




Surveys: What individual positions or departments receive information related to the emission of CO2?
Emissions “The Air Compliance Manager and Director of Environmental Affairs and
Compliance Development share emissions information with [Organization’s name] President …”
Env. Strategy “Data is reported and consolidated by the Environmental Engineers at the Site Level
… Data is consolidated and verified at the Corporate Level …”
Env. Analyst “Engineering Manager, Treasury Department, Accounts Receivable, Power Plant Operations.”
Env. Manager “All plant staff are given monthly updates of plant performance of [sic] which CO2
emissions are discussed.”










treating CO2 as 
controlled
Surveys: What considerations are used to select measurement methodology and monitoring equipment? RGGI's treatment of CO2 
Env. Manager “GHG CEMS equipment has been selected based on EPA criteria and requirements.”
Env. Strategy “Regulatory requirements.”
Env. Engineer “Must meet regulations such as 40 CFR 75 or other EPA approved methodology.”
can control CO2 and tech.
Plant Manager “Federal regulations drive what is used. Beyond that, we look for equipment that has




Existing equip. and skills 
can control CO2 and tech.
Existing equip. and skills 
can control CO2 and tech.
Existing equip. and skills 
Existing equip. and skills 
can control CO2 and tech.
Existing equip. and skills 
can control CO2 and tech.
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Respondents were also specifically asked if the passage of RGGI affected the 
choice or use of these technologies.  They indicated that RGGI requires modifications to 
existing equipment, additional reports, or that it is not a consideration.  These responses 
demonstrate that organizations can get the information they need to control CO2 and the 
operation of CO2-emitting technologies through existing programs and procedures, and 




During the subsequent interviews respondents were asked whether RGGI is 
affecting their operations and if so how.  Even though their organizations are controlling 
CO2 emissions and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies, these individuals 
indicated the policy’s impact upon their operations is relatively insignificant.  In 
following up on why they felt this way, many regulated entities attributed RGGI's limited 
operational impact to the low allowance price, to the ease of purchasing allowances, and 
Surveys: Did the passage of RGGI affect the considerations used to select measurement methodology and RGGI's treatment of CO2 
 monitoring equipment? If so how?
Env. Strategy “The information which must be reported for the sites to which is [sic] applies is the same
 as that which is reported for the EPA Acid Rain Program (Part 75), thus this information is
 simply reported again to the RGGI program.”
Env. Analyst “No.”
Env. Engineer “NO, just added more paperwork and cost.”
Env. Manager “Changes to CEMS, additional RATA [relative accuracy test audit] testing, additional
monitoring and reporting, and additional cost ($2.86/ton of CO2).”
Plant Manager “No. We will continue to use the installed CEMs for the RGGI reporting.”
Env. “It required reporting and dictated how to report.”
Coordinator
and CO2-emitting tech.
Easy to control the 
operation of CO2-
emitting techs. 
Easy to control the 
operation of CO2-
emitting techs. 
Easy to control the 
operation of CO2-
emitting techs. 




Easy to control the 
operation of CO2-
emitting techs. 




to the relatively simple monitoring requirements.  The most significant impact identified 




Individuals and organizations involved with the region’s electrical system, but 
that are not regulated were also interviewed.  In their responses they implicitly 
acknowledge that RGGI is controlling CO2 emissions and the operation of CO2-emitting 
technologies, but also highlight RGGI’s limited impact.  These individuals attributed the 
lack of impact to RGGI’s low allowance price.  
 
Env. Employee: "We haven't really done anything special to comply with that [RGGI].
Investor Owned We already had programs, procedures and systems in place to deal
with that. We didn't do anything special.”
Emissions Compliance: Use of existing equipment and “The addition of CO2 monitoring was very minor. We just added a calculation to the 
Investor Owned procedures makes controlling software and then include it in our yearly calibration checks.”
the operations of CO2-emitting 
technologies easy
Env. Employee: “Well, RGGI [prices] was never really that high … I'm not sure if it is
Municipal pennies per megawatt used or whatever.”
Env. Employee: “It's [RGGI allowances] not really, that's not really a big cost right now to us."
Municipal
Compliance Supervisor “[CO2] reporting is very minor workload ...”
Investor Owned
Operations Employee: "We just go out to the auction and buy the credits that we need … there hasn't been a
Municipal  lot of competition in the auction … The auction itself might take twenty minutes,
 depending on how many different bids I'm putting in. ” 
Env. Employee: "It [RGGI] created more paper work. I mean it's just more paperwork,
Municipal  more and more paperwork.”
Use of existing equipment and 
procedures makes controlling 
the operations of CO2-emitting 
technologies easy
Interviews with Regulated Organizations: RGGI's Perceived Formal Effects and The Treatment of CO2 and CO2-Emitting Technologies
Low allowance prices and easy 
compliance requirements 
make controlling CO2 easy and 
inexpensive
Monitoring emissions and 
allowances make controlling 
CO2 a responsibility
Low allowance prices make 
controlling CO2 inexpensive
Low allowance prices make 
controlling CO2 inexpensive
Easy compliance requirements 






Even with RGGI’s perceived limitations in affecting the operation and selection 
of CO2-emitting technologies, regulated entities indicated a growing familiarity with and 
acceptance of controlling CO2 emissions and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies, 
and specifically by purchasing CO2 allowances.  As part of this, regulated entities 
described how they are developing more expertise with allowance auctions.  They also 
talked about cultivating the capabilities required to integrate CO2 allowances and 
allowance auctions into their organizational activities.  Lastly, regulated organizations 
described how information about CO2 emission allowances is being transmitted to 
various departments and used in corporate strategy.  These findings indicate that 
individuals throughout electrical organizations are treating CO2 and the operation of CO2-
emitting technologies as controlled.  They also show that these meanings are influencing 
how these individuals understand their operations despite the perceived weakness of the 
policy.  
 
Fellow: "The allowance price is now binding at, you know, a whopping $1.86 … That
Env. Think Tank has had very little significance for investment in generation decisions ..."
Associate Director: "RGGI was started and the price of emissions never got very high.”
Energy Policy Group
Env. Director: "Utilities don't really quibble because, you know, it's [RGGI allowance] 
Electrical Industry Group not a huge, you know, sort of payment, if you will, at the end of the day.”
Electricity Trader: "The reality is that it [CO2 price] only marginally increases their [generators]
Energy Trading Group  costs, like it doesn't really change anything in terms of how often they get
 picked up in the system or how often they are running ..."
Interviews with Non-Regulated Organizations: RGGI's Perceived Formal Effects and The Treatment of CO2 and CO2-Emitting Technologies
Low allowance prices make 
controlling CO2-emitting 
technologies inexpensive
Low allowance prices make 
controlling CO2 inexpensive
Low allowance prices make 
controlling CO2 easy and 
inexpensive








In both surveys and interviews, regulated generators and non-regulated 
distributors also described their equipment and how they are using them through their 
CO2 emissions.  In the surveys, some generators answered survey questions about 
managing CO2 emissions with responses that touch on the production efficiency of 
existing equipment.  Other generators also linked the production efficiency of existing 
equipment to CO2 emissions during the interviews.  When generators improve the 
production efficiency of their equipment less fuel needs to be combusted to produce one 
unit of electricity, which means less CO2 is emitted per unit of electricity produced.  By 
describing improvements in production efficiency through their effects on CO2 emissions 
generators demonstrate that they are treating CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting 
equipment as a material and action that are managed and controlled.  These statements 
also show that these organizations are using CO2 emissions as an indicator of efficiency 
and that they are operating their equipment in ways that minimize CO2 emissions. 
 
Env. Engineer: "We might have been reporting on that [CO2 emissions] prior to RGGI but
Investor Owned  certainly with RGGI that raised the level of awareness quite a bit.”
Env. Manager: "They will glean the information that they need to report under for CO2 and
Investor Owned  that information is taken, and is forwarded on to accounting, asset 
management, trading people that are responsible for managing the credit 
side of it.”
Env. Strategy: "Our company has this whole business strategy surrounding the reduction
Investor Owned  and abatement of greenhouse gas emissions … So being responsible for that
 GHG inventory, I do spend a lot of my time making sure we're getting quality
 data from all of the operating companies, and that we're able to manage
that data and get it into the reports and formats that we need.”
Including CO2 information in 
strategy makes treating CO2 
and CO2-emitting technologies 
as controlled more relevant for 
the organization
Diffusing CO2 information 
throughout the organization 
helps different employees 
treat CO2 as a controlled 
Collecting CO2 information 
helps the organization treat 
CO2 as controlled






Customer-facing companies, those with and without generation facilities, also 
connected demand-side energy efficiency to CO2 emissions in surveys and interviews.  
This indicates that electrical organizations are aware of the relationship between CO2 
emissions and electricity consumption, and that they are trying to manage their CO2 
emissions by reducing electricity consumption.  Especially progressive organizations also 
Compliance Supervisor: “In the early, in the late 1990s, and the early 2000s, things were relatively 
Investor Owned stable. As people became aware of climate change … we've started looking
at things that we just weren't, we never thought about before.”
Plant Manager: “Now we've actually been able to improve all of our emissions over the last
Investor Owned couple of years because. we have essentially converted our units. These
three steam units that I am talking about, the two smaller units were at one
time coal fired units, and then they were converted over to number six oil
 and natural gas.”
Env. Engineer: “We modeled the emissions for our fleet, environmental gets directly
Distribution involved with that, we get the fuel consumed, the type of fuel it is, whether
it is gasoline or biodiesel, the miles driven, and we'll calculate carbon dioxide 
along with other pollutants … Same with buildings …"
Env. Strategy: "We call that customer abatement and it's the efforts that we are taking to
Investor Owned help our customers be more efficient and reduce their greenhouse gas 
impacts. So it's definitely included as part of our [Company Strategy Name]
, and it is something that is looked at all the time as part of our whole 
 corporate, overall carbon strategy. “
Sustainability Director: “Yes, we measure our GHGs. We also have energy efficiency initiatives that will 
Investor Owned result in greater energy generation per ton of GHGs emitted.”
Env. Strategy: "Other greening ... opportunities, we try to relate it back to carbon just so that
Investor Owned  we have, sort of, a single focus that people can relate to, and something that
 we can measure against. We try to tend to relate it back to carbon reduction
 because it helps people put it into perspective, if you are trying to have a single
program and motivate employees to be involved … it's definitely something that 
people keep in mind when they are trying to put together a project that's going
 to improve efficiency or, you know something that would be important to their 
department, they try to relate it back to the overall [Company Strategy Name]
 carbon strategy and show how they will be contributing to that abatement of 
the CO2 footprint … "
Surveys and Interviews with Electrical Organizations: How CO2 Information and New Meanings for CO2 and CO2-Emitting Technologies are Used
Treating CO2 and CO2-emitting 
technologies as controlled 
changes how employees 
understand operations
Treating CO2 and CO2-emitting 
technologies as controlled 
changes how employees 
understand generation 
technologies and fuels
Treating CO2 as controlled 
changes how employees 
understand non-generation 
equipment 
Treating CO2 and CO2-emitting 
technologies as controlled 
changes how employees 
understand energy efficiency
Treating CO2 and CO2-emitting 
technologies as controlled 
changes how employees 
evaluate production efficiency
Treating CO2 as controlled 
creates a new way to motivate 




described how they use CO2 emissions as a lever to get individuals to think more about 
the organizations’ overall environmental performance, even as it relates to non-
generating electrical equipment and procedures.  These responses show that electrical 
companies are increasingly interpreting CO2 and the operation of their CO2-emitting 
equipment as controlled.  They also show that the use of these meanings is shifting how 
individuals throughout the organization understand the different facets of their operations.  
 
Regional and Industry Data about CO2 and CO2-Controlling Policies after RGGI 
To identify how these organizational changes are affecting regional and industrial 
acceptance for controlling CO2, the operation of CO2-emitting technologies, and for using 
CO2-controlling policies, regional and industrial archival and interview data are presented.  
These data sources depict how RGGI's overall effects are changing how regulated and 
non-regulated organizations in the region and organizations associated with the electrical 
industry view CO2 emissions, the operation of CO2-emitting technologies, and the use of 
CO2-controlling policies.  More specifically, they show how RGGI's initial operations are 
prompting these organizations to accept controlling CO2 and the operation of CO2-
emitting technologies and to view the use of CO2-controlling policies more favorably.  
The data sources also depict how RGGI's initial operations are influencing how 
policymakers outside the region and country view auction-based cap and trade policies.  
In particular, they demonstrate that the initial operations of RGGI are causing 
policymakers to reconsider the viability of using auction-based cap and trade policy 
designs to control CO2 emissions and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies.  
According to the most recent Pew global warming survey, Americans 
increasingly believe the earth is warming (Pew Research Center, 2012).  Furthermore, in 
the PEM industry publication, articles that reference CO2 topics increasingly identify 
climate change as a driver of industry changes.  These sources support the notion that 
consumers and electrical companies increasingly see CO2 emissions and climate change 
as an issue that will have to be addressed.  It is unlikely that a regional policy like RGGI 
has been able to significantly influence national and industry-wide interpretations to this 
degree.  However, the number of extreme weather events that have recently affected the 
U.S. does seem to have increased Americans' awareness of and concern about CO2 
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emissions and global climate change (Natural Resources Defense Council, 2013; Pew 
Research Center, 2010, 2012).  When positioned against this backdrop, the ongoing 
presence of RGGI as a relatively inexpensive CO2 policy does appear to be attracting 







Additionally, RGGI’s revenue recycler allows individuals and organizations in the 
region to directly benefit from controlling CO2 emissions and the operation of CO2-
emitting technologies.  While system benefit charges have long been used to support 
energy efficiency and The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (TARRA) 
created new resources for energy efficiency, recycling RGGI’s revenues towards energy 
efficiency is increasing the amount of money New England and Mid-Atlantic states can 
spend on energy efficiency even further (U.S. Department of Energy, 2012; York et al., 
2012).  With these resources, the region’s already strong commitment to energy 
efficiency is being accentuated even more.  Moreover, the effects of the increase in 
















CO2 Referencing PEM Articles that Identify Climate Change as a 
Source of Industry Changes 
Env. Engineer: “I think this whole area of greenhouse gases and climate change is obviously
Investor Owned been gaining momentum. It has kind of stalled lately because of economic factors
but my guess is that it will be revived again, and there is still quite a bit of inertia
even now, so I think clearly that is going to be an issue that we deal with going 
` forward.”
Interview with a Regulated Organization: RGGI's Perceived Industry Effect and The Treatment of CO2 and CO2-Emitting Technologies
Industry is more willing to treat 




both RGGI and energy efficiency.  The RGGI funds are suppressing allowance prices and 
stabilizing electricity prices, which limits the overall economic impact of the policy, or 




In fact, the ongoing presence of an economically beneficial CO2 policy appears to 
be facilitating regulated and non-regulated individuals’ and organizations’ willingness to 
control CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies.  Specifically, the policy is 
changing how policymakers and electrical companies in and out of the region feel about 
New York Times: “ 'For many power producers, RGGI (pronounced reggie) serves as a useful
4/2/2009 introduction to carbon trading', said Milo Sjardin … ‘The essential role of RGGI is 
to set up the infrastructure of carbon trading in the United States and get
companies familiar with the concept of carbon prices,’ he said. ‘It's been very
successful at that end.’"
Green Tech Media: "On a dollar-for-dollar basis, RGGI is a winner across the board, with ratepayers
6/17/2011  benefiting from investments in energy efficiency and other clean technology 
programs that provide $3 to $4 in savings for every $1 invested, thereby sparking
 local economies.”
Fellow: “It [RGGI] has also led to several hundred million dollars of revenue for the states 
Env. Think Tank for their energy efficiency programs, and then to complete the circle those energy 
efficiency programs have clipped energy demand and probably caused there to be
an undetectable change in retail electricity prices. Because at the same time that
costs of supply have gone up incrementally because of this small allowance price
on CO2 emissions the, there has been this, you know, associated reduction 
in demand because of the investments in energy efficiency that serve to push
 back down the price.”
Fellow: “The whole allocation thing was a huge innovation by RGGI, and … the auction
Env. Think Tank design was very good and became a model, and you actually saw in the Waxman-
Markey proposed legislation, paragraphs that looked like they were cut from 
whole cloth, you know out of RGGI material, that found its way into the Waxman-
Markey design … I know firsthand that folks in Brussels looked at what was 
happening in RGGI very closely and did not think that it was possible to do what
RGGI was doing, that is to hold an auction for a major share of the emission 
allowances, and it really caused a rethink in Brussels about what could be done …
the culture, the regulatory culture and the business culture at the time, didn't 
perceive that [an auction] as being in the realm of possibility. And over the, over 
a six year period these, this accepted wisdom turned 180 degrees and that, and 
RGGI had an enormous role in that.”
Policymakers see that 
controlling CO2 and CO2-
emitting technologies through 
an allowance auctions is viable 
Consumers see that controlling 
CO2 and CO2-emitting 
technologies doesn’t have to 
increase electricity prices
Industry more experienced 
with controlling CO2 and CO2-
emitting technologies by 
purchasing emission 
allowances through auctions
Consumers see that controlling 
CO2 and CO2-emitting 
technologies doesn’t have to 
hurt the economy
Interviews and Archival Documents: RGGI's Perceived Regional and Industry Effects and Treatments of CO2 and CO2-Emitting Technologies
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purchasing the right to emit CO2, and is making CO2 allowance auctions a more viable 
policy tool.  RGGI also offers policymakers involved in the design of CO2 policies, both 
in and out of the region, an opportunity to learn more how allowance auctions function in 
the real world.  Namely, they can work without creating large economic costs or 
logistical concerns.  These insights are now being applied to the design and 
implementation of other CO2-controlling policies.  
 
Data about the Contestation and Extension of RGGI 
Due to the small economic costs being imposed and economic benefits being 
created by RGGI, generators in New England and Mid-Atlantic states generally view 
RGGI as a tolerable nuisance.  It slightly increases the cost of producing electricity with 
fossil fuels and creates additional administrative duties and responsibilities, but neither of 
these consequences is significant enough to prompt widespread or adamant contestation 
of the policy.  In fact, the two major examples of contestation were relatively isolated 
events that occurred within individual states, and neither contested controlling CO2 or the 
operation of CO2-emitting technologies.  One revolved around a desire to re-evaluate a 
particular facet of the allocation approach and the other was largely attributed to the 
political ambitions of the state’s governor.  In the former, an independent power producer 
sued the state of New York to receive free allowances because they had a pre-existing 
contract with a utility that prevented them from passing on the costs of purchasing 
allowances in the price of electricity.  This lawsuit was settled through a three-way 
agreement between the state, the independent power producer, and the utility that allowed 
the RGGI costs to be accounted for.  The latter case involved the current governor of 
New Jersey, Chris Christie.  Governor Christie withdrew New Jersey from RGGI in 2011 
in spite of opposition from state legislators.  Christie’s rationale for leaving the program 
was that RGGI was not effectively reducing the state’s CO2 emissions enough, although 






Beyond these isolated and somewhat self-serving acts of contestation, electrical 
companies and consumers in the region generally have an ambivalent, if not somewhat 
positive, view of RGGI.  Electrical companies' and consumers' growing acceptance with 
controlling CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies in general and through 
auctions in particular, is evident from the 2012-13 RGGI review documents.  During the 
review, electrical generators and environmental organizations came together to release a 
number of joint statements expressing their support for RGGI.  Similarly, consumers and 
businesses, including many involved with the region's electrical system, also indicated 
their support for continuing RGGI.  Although electrical companies and consumers in 
other states have not attempted to bring their states into RGGI, stakeholders in the region 
want to extend the policy, and their support is nearly unanimous.  In fact, the meetings 
and discussions held during the 2012-13 review period primarily revolved around how 
much the subsequent cap will be tightened and the modeling assumptions used to 
New Jersey Withdrawals “Gov. Chris Christie said Thursday that New Jersey would become the first state to
From RGGI: withdraw from a 10-state trading system, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 
New York Times declaring it an ineffective way to reduce carbon dioxide emissions … Opponents
5/27/2011 were quick to ascribe political motives to the governor's decision, given that Mr.
Christie is seen as a possible Republican candidate in the 2012 presidential race …
the governor asserted that New Jersey was succeeding in reducing its carbon 
dioxide emissions not because of the multistate program, known as RGGI 
(pronounced Reggie), but because it is relying more on natural gas and less on coal 
to fill its energy needs. ‘RGGI does nothing more than tax electricity, tax our
 citizens, tax our businesses, with no discernible or measurable impact upon our
 environment,’ Mr. Christie said.”
New Jersey Tries to “In a legislative do-over, the state Assembly is set to vote Thursday on a bill that
Rejoin RGGI:  would require New Jersey to rejoin a nine-state program designed to reduce
The Record [North Jersey]  greenhouse gas emissions."
5/23/2012
Generator Sues New "Indeck's main claim was that, under the RGGI regulations, it was unable to pass 
York State: through the costs for purchasing carbon emissions allowances because it was 
Bloomberg BNA obligated to a long-term fixed-price contract for electricity with Con Edison …"
12/24/2009
"Under the terms of the settlement, Con Edison will pay the cogeneration plants 
for costs they incur in purchasing carbon dioxide emissions allowances at RGGI 
auctions."
Gov. contested RGGI because 
the policy was not doing 
enough and because of 
political ambitions, but did not 
contest treating CO2 and CO2-
emitting technologies as 
controlled
Archival Documents: Main Ways RGGI and Its Treatment of CO2 and CO2-Emitting Technologies Have Been Contested
IPP contested RGGI because it 
couldn't include the allowance 
price in its electricity price, but 
did not contest treating CO2 




determine it, not whether the policy would remain in place.  The modeled cap reductions  
(106, 101, 97 and 91 million tons), which represent the range of possible caps being 
considered for the next phase of RGGI, are also much lower than the initial cap, even 
after accounting for New Jersey’s approximately 20 million tons of emissions (RGGI 




   
Analysis of the Data about CO2 Allowances and RGGI 
State policymakers designed and enacted RGGI to control the amount of CO2 
emissions electrical generators are emitting into the atmosphere.  The enactment of RGGI 
Generators and Env. “We, the undersigned electric industry companies and environmental non-profit
Organizations  organizations, would like to take this opportunity to provide these joint 
comments. We write to offer our support and congratulations on the first two
RGGI Review  years of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), the leading mandatory
 carbon reduction program in North America ...”
Generators and Env. “The Pace Energy and Climate Center convened a group of electric generators, 
Organizations utilities and environmental organizations to develop this set of joint
 recommendations to the states participating in RGGI. The Dialogue aims to support
RGGI Review  the states as they consider ways to preserve and improve RGGI in the 2012 
program review.”
Consumers “We are companies that believe strong clean energy and clean air policies create
jobs and stimulate economic growth. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
RGGI Review (RGGI) shows that market-based programs can reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions while boosting our economy and improving energy security, and we 
encourage you to support and strengthen RGGI going forward.”
Consumers “The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is a groundbreaking, first-in-the-
nation partnership by ten states that demonstrates the effectiveness of carefully 
RGGI Review designed and implemented market based climate programs. As member states of
12/2011 RGGI undertake the comprehensive 2012 Program Review, the undersigned 
stakeholders endorse principles and highlight potential reforms that will build on 
the success of RGGI to date and deliver greater environmental and economic 
benefits in the future.”
Utility “’My hope is that it [RGGI] will be strengthened because we need to address 
greenhouse gas emissions, but we need to do it in a responsible way so it doesn't
New York Times impact utility customers, especially in this economy,’ said Bob Teetz, vice
president of environmental services for National Grid, an electrical and gas
company.”
1/27/2012
Generators and environmental 
orgs. support additional 
controls on CO2 and CO2-
emitting technologies 
Generators and environmental 
orgs. support additional 
controls on CO2 and CO2-
emitting technologies 
Consumers support additional 
controls on CO2 and CO2-
emitting technologies 
Consumers support additional 
controls on CO2 and CO2-
emitting technologies 
Utility supports additional 





Archival Documents: Stakeholder Support for Extending RGGI and Its Treatment of CO2 and CO2-Emitting Technologies
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makes generators purchase allowance rights to emit a ton of CO2 into the atmosphere 
rather than doing so for free. By creating and distributing CO2 allowances, RGGI 
encapsulates alternative ways for generators and consumers to interpret and utilize CO2 
and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies.  More specifically, policymakers enacted 
RGGI to try to shift generators' and consumers' interpretations and uses of CO2 away 
from an uncontrolled, unvalued waste stream to a controlled and valuable asset (Fligstein, 
1997).  Policymakers are also trying to shift how generators and consumers interpret and 
use the operation of CO2-emitting technologies to include an understanding that this 
action needs to be restricted (Fligstein, 1997).  The new meanings policymakers are 
trying to highlight through the enactment of RGGI are very different from the pre-
existing cultural controls that generators and consumers had been using to interpret and 
utilize CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies.  This means that even after 
RGGI was enacted generators and consumers would not necessarily accept these 
meanings as legitimate.  If generators and consumers did not accept these meanings as 
legitimate they would contest the use of them by contesting the existence of RGGI 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).  The continued existence and functioning of RGGI hinges 
on the willingness of generators and consumers to accept these new meanings as 
legitimate and to utilize them to interpret and use CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting 
technologies for themselves (Caronna, 2004). 
When looking at the formal effects of RGGI, the data suggest the policy is having 
a relatively insignificant effect on the region’s electrical industry.  The initial weakness of 
the cap and unaccounted-for external events, such as falling natural gas prices and an 
economic recession, are constantly pushing the allowance price to the reserve price 
(Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 2012d).  The resulting low allowance price 
represents a minor cost for generators.  In fact, generators and other non-regulated 
organizations in the region do not see it as high enough to drastically change generators' 
operations or the composition of the region’s electrical system.  The interpreted 
insignificance of the policy is further accentuated by RGGI’s monitoring requirements.  
The same equipment and procedures that are being used to monitor SO2 and NOx 
emissions have been repurposed to address CO2 emissions.  This is prompting regulated 
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organizations to view RGGI’s monitoring and reporting requirements as simple but 
redundant exercises that merely create more administrative responsibilities. 
However, when the data are reinterpreted to analyze the policy’s informal effects, 
or changes in how generators and consumers interpret and use CO2 and the operation of 
CO2-emitting technologies, they suggest that RGGI’s low allowance price is having a 
more significant effect.  Generators and consumers have been defined as economically 
rational.  In the context of this analysis, this means that generators interpret and use the 
physical materials and behavioral actions associated with CO2 emissions through their 
effects on their costs and revenues (Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  Consumers interpret 
these materials and actions through their effects on the price and availability of the 
electricity they use to get the services they desire (Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  The 
economic basis of generators’ and consumers’ pre-existing cultural controls explains why 
many attribute RGGI's lack of impact to its low allowance price (Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 
2001).  However, the economic inclination of generators and consumers also means they 
would be more inclined to support policy structures or outcomes that make it inexpensive 
or economically beneficial to use the new meanings the policy is conveying (Blanchard, 
2008; Lindblom, 1977; Scott, 2001).  
Generators are willing to use the new meanings for CO2 and the operation of CO2-
emitting equipment RGGI encapsulates because the initial allowance price was designed 
to be low and because it continues to be low.  Low allowance prices do this because they 
make it inexpensive for generators to use the new meanings associated with the policy.  
Due to the economic basis of their pre-existing cultural controls, generators are willing to 
interpret and use CO2 as a controlled material whose emission requires an allowance 
because the cost and effort of doing so are low (Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  Likewise, 
generators are willing to interpret and operate their CO2-emitting equipment in ways that 
minimize emissions because doing so does not require adding new components or impede 
their ability to profit from the production of electricity.  These claims are supported by 
the survey and interview data, as regulated generators’ dismissive, but not oppositional, 
attitude towards RGGI suggests a willing, though less than enthusiastic, acceptance of 
these new meanings.  
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The survey and interview data also demonstrate that regulated generators are 
interpreting and treating CO2 emissions as a controlled material whose emission into the 
atmosphere requires an allowance.  Generators are developing experience with CO2 
allowance auctions, and information associated with the auctions, such as emissions 
levels and allowance prices, is being circulated throughout the organization and beyond 
its traditional realm of environmental departments.  The archival, survey, and interview 
data also show that regulated organizations are monitoring the emissions associated with 
generation and non-generation equipment, interpreting the equipment according to their 
emissions, and then using them in ways that minimize emissions.  Furthermore, these 
meanings are not just being used by environmental employees, but by individuals 
throughout the organizations, including those involved with strategy.  These efforts 
suggest that the meaning of CO2 as a controlled material and the meaning of CO2-
emitting equipment as technologies whose operation needs to be controlled are becoming 
more broadly legitimate to different types of employees within electrical companies 
throughout the region.  
Generators do not necessarily desire the new meanings for CO2 and the operation 
of CO2-emitting equipment that RGGI highlights, but because the economic cost of using 
them is so low they are tolerable (Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  Moreover, because 
these meanings are tolerable, generators are less motivated to devote time and resources 
to contesting them by contesting the existence of the policy (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 
1992).  This position is evident from the regional newspaper coverage of RGGI and the 
documents describing the RGGI review meetings, both of which indicate support for the 
policy and its continuation.  Generators’ acceptance of the meanings embedded within 
RGGI is also apparent from the ways the policy was contested.  In New York, the 
generator was willing to treat CO2 as a controlled material and to accept controls on the 
operation of CO2-emitting equipment, but contested the policy because it had to pay more 
to use its equipment than other generators.  Similarly, Governor Christie did not pull New 
Jersey out of RGGI because he thought CO2 emissions from electrical facilities should 
not be controlled, but because he thought RGGI was not actually controlling them, or 
because of his personal political ambitions.  Even after this occurred, there was still 
support for RGGI within New Jersey, as state legislators unsuccessfully tried to rejoin the 
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policy.  In both of these cases, the contestation was less about utilizing the new meanings 
and uses for CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies underlying RGGI, and 
more about how individuals or organizations, whether a generator or governor, wanted to 
leverage these new meanings to benefit themselves.  
Consumers are willing to use the new meanings for CO2 and the operation of 
CO2-emitting technologies underlying RGGI because the allowance price has been 
consistently low and because much of the auction revenues are earmarked for their 
benefit.  Low allowance prices and revenue recycling to energy efficiency ensure that 
generators can continue using their CO2-emitting technologies to produce reliable and 
reasonably priced electricity supplies for consumers.  This means the new meanings for 
CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies are being used without significantly 
increasing the price that consumers pay or restricting their ability to use electricity to 
achieve the services they desire.  RGGI's recycled auction revenues are also being used to 
reduce the upfront costs that consumers would pay for energy efficiency technologies and 
practices.  This means that consumers receive economically appealing benefits by 
accepting the use of the new meanings for CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting 
technologies embedded in RGGI.  Consumers are willing to interpret CO2 as a controlled 
material and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies as a controlled activity because 
doing so does not significantly affect the price or the availability of the electricity they 
consume and because it produces economic benefits for them (Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 
2001).   In fact, consumers' support for these meanings has been reinforced as they 
experienced the lack of costs and emerging benefits of RGGI over the course of the first 
eighteen allowance auctions.  Generators' and consumers' growing acceptance of these 
meanings can be seen in the region's newspapers.  The number of articles that connect 
CO2 and electricity topics increased after the enactment of RGGI, and both emitting and 
non-emitting electrical technologies are increasingly being described through their CO2 
emissions.  
Additionally, newspaper coverage of the RGGI policy also suggests the new 
meanings for CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting equipment the policy encapsulates 
are becoming more acceptable to consumers and generators, and perhaps are on the verge 
of being taken for granted.  Coverage of RGGI peaked during its design and enactment 
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and gradually tapered off as the policy became more mature.  This pattern implies, and 
the survey and interview data support, that RGGI is becoming just another environmental 
policy that does not warrant excessive amounts of attention or coverage.  The reduction 
in RGGI coverage suggests that consumers and generators in the region have grown so 
accustomed to CO2 allowance auctions and to the new meanings for CO2 and the 
operation of CO2-emitting technologies that underlie them that they no longer need to be 
discussed as thoroughly.  Additionally, the number of articles that contain a positive 
reference to RGGI has been consistently larger than the number of articles that contain a 
negative reference, and this has held true even as the overall coverage declined.  
Furthermore, the arguments used against RGGI have also shifted over the course of the 
policy’s life.  The two main arguments initially used to contest RGGI, that it would 
increase electricity prices and reduce the region’s economic competitiveness, implied that 
CO2 emissions and the operation of CO2-emitting equipment should not be controlled.  
However, as RGGI and the use of these new meanings have not produced these effects, 
generators and consumers are less motivated to contest the legitimacy of these meanings 
or the policy, and the use of these contesting arguments declined.  The newer argument 
against RGGI, that the policy is weak, is supported by the underlying understanding that 
CO2 emissions and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies need be controlled, and 
that RGGI is just not controlling them enough.  This shift further supports the claim that 
generators and consumers in the region are increasingly interpreting CO2 emissions as a 
controlled material and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies as an activity that 
needs to be restricted.  It also suggests, and the RGGI review data confirms, that 
generators and consumers in the region are more accepting of CO2- controlling policies 
and are amenable to stronger or more expansive controls.  
Generators' and consumers' acceptance of RGGI and its associated meanings for 
CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies are also affecting how stakeholders 
and policymakers inside the region interpret the use of CO2-controlling policies.  It is also 
affecting how stakeholders and policymakers outside the region interpret the use of 
nearly-full CO2 allowance auctions.  Generators and consumers inside the region had 
been concerned that using nearly-full allowance auctions would increase electricity prices 
and cause reliability issues, which would hurt the economic competitiveness of the region, 
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especially if other regions did not enact similar policies.  However, as the ongoing 
operations of RGGI have not brought about these effects, generators and consumers in 
the region are supportive of the policy and appear amenable to more stringent controls.  
The acceptance validates a cap and trade CO2 policy that includes an auction as a viable 
policy tool, and allows policymakers to consider stronger variations of it.  This can be 
seen from the nearly unanimous support for continuing RGGI, and from the fact that all 
of the extensions being considered include a tighter emissions cap.  
Outside of the region and the country, emissions auctions and especially nearly-
full auctions have also been viewed as political anathemas.  Generators and consumers 
have been concerned about auctions’ effects on the price and availability of electricity 
supplies.  As a result of these fears, policymakers did not actively consider full or nearly-
full allowance auctions as viable policy tools they could utilize to control CO2 emissions.  
However, generators and consumers in the RGGI states are supporting the policy and 
accepting the new meanings embedded in it.  This support is prompting policymakers 
outside of the RGGI region and the U.S. to reconsider the viability of using partial or 
nearly-full allowance auctions to control CO2 emissions.  In particular, the use of 
allowance auctions was included in the failed Waxman-Markey bill, but also in the newly 
enacted California cap and trade policy (California Environmental Protection Agency: 
Air Resources Board, 2012a; Waxman, 2009).  An allowance auction is also being 
considered for the newly revitalized WCI and has recently been incorporated into the 
existing European Union CO2 Emissions Trading System (European Commission, 2011; 
Western Climate Initiative, 2012c).  
 
Data and Analysis about RGGI's Energy Efficiency Revenue Recycler  
 
This section presents and analyzes data about the effects RGGI's energy 
efficiency revenue recycler is having on electrical companies, consumers, and PUCs.  
Data that describe how these individuals and organizations had been interpreting the use 
of electricity and energy efficiency technologies and practices are presented first. They 
are followed by data that depict how PUCs, electrical companies, and consumers interpret 
and use electricity and energy efficiency technologies and practices after the creation and 
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allocation of RGGI's energy efficiency funds.  Lastly, data about innovative approaches 
to marketing existing energy efficiency initiatives, reducing electricity consumption, 
measuring reductions in electricity consumption, and integrating demand-side resources 
into electrical systems are discussed.  Then, the presented information is analyzed to 
answer whether RGGI is changing how electrical companies, consumers, and PUCs 
interpret and use energy efficiency technologies and practices, and if these changes are 
influencing innovation in and the diffusion of them.  
 
Energy Efficiency in the Region before RGGI 
Electrical companies, consumers, and PUCs in New England and Mid-Atlantic 
states had been aware of the connection between CO2 emissions, electricity, and energy 
efficiency initiatives before RGGI, but their attention to this relationship fluctuated.  This 
can be seen in the pattern of newspaper articles from The New York Times and Boston 
Globe that connect CO2 and electricity topics and reference energy efficiency.  The 
number of articles connecting these three topics increased at times during the 1990s and 
2000s, but the coverage was not maintained. Furthermore, between these spikes in 
interest coverage of the three topics often ceased completely.  The 1997 spike in coverage 
overlaps with design and adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, which drew considerable 
attention to CO2 emissions, global climate change, and different strategies for reducing 
CO2 emissions, including energy efficiency initiatives (United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, 2012a).  The more recent spike in coverage occurred 
during the late 2000s when a number of proposed federal CO2 policies, as well as the 
initial development of RGGI brought CO2 and global climate change back into the public 















CO2/Electricity Newspaper Articles that Mention Electrical Energy Efficiency 
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The chronological progression of Boston Globe and The New York Times articles 
referencing energy efficiency suggests that utilities and consumers in the region were not 
consistently motivated to use technologies and practices that reduce electricity 
consumption to manage CO2.  The next two sections explore why electrical companies 
and consumers would not be self-motivated to deploy and adopt energy efficiency 
initiatives.  
 
Energy Efficiency for Electrical Companies  
The electrical companies comprising the electrical industry had been aware of the 
relationship between CO2 emissions and energy efficiency.  In fact, PER industry articles 
reference the two topics together as far back as 1989.  Even with this early awareness, 
electrical companies’ attention to the relationship between CO2 and energy efficiency 
topics fluctuated significantly.  The pattern of PEM articles that reference CO2 and 
energy efficiency topics still exhibits some volatility, although it is less than what is 
found in the earlier PER publication. After 2006, more industry articles reference CO2 
and energy efficiency topics than ever before, but of late the number of articles that do so 
is declining.  However, the number of articles referencing these topics in 2010 is just 























Electrical companies had not been self-motivated to deploy energy efficiency 
technologies and practices that reduce electricity consumption to manage CO2 emissions 
because doing so limits their revenues and costs them money to implement (Hayes et al., 
2011; Kushler et al., 2006).  An individual working in energy efficiency in the region 
stated that electrical companies are not concerned with end use energy efficiency unless 
they are pressured by regulators.  The interview highlights that utilities are willing to 
deploy energy efficiency initiatives that reduce electricity consumption if regulators enact 



















CO2 Referencing PEM Articles that Mention Energy Efficiency 
Business Development: “I mean the utilities are only going to really do what the regulators and/or the
Energy Efficiency legislators require them, from an efficiency point of view … from a utility
Company standpoint is just simply, the regulator tells us we need to meet this much energy
efficiency, let's find out exactly what that means … how we meet that in, you 
know, in a way that disrupts the rest of our operations in as small a means as
possible …"
Interview: Utilities' Involvement with Energy Efficiency When There Is Less Funding
Utilities are not self-
motivated to deploy 
energy efficiency 
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One reason why electrical companies would not be self-motivated to use energy 
efficiency initiatives that reduce electricity consumption to manage CO2 emissions is 
because they could not earn a profit from doing so (Kushler et al., 2006).  This can be 
seen when the line graph depicting the number of newspaper articles referencing CO2, 
electricity, and energy efficiency in the region, is expanded to include the number of 
these articles that describe energy efficiency as a potential business opportunity.  Until 
the late 2000s, energy efficiency was only occasionally described as a potential business 
within these articles.  This meant there were limited opportunities in the region to profit 
from using energy efficiency initiatives that reduce electricity consumption.  Without 
these available opportunities or energy efficiency requirements, electrical companies are 
not motivated to use energy efficiency initiatives that reduce electricity consumption to 
manage CO2 emissions even though they are aware of this benefit.  
 
Energy Efficiency for Consumers  
Many consumers of electricity also do not appear to be self-motivated to adopt 
energy efficiency technologies and practices that reduce electricity consumption to 
manage CO2 emissions (Jaffe & Stavins, 1994a; Zhao et al., 2012).  Both interviews and 
industry publications identify cost considerations as the primary barriers to adoption.  
These include the upfront cost of purchasing new equipment or implementing new 
practices, as well as a lack of motivation that arises due to low electricity and energy 
costs (Jaffe & Stavins, 1994a; Zhao et al., 2012).  It is also apparent that existing 
understandings of electricity consumption and energy efficiency technologies and 
practices make their use seem unappealing or unnecessary.  These positions are 
reinforced by utilities’ behaviors, which make it difficult for consumers to become aware 
of their consumption patterns, how to reduce them, and how these reductions can be 
funded.  However, energy efficiency organizations, and the clean energy industry 
publication, state that consumers would be more receptive to adopting energy efficiency 









For the inhabitants of the RGGI region, nearly all of whom are consumers, the 
upfront cost of adopting energy efficiency technologies and practices is a significant 
Green Tech Media: “The problem with energy efficiency is how to pay for it upfront. Even if the
12/14/2011  payback for lighting upgrades or HVAC improvements pay off in less than a year,
 many companies still can’t get the financing, or don’t want to spend the money.”
Business Development: “It [energy efficiency] needs to be, at least initially, free, it needs to be simple,
Energy Efficiency  and it needs to be easy.”
Company
Green Tech Media: “Consumers remain unconvinced of the value of energy efficiency, in part due to 
8/11/2011 skewed perceptions of its true cost."
Env. Engineer: " ... when electricity and gasoline are cheap people aren't thinking as much about
Municipal System them unfortunately, and... it's harder to promote those [energy efficiency]
programs and get them going or keep them going. So I guess what I'm saying is that
it is only important when it affects their pocket book …"
Green Tech Media: "People have no clue about how to save energy or where to go for accurate
10/13/2011 information … most Americans don’t have the money or inclination to pay upfront  
for upgrades, even if the payback would come in two years."




they want to avoid 
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Consumers don’t 
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want to avoid new 
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concern (Jaffe & Stavins, 1994a; Zhao et al., 2012).  This can be seen when the line 
graph depicting the number of articles referencing CO2, electricity, and energy efficiency 
in the region is modified to include the number of these articles that describe energy 
efficiency as an upfront cost.  Within the articles that reference CO2, electricity, and 
energy efficiency topics many also describe energy efficiency initiatives according to 
their upfront costs.  When consumers interpret energy efficiency technologies and 
practices as upfront costs, they are less motivated to adopt them to reduce their electrical 
consumption or to reduce their CO2 footprint even if they are aware of these benefits.  
The next section identifies how PUCs can use new energy efficiency funds to encourage 
utilities to deploy and consumers to adopt energy efficiency initiatives.  
 
Energy Efficiency for PUCs  
As the organizations involved with implementing and funding energy efficiency 
programs, PUCs are familiar with energy efficiency technologies and practices (York et 
al., 2012).  In practice, PUCs’ desire to improve the efficient use of existing electrical 
supplies can be low when electricity supplies are readily available and inexpensive and 
can be countered by their simultaneous need to minimize price increases for consumers 
(York et al., 2012).  However, pro-efficiency stakeholders, such as energy efficiency 
organizations, legislators, industry groups, environmentalists, and consumers, are 
directing PUCs’ attention to the benefits energy efficiency can provide even when 
electricity is inexpensive and readily available.  These benefits include the potential 
economic savings and CO2 reductions that can be achieved by using energy efficiency 
technologies and practices to reduce electricity consumption.  Pro-efficiency stakeholders 
may have been able to do this because the RGGI design and enactment meetings included 
a comprehensive economic analysis of energy efficiency’ costs, benefits, and effects on 
CO2 emissions.  As groups of stakeholders in the region express their support for energy 
efficiency initiatives, regulators are becoming more receptive to using them and 








PUCs have been able to implement new energy efficiency requirements, standards, 
and incentives without increasing electricity rates because increasing amounts of funding 
are becoming available.  Funding for energy efficiency comes from traditional system 
benefit charges and new sources such as TARRA and RGGI (U.S. Department of Energy, 
2012; York et al., 2012).  Instead of billing consumers, PUCs are using these new 
resources to fund the energy efficiency initiatives electrical companies have to undertake 
to comply with energy efficiency standards (York et al., 2012).   
 
Business Development: “Regulators hate to like, you know, approve a rate increase or something … many
Energy Efficiency  times the regulators are just implementing legislation that's been passed … for 
Company example all the, all the energy efficiency portfolio legislation that's been passed …
 the reason that they're [regulators] doing this [increasing energy efficiency 
requirements] is because they are forced to by the legislature. But also, you know, 
they also want to make rate payers happy basically, so a lot of this is just to make 
them happy as well. Or at least, not make the actual ratepayers happy; make the 
stakeholders, environmental groups, and everybody else happy.”
Interviews: PUC's Involvement with Energy Efficiency When It Imposes New Costs on Consumers
PUCs are reluctant to 
increase the use of 
energy efficiency 
because they don't 
want to increase 
prices for consumers  
and they don't see the 
benefits
Strategy: “These are numbers [potential electricity savings] that, when utility commissions
Energy Efficiency see, they realize, wow, you know, this is very powerful, this is saving a lot of
Company money for our constituents, and this is, you know … this approach is actually 
moving the needle in terms of, you know, abatement of greenhouse gases, and so 
on … people are really paying attention and people are giving us a warm welcome
 at a lot of these public utility commissions, and they want, you know, they want to 
find ways to, you know, to allow utilities to run these programs at a larger scale.”
Director: “We do see the cost effectiveness and the, you know, the relative benefits
State Research and outweighing costs with energy efficiency investments. We're going to set a new
Development target goal of 15 percent of our electricity is going to come from energy efficiency 
Agency by the year 2015."
Interviews: PUC's Involvement with Energy Efficiency When It Does Not Impose New Costs on Consumers
PUCs appreciate the  
benefits and want to 
increase the use of 
energy efficiency
PUCs appreciate the  
benefits and want to 







The American Council for an Energy Efficiency Economy (ACEEE) compiles 
annual lists of states’ involvement with energy efficiency initiatives.  RGGI states occupy 
a number of the top ten spots on the latest list and are allocating significant financial 
resources to support energy efficiency (Foster et al., 2012).  RGGI states’ commitment to 
energy efficiency is evident from both the raw sums of money, the percentage of utility 
revenues spent on energy efficiency, and their use of energy efficiency requirements, 
standards, and incentives (American Council for an Energy-Efficiency Economy, 2012b; 
Foster et al., 2012).  With this money electrical companies or energy efficiency 
organizations are reducing the first cost barrier for consumers, through both incentives 
and education.  The money also allows PUCs to create incentives for electrical companies 
that exceed their energy efficiency requirements.  The next two sections illuminate how 
these financial resources are motivating electrical companies and consumers to deploy 
and adopt energy efficiency technologies and practices that reduce electricity 
consumption. 
 
Fellow: “[RGGI] raised, you probably know the number now, what is it 950 million dollars 
Env. Think Tank it has raised, more than that. That has, that has been funneled into energy
 efficiency and strategic energy planning at the state level, and the region. That's a 
lot of money. That's a lot of light bulbs.”
Energy Efficiency: "There is a reluctance to charge customers to create [energy efficiency] programs 
Municipal because, obviously, they don't want to increase customer's bills. So there is that 
focus on the municipal end and, but there is also in [RGGI state], in the Northeast,
we have this thing called the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), and a lot 
of those revenues flow to the state, and in [RGGI state], I believe it is 80% of its
revenues have to flow to energy efficiency programs.”
Green Tech Media: “Massachusetts overtook California with its aggressive Green Communities Act, 
8/20/2011 which was passed in 2008. The initiative, which ACEEE called ‘the most aggressive
EERS [Energy Efficiency Resource Standard] in the nation,’ calls for a 2.4 percent
savings in electricity sales and 1.5 percent for natural gas in 2012.”
Business Development: “I mean usually there is [sic] a couple commissions that are leaders, you know, CA
Energy Efficiency  is always a leader, some of the east coast states, and then the other ones 
Company eventually follow …”
Interviews and Archival Documents: The Connection Between RGGI, Energy Efficiency Funds and Standards 
RGGI is creating new 
funds for energy 
efficiency
RGGI is creating new 
funds for energy 
efficiency
A RGGI state has the 
strongest energy 
efficiency standard
RGGI states are at the 









2011 EE Budget 
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ME 25 $22.8 1.59% Yes No** 
NH 18 $25.6 1.59% No Yes 
VT 5 $40.7 5.64% Yes Yes 
MA 1 $453.0 5.77% Yes Yes 
RI 7 $54.2 5.34% Yes Yes 
CT 6 $138.3 2.83% Yes Yes 
NY 3 $1,073.2 4.69% Yes Yes 
DE 27 $3.3 0.25% Yes No 
MD 9 $156.4 2.05% Yes No** 
            
NJ 16 $225.0 2.05% Yes* No*** 
*Not Binding ** In development or just approved ***Eliminated in 2011 
Sources: ACEEE 2012 State Energy Efficiency Scorecard and ACEEE State Energy Efficiency Database. 
 
 
Energy Efficiency for Consumers after First Costs Are Removed  
 Portions of RGGI’s recycled revenues are being used to reduce the adoption cost 
of energy efficiency technologies and practices.  When the first cost barrier can be 
removed, whether through funding or education, consumers are more receptive to the use 
of energy efficiency technologies and practices.  More specifically, after the fiscal costs 
and cognitive obstacles are eliminated consumers are more likely to view reducing 
electricity consumption through energy efficiency as a viable solution to their problems.  
These problems include macro issues, such as their CO2 emissions, or micro issues, such 
as their energy costs or personal comfort.  This change can be seen in the region’s 
newspaper coverage of CO2, electricity, and energy efficiency topics.  When 2009 and 
2010, the first two full years of RGGI funding, are added to the graph the number of 
articles referencing CO2, electricity, and energy efficiency topics almost doubles.  The 
number of articles that reference the upfront cost of energy efficiency also falls to zero.  
In interviews individuals involved with energy efficiency also described how consumers 
are more receptive to energy efficiency and appreciative of its many benefits after the 
first cost barrier is removed.  Once it is removed, energy efficiency organizations are able 
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to utilize a broader array of arguments and approaches to help consumers actually reduce 










Director: "What we're hoping to do is influence the marketplace from the upstream all the
State Research and way through the downstream … so the retailer is actually educating the consumer
Development on their energy use, on what kind of energy purchases they can make, and even 
Agency though certain energy efficiency may come at a higher upfront cost … operating
energy efficiency equipment over the life of the equipment will reduce an overall
lower cost to the consumer because of the energy savings that will be realized 
over time … You know, consumers understand that once, once they're educated,
but unfortunately, without that kind of engagement and education consumers 
will tend to look to that first cost barrier, first cost barrier is one thing that our 
programs are designed to try to get around.”
Interviews: Consumers' Involvement with Energy Efficiency When There Is More Funding
Consumers are more 
willing to adopt 
energy efficiency 
when it is no longer 
interpreted as an 
upfront cost
Business Development: "Any efficiency program should be free, it should be easy, and it should be
Energy Efficiency  rewarding, it should give people a choice about what they want to do, to save 
Company energy, help them with those choices, give them incentives about saving energy 
overall … it [energy efficiency] needs to be valuable to them, right. And that value
can take a lot of different forms, it can take a form of them just feeling good about 
themselves, it can take a form of them feeling more comfortable in their homes,
because of their insulation, it could be valued because they have lower energy 
bills, it could be valued because they entered a lottery and get a lot of kick out 
seeing if they've won every week.”
Interviews: Consumers' Interpretations of Energy Efficiency's Benefits After Cost Issues Have Been Removed
Once consumers stop 
interpreting energy 
efficiency as an 
upfront cost they are 
better able to see the 




Energy Efficiency as a Business Opportunity for Electrical Companies 
PUCs are also using energy efficiency funds, such as those provided by system 
benefit funds, TARRA, and RGGI, to create incentives for electrical companies (U.S. 
Department of Energy, 2012; York et al., 2012).  These incentives make reducing 
electricity consumption through the use of energy efficiency initiatives a lucrative 
endeavor.  Energy efficiency incentives enable electrical companies to earn a return on 
the money they spend on energy efficiency initiatives.  This return is comparable to the 
one that PUCs allow utilities to earn from constructing new transmission and distribution 
equipment that can deliver larger amounts of electricity.  These incentives make reducing 
electricity consumption through energy efficiency efforts more appealing to eligible 
organizations.  They also motivate ineligible organizations, such as municipal systems, to 
try to become eligible.  Additionally, energy efficiency organizations and industry groups 
are also working with PUCs to identify and implement new ways to make reducing 
electricity consumption through the use of energy efficiency initiatives a profitable 
business opportunity.  
Figure 42 
 
Manager: “There are very generous incentive programs for utilities to actually, you know,
Energy Efficiency  perform, implement energy efficiency. So once they, once you got it out of, out
Company  of your, affecting your revenue it became, in terms of negatively, it really has
 become a very positive revenue stream for them. ”
Energy Efficiency: “We work with a lot of state commissions and utilities to describe different 
Electrical Industry business models that support energy efficiency … that's kind of where 
Group performance incentives come in, where you can actually … have some goals and
then have a reward for the utility to hit those goals, and usually the performance
incentives are kind of in the same range as, as the rates of return for, on capital 
assets. And that's sort of where you make energy efficiency sort of equal or on par
to investments in generation assets … some utilities say, wow, I can actually make 
money off this [energy efficiency], and make good money off this …"
Energy Efficiency: "... that is another source of funding that we are trying to work on and that effort
Municipal entails developing a plan, and saying to the state that 1) you don't have jurisdiction
over us, but we have an energy efficiency plan that should meet the requirements
of getting this RGGI funding.”
Interviews: Utilities' Involvement with Energy Efficiency When They Can Earn Revenues From Using It
Utilities are more 
interested in 
deploying energy 
efficiency when they 
can interpret it as a 
profit source
Utilities are more 
interested in 
deploying energy 
efficiency when they 
can interpret it as a 
profit source
Utilities are more 
interested in 
deploying energy 
efficiency when they 




When electrical companies can view the reductions in electricity consumption 
induced by energy efficiency initiatives as a source of profits they are more willing to 
interpret their use as a solution to other problems they are experiencing.  These problems 
include CO2 emissions, siting concerns for new power plants, and low customer 
engagement or satisfaction.  This response can be seen from the interviews as well as 
from the regions’ newspaper coverage of CO2, electricity, and energy efficiency topics 
when 2009 and 2010 data are included.  As indicated, the number of articles referencing 
CO2, electricity, and energy efficiency almost doubled during this period, but within 
these articles energy efficiency is also described as a business opportunity much more 
frequently than it ever had been.  
Figure 43 
 
Principal: “It's [energy efficiency] certainly being pushed by the utilities anyway. It’s more
Energy Efficiency convenient that way to make their consumers more efficient than build generation 
Company under uncertain legislation of a carbon market.”
Energy Efficiency "It's more beneficial, more cost effective to be more efficient with what energy 
Manager: we have now and find a solution that way, instead of relying on creating new 
Municipal generation and just being less efficient with it, I guess that's really the bottom line. 
The costs for creating new generation outweigh, are vastly more than just being
 more efficient with what we have.”
Strategy: “We’ve actually measured, in a test and control fashion, an increase in customer 
Energy Efficiency satisfaction, overall customer satisfaction with the utility in places where we have 
Company this program running … And more and more this is coming up, if not the primary
reason, certainly a close second, a secondary motivation for utilities to do this
[use their energy efficiency program].”
Interviews: Utilities' Appreciation of Energy Efficiency's Benefits After It Is Profitable
When utilities view 
energy efficiency as a 
profit source they  
want to use it to meet 
demand
When utilities view 
energy efficiency as a 
profit source they  
want to use it to meet 
demand and to save 
money
When utilities view 
energy efficiency as a 
profit source they  












Electrical companies’ increasing interest in reducing electricity consumption 
through the use of energy efficiency initiatives to manage their CO2 emissions is also 
evident at the industry level.  This makes sense because energy efficiency funds are being 
used to create performance incentives around the country (Foster et al., 2012).  































CO2 Referencing PEM Articles that Identify Increasing Attention to 
Conservation as a Source of Industry Changes 
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reduce electricity consumption and CO2 emissions is also triggering a number of 
innovations in the presentation and design of these initiatives, and in how demand-side 
resources are integrated into electrical systems.  The next section illuminates a number of 
these innovations and describes how utilities', consumers', PUCs' increasing desire to 
reduce electricity consumption through energy efficiency initiatives are facilitating their 
emergence. 
 
Energy Efficiency Innovations 
Increasing amounts of energy efficiency funding are empowering PUCs to expand 
the use of energy efficiency requirements, standards, and incentives (Foster et al., 2012; 
York et al., 2012).  This money is being used to reduce the first cost of adopting energy 
efficiency initiatives for consumers and to make reducing electricity consumption 
through the deployment of these initiatives profitable for electrical companies.  After the 
first cost of and lack of profits associated with reducing electricity consumption are 
addressed, it is easier for consumers and electrical companies to recognize and appreciate 
the benefits of adopting and deploying energy efficiency initiatives, including their ability 
to reduce CO2.  These positive interpretations are prompting electrical companies and 
consumers to actually deploy and adopt energy efficiency technologies and practices that 
reduce electricity consumption.  In fact, increasing amounts of funding, requirements, 
and interest for using energy efficiency initiatives are spurring a number of energy 
efficiency innovations within and beyond the RGGI region (Foster et al., 2012; York et 
al., 2012).  These innovations include new strategies for incentivizing a more efficient 
use of electricity, novel energy efficiency technologies and practices, improvements in 
how reductions in electricity consumption are evaluated and measured, and changes in 
how energy efficiency resources are integrated into electrical systems.  To begin with, the 
aforementioned performance incentives represent a new and innovative way to make 
reducing electricity consumption through energy efficiency a profitable activity.  These 
potential profits are motivating electrical and energy efficiency organizations to expand 






Larger amounts of energy efficiency resources also enable PUCs to implement 
new and to strengthen existing energy efficiency standards and requirements for utilities 
(Foster et al., 2012; York et al., 2012).  To meet these new requirements and to capture 
the new performance incentives, utilities are scaling up their involvement with and 
deployment of energy efficiency initiatives.  Some electrical companies are developing 
these initiatives themselves, while others are soliciting requests from the expanding 
population of pure energy efficiency organizations.  Electrical companies and energy 
efficiency organizations can profit from reducing electricity consumption through the use 
of energy efficiency initiatives, so they are expanding the use of existing initiatives and 
searching for new types of energy efficiency technologies and practices.  In particular, 
these organizations are working to identify and develop new ways to reduce electricity 




Business Development: “Now what's interesting is the paradigm for that model, which essentially still 
Energy Efficiency exists today, has taken a pretty big, has undertaken a pretty big shift, in the last five 
Company or six years, and that's basically from a, a model that revolves around just giving the
utilities money, a sort of set amount of money, and asking them to spend that 
wisely, versus, having measurable goals of energy savings that they have to meet 
in as cost effective a manner as possible, and then there's generally incentives,
both positive and negative, for meeting or not meeting those goals.
Interviews: Innovation In How Energy Efficiency Initiatives Are Deployed
Energy efficiency 
initiatives motivate 
utilities and energy 
efficiency orgs. to 
deploy energy 
efficiency
Business Development: “When we started we saw a lot more RFPs [requests for proposals] that we're very,
Energy Efficiency very product focused, and said, you need to have this product, selling this product,
Company blah, blah, blah, as we've gone on we're seeing a lot more RFPs, which are, are 
frankly a lot better, which are saying, here is our goal, how do you meet our goal …
when you are under this performance basis, they can say, hey here's the market
price of you delivering to me a verified energy saving, go out and do it however




utilities and energy 
efficiency orgs. to 
identify new ways to 
reduce electricity 
consumption and to 
deploy them
Interviews: Innovation In Energy Efficiency Initiatives and In How They Are Deployed
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This search has led to two broad energy efficiency innovations. The first is that 
energy efficiency programs are being redesigned to be more accessible to consumers and 
more aligned with how they actually perceive and use electricity.  More specifically, 
energy efficiency organizations are learning about consumers' behaviors, how they 
interpret energy efficiency technologies and practices, and how they interact with the 
provider itself in order to bring about further reductions in electricity consumption.  Due 
to the technical nature of the electrical system and the associated culture of electrical 
companies, it has been difficult for them to identify and resolve these issues themselves.  
This is facilitating the emergence and expansion of pure energy efficiency organizations 




The second, and related, innovation leverages a more in-depth understanding of 
consumer behavior to reduce electricity consumption through informational and 
behavioral programs.  Much of the innovation in this area is being driven by pure energy 
User Engagement: “A lot of this energy stuff is so dense, just pulling that out and … actually making it 
Energy Efficiency easy to read, and understandable by like human beings, has been probably the
Company biggest thing we have done. It sounds like so simple, but, you know, I can't tell you
how many times I've talked to users where they are like, oh I know the energy
company has information on this, but I just can't read it … electricity stuff is not a
 technical issue, you know, it's now getting to the point of, like this is a behavioral
and human, human interaction issue. And if you look at the staff of the utility
companies, there is not a single person that does that on their staff. Which is, you 
know, really indicative of what, how they approach their programs.”
Clean Energy Innovation: “The big thing there was just making people aware of how much energy they are
Env. Regulator using, and how, and getting them to feel that they were either a very efficient
building or not, and making them move towards it. So it was a lot of, you know, just
basic data, like getting people to understand that they need to look at their bills.”
Strategy: “The one thing that's remained consistent is that we really believe, like sort of 
Energy Efficiency broader strategy and philosophy has been of creating solutions that work for the
Company average consumer.”
Interviews: Innovation In How Energy Efficiency Initiatives Are Designed and Marketed
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efficiency organizations that are looking for the cheapest and easiest ways to reduce 
electricity consumption.  Instead of replacing existing technologies with more efficient 
versions of the same technologies, these companies are collecting, analyzing, and 
diffusing information about electricity consumption to get consumers to change their 
behaviors.  The initial results of these efforts are extremely promising, and because they 





Electrical companies are increasingly interested in deploying energy efficiency 
initiatives because they can profit from their use, and consumers are increasingly willing 
Editor: “You are going to have the hardware light ones come in, there is a company called
Energy Media  [Energy Efficiency Company] that does the whole behavioral, kind of encouraging
 people to reduce their consumption, and showing them ways how they can save
 money. Those are going to be big, because they are very cheap for the utilities to 
adopt them, and they are getting about average household consumption
 reductions [of] 2-3%.”
Director: “[Agency]’s very much engaged in these behavioral approaches … sort of playing on 
State Research and consumer, on human decision making patterns and consumer decision making
Development triggers and trying to utilize those behavioral patterns as a means of getting
Agency consumers to become more aware of their energy choices and then engage in the
energy choice.”
Strategy: "Traditionally, the energy efficiency community has been almost exclusively
Energy Efficiency focused, I would just say exclusively focused on, what they call, installed, quote 
Company unquote, installed measures, which are things that you can put inside the homes,
physical things, that, that actually change the constitution of your house. And 
those were the things that count as energy efficiency … What we've done is 
essentially introduced a new notion, which is using information only, you can
actually get, engage people and motivate them to change their behavior in a 
permanent way, and … sort of the fundamental premise is that behavior, not just
the installed measures, is an integral part of energy efficiency, one cannot go 
without the other … You can really, just using information only, really help people 
become more aware, … and then make small changes that makes their behavior 
more energy efficient."
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to adopt these technologies and practices when they are free or inexpensive (Hayes et al., 
2011; Zhao et al., 2012).  As a result, the amount of energy efficiency resources that are 
being created by expanding traditional technological approaches and instigating new 
behavioral approaches is rapidly expanding (Foster et al., 2012; York et al., 2012).  The 
increasing presence of demand-side resources in the electrical system is also driving a 
number of innovations (Foster et al., 2012; York et al., 2012).  These innovations can be 
broadly classified as integration innovations, in that they revolve around integrating 
larger amounts of energy efficiency resources into ISO systems and wholesale electrical 
markets.  The most significant innovation simply involves a better understanding of the 
reductions in electricity consumption that energy efficiency technologies and programs 
are able to achieve. While this may seem like a simple exercise, electrical companies 
have had little incentive to actually measure the reductions in electricity consumption 
they are achieving, and to do so with a high level of rigor.  One of the main measurement 
innovations involves the use of experimental design.  Energy efficiency organizations 
deploy a particular initiative to a treatment population of consumers.  They then compare 
the resulting changes in electricity consumption with the amount of electricity consumed 




The increasing amount of demand-side resources that are appearing in the region 
is also prompting ISOs to develop plans for integrating these resources into their long-
term system plans (Foster et al., 2012; York et al., 2012).  Reductions in electricity 
consumption, or demand-side resources, are fundamentally different from traditional 
supply-side resources, in both their consistency and their availability (American Council 
for an Energy-Efficiency Economy, 2012a).  ISOs have to change how they value and 
Business Development: " ... so the only way to actually measure what is going on is to use real billing data, 
Energy Efficiency with a treatment versus a control, which is what, which is what we do, a few others
Company are starting to do that as well, but it's still relatively rare, and that's what, that's
what we're really pushing for in the industry. That if you want to make this real, you
have to use real billing data, and you have to have a treatment versus a control."
When utilities, PUCs, 
and consumers are 
more involved with 
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account for demand-side resources in order to use larger amounts of them to meet current 
and expected electrical demand.  This need is further driving the development of more 
rigorous measurement and evaluation approaches.  ISOs cannot use demand-side 
resources to assure long-term electrical availability if they do not have an accurate 
understanding of the size and availability of these resources.  As better evaluation 
methods are emerging, ISOs are gaining confidence that demand-side resources will be 
available and that their estimated size is correct.  This then allows ISOs to utilize larger 




Lastly, the increasing presence of accurately measured demand-side resources is 
also driving changes in the wholesale electricity markets that are found in the region 
(American Council for an Energy-Efficiency Economy, 2012a; Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, 2011; Foster et al., 2012; York et al., 2012).  In particular, ISOs 
in the region are starting to allow demand-side resources that are created by reducing 
electricity consumptions through the use of energy efficiency initiatives to be bid into 
wholesale electric markets, just like supply-side resources.  The inclusion of demand-side 
Director: “Now that we're at the fifteen percent [energy efficiency requirement], the ISO is 
State Research and very much engaged in trying to ensure they have an understanding of how much of
Development  that efficiency they can reliably look to in their system planning activities … We've 
Agency shifted a little bit to that, to get a higher level of rigor standard in our evalu – 
methodology, so that when we quantify the savings we're doing it at, at what we 
call a 90-10 confidence level, so at the end of our evaluation we're 90 percent
confident that the result of our evaluation is within ten points of, of providing the
efficiency, the quantified efficiency savings that are being demonstrated from the 
evaluation results … So if [the agency], for instance, said we had a 100 kilowatt
hours of energy efficiency in this year, the [ISO] would say, okay, well at, you
know, at a lower level of rigor we're actually going to count maybe thirty percent 
of, of those kilowatt hours for our system planning purposes. Now, in our talks with
the ISO, given our higher levels of rigor and program structures, they are now
looking to adopting upwards of seventy percent of those efficiency savings as, as 
real, and as part of the demand profile, so, so that is, you know, a very significant
change in the way, you know, our system planning is, is accounting for energy 
efficiency …"
When utilities, PUCs 
and consumers are 
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resources in wholesale markets represents a significant innovation, and the presence of 
this type of market is encouraging other ISOs to explore similar structures (American 
Council for an Energy-Efficiency Economy, 2012a; Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, 2011).  However, the increasing use of demand-side resources in wholesale 
markets and the growing number of electrical regions that include this market structure 
are also driving further changes in how reductions in electricity consumption are 
evaluated and measured (American Council for an Energy-Efficiency Economy, 2012a; 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2011; Foster et al., 2012).  Many of the 
proposed changes are being evaluated at a national level and are currently informing how 
other ISO regions evaluate demand-side resources on their own and as part of wholesale 





Analysis of the Data about RGGI's Energy Efficiency Revenue Recycler  
By recycling the revenues from RGGI's CO2 allowance auction to support energy 
efficiency, state policymakers are using the policy to modify electricity consumption 
patterns.  Meeting increasing demand for electricity by modifying consumption instead of 
Manager: “2006-7, was the first time that the ISO decided to set a market up that included, 
Energy Efficiency what we call ODR, other demand resources, they had had a market that included 
Company demand response, and that sort of opened the door, in some ways, to energy 
efficiency in general and, so that was a, you know, and it still is a, was a pioneer
market that we developed in the east here … we're a not trivial portion of the 
market now if you consider [Company Name] as a plant, I think we are the second 
largest bidder, the second largest participant in the [ISO] market from [RGGI state],
 second only to [Nuclear Plant Name].”
Business Development: “If you look at the New England forward capacity market, they have some efficiency
Energy Efficiency [resources] … So the real key in this, and this is sort of getting fought in the FERC
Company [Federal Energy Regulatory Commission], it's getting fought in the different 
regional transmission organizations is, is what is the methodology going to be for 
having demand resources be on the same page as supply, and that principle hasn't 
been stated by FERC. So it's, this is in motion …"
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by expanding the supply reduces the emission of electricity-derived CO2.  It also 
improves system reliability and limits the need to build and pay for new generation, 
transmission, and distribution equipment. Increasing demand for electricity was 
historically met by expanding the supply (Hirsh, 2002). When CO2 was viewed as a 
benign, naturally occurring material and the operation of CO2-emitting equipment was 
interpreted as a clean, safe, and desirable activity increasing electricity consumption was 
considered both appropriate and appealing (Hirsh, 2002; Hulme, 2009; Schnaiberg, 1980).  
However, when CO2 is viewed a pollutant that needs to be controlled and the operation of 
CO2-emitting equipment is interpreted as a less clean, safe, and desirable activity then 
increasing electricity consumption is considered less appropriate and appealing  (Hulme, 
2009; Schnaiberg, 1980).  Under these meanings and uses of CO2 and the operation of 
CO2-emitting equipment reducing consumption by using electricity more efficiently is 
considered appropriate and appealing (Hulme, 2009; Schnaiberg, 1980; York et al., 2012).  
In fact, intertwined with their efforts to shift the meaning and use of CO2 and the 
operation of CO2-emitting equipment, state policymakers are using RGGI's revenues to 
try to shift how electrical companies', consumers', and PUCs' interpret the use of 
electricity (Fligstein, 1997; Scott, 2001).  Specifically, they are trying to get these 
individuals and organizations to view the use of energy efficiency technologies and 
practices that reduce electricity consumption as an appealing endeavor, in the hope they 
will actually deploy and use them to reduce consumption (Brint & Karabel, 1991; 
Fligstein, 1997).  
Electrical energy cannot be readily stored, so the available supply has to match up 
with the demand (Casazza & Delea, 2009).  Due to this characteristic, improving the 
efficient use of electricity requires changing the supply- and demand-sides of the system.  
Electricity consumers can modify their consumption patterns by changing the 
technologies they power with electricity and how they use these technologies (Casazza & 
Delea, 2009).  Utilities, those with and without generation facilities, determine the 
available electrical supply and are the main, but increasingly not only, source of 
information about electricity consumption and distributors of energy efficiency 
technologies and practices (Casazza & Delea, 2009; York et al., 2012).  PUCs also affect 
the use and adoption of energy efficiency technologies and practices because they 
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implement energy efficiency standards and requirements for utilities and then determine 
the costs and revenues these companies incur or receive for them (Casazza & Delea, 2009; 
York et al., 2012).  Given utilities’, generators', and PUCs' respective roles in shaping 
consumption patterns, all of them have to see value in and the benefits of reducing 
electricity consumption through the use of energy efficiency in order for it to occur.  
Electrical utilities have been defined as economically rational, which means they 
interpret and use electricity and energy efficiency initiatives through the profits they can 
earn from them (Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  As utilities could not traditionally earn 
profits from reducing electricity consumption through the use of energy efficiency they 
were not proactively deploying these technologies and practices to manage demand or 
CO2 emissions (Hayes et al., 2011; Kushler et al., 2006).  This is evident from both the 
interview data and from the industry publications.  The pattern of PER and PEM articles 
that reference energy efficiency and CO2 topics shows that electrical companies had been 
aware of, but were not always attentive to the relationship between electricity 
consumption and CO2 emissions.  A similar, but less consistent pattern is also found in 
the number of articles that connect CO2, electricity, and energy efficiency topics in the 
region’s newspapers.  Within this coverage energy efficiency is rarely described as a 
potential business opportunity.  These findings suggest that electrical companies were 
aware of energy efficiency's benefits, such as reducing CO2 emissions and limiting new 
construction, but their inability to profit from reducing consumption suppressed the 
salience of these benefits and limited their internal motivation to achieve them.  This is 
consistent with economically rational behavior.  Electrical companies would not 
proactively reduce electricity consumption through the use of energy efficiency initiatives 
because they could not profit from doing so (Blanchard, 2008).  In fact, electrical 
companies’ inability to interpret and use energy efficiency initiatives as a profitable 
activity appears to produce an anchoring effect (Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  This 
anchoring effect marginalizes the other positive ways electrical utilities can interpret the 
use of energy efficiency initiatives.  When electrical companies cannot interpret the use 
of energy efficiency technologies and practices that reduce electricity consumption as a 
profitable activity, the positive benefits they provide become less relevant.  This then 
prevents utilities from proactively deploying energy efficiency technologies and practices. 
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Consumers have also been defined as economically rational, which means they 
interpret electricity and energy efficiency initiatives according to the price they pay for 
the services electricity provides (Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  Historically, increasing 
electricity consumption was considered appropriate and appealing, while energy efficient 
technologies and practices represented new upfront costs for consumers (Hirsh, 2002; 
Hughes, 1993; Jaffe & Stavins, 1994a; Zhao et al., 2012).  This meant many consumers 
were not interested in reducing their electricity consumption, especially if they had to pay 
new upfront costs to do so (Jaffe & Stavins, 1994a; Zhao et al., 2012).  This is evident 
from the interviews and the industry and newspaper publications.  Interviews and 
industry publications identify the first cost of energy efficiency technologies and 
practices as a direct barrier that prevents consumers from adopting them, as well as a 
conceptual barrier that inhibits them from understanding and valuing the other benefits 
they provide.  The newspaper articles also demonstrate that inhabitants of the RGGI 
region, almost all of whom are consumers, had been aware of the connection between 
CO2, electricity, and energy efficiency.  However, the fluctuations in the coverage pattern 
suggest that consumers’ attention to the connection between these topics and their 
appreciation of energy efficiency’s ability to reduce CO2 emissions has varied over time.  
In fact, within this coverage just under half of the articles describe energy efficiency 
according to its upfront costs.  This suggests that the upfront cost of adopting energy 
efficiency technologies and practices overshadows their potential benefits, including their 
ability to reduce CO2 emissions and to provide the services that consumers desire with 
less electricity.  So even when consumers are aware of the connection between electricity 
consumption and CO2, their appreciation of energy efficiency's ability to reduce 
emissions and their desire to act on it can be low when doing so requires an initial upfront 
cost.  This is consistent with economically rational behavior.  Consumers would not be 
interested in reducing their electricity consumption through the use of energy efficiency 
initiatives because doing so creates new costs for them (Blanchard, 2008).  In fact, 
consumers' fixation on the upfront costs of energy efficiency technologies and practices 
appears to produce a shadow effect (Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  This shadow effect 
masks the positive ways that consumers can interpret and use energy efficiency initiatives.  
When consumers interpret energy efficiency initiatives as upfront costs, the other benefits 
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they provide become less apparent.  This then prevents consumers from proactively 
adopting energy efficiency technologies and practices. 
Electricity regulators or PUCs have also been defined as economically rational.  
In this case, this rationality means that PUCs interpret electricity and energy efficiency 
initiatives according to the costs that consumers pay to get the services they desire 
(Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  Energy efficiency initiatives had traditionally been 
funded through system benefit charges that were placed on every consumer’s electricity 
bill (York et al., 2012).  This meant that PUCs would be reluctant to expand the use of 
energy efficiency initiatives when electricity is inexpensive and readily available, even if 
they wanted to, because doing so would increase the price that consumers pay for 
electrical service (York et al., 2012).  Moreover, PUCs' focus on minimizing the costs 
that consumers pay for electricity and electrical service also influences how they interpret 
the use of energy efficiency technologies and practices.  In fact, the upfront cost of 
funding energy efficiency initiatives produces a shadow effect that makes their benefits 
less visible to PUCs as well, and it is especially pronounced when electricity is 
inexpensive and readily available.  This shadow effect then restricts PUCs’ ability and 
desire to expand the use of energy efficiency technologies and practices. 
The upfront cost of deploying and adopting energy efficiency initiatives is 
partially being addressed by RGGI.  Recycling the policy’s auction revenues creates 
additional resources that are being used to fund energy efficiency initiatives in New 
England and Mid-Atlantic states, and that are not based on increasing the cost of 
electrical service.  When RGGI revenues are combined with existing system benefit 
funds and the newly allocated TARRA funds they are collectively changing how PUCs 
interpret energy efficiency technologies and practices by removing a shadow effect (U.S. 
Department of Energy, 2012; York et al., 2012).  With this newly available pool of 
resources, regulators do not have to interpret the deployment of energy efficiency 
initiatives as a cost that is imposed on consumers.  Once this shadow effect is removed, 
other meanings or benefits of energy efficiency, such as its ability to reduce CO2 
emissions, become more visible and salient.  This is particularly true in the presence of 
RGGI and because these meanings are being reinforced by pro-efficiency stakeholders in 
the region.  Initially, the positive meanings and benefits of energy efficiency may not 
202 
 
have been sufficient to overcome PUCs' reluctance to fund energy efficiency initiatives 
by increasing the cost of electrical service, especially when electricity was inexpensive 
and readily available (York et al., 2012).  However, PUCs are becoming more aware and 
appreciative of the benefits energy efficiency provides because the upfront deployment 
costs are being alleviated by new energy efficiency funds (Foster et al., 2012; York et al., 
2012).  This can be seen in the interviews and from the ACEEE energy efficiency report 
card.  The report specifically shows the number of RGGI states occupying top spots in 
the rankings, the funds allocated and spent by RGGI states on energy efficiency, and that 
all RGGI states except New Hampshire have energy efficiency standards or requirements 
(Foster et al., 2012).  
The emergence of RGGI funds is also changing how consumers interpret energy 
efficiency technologies and practices by eliminating a shadow effect.  When energy 
efficiency funds are raised without increasing electricity rates, they can be used to 
directly reduce the upfront cost of these technologies and practices through rebates and 
incentives, but also to remove it as a potential concern through education.  Once 
consumers no longer view energy efficiency as an upfront cost, it is easier for them to 
envision and understand how energy efficiency can benefit them, such as by reducing 
CO2 or by enabling them to consume less electricity to get the services they desire.  This 
can then motivate consumers to actually change their consumption patterns by adopting 
energy efficiency technologies and practices.  After RGGI revenues became available to 
fund energy efficiency in late 2008, the number of newspaper articles connecting CO2, 
electricity, and energy efficiency topics almost doubled.  Furthermore, these articles 
describe energy efficiency as an upfront cost much less frequently in 2009 and not at all 
in 2010.  Interviews with energy efficiency organizations also demonstrate that 
consumers are more likely to understand the many benefits that energy efficiency 
technologies and practices provide and be motivated to act upon them once they are made 
cost free and user friendly.  This supports the notion that removing the relevance of a 
dominant negative meaning, in this case the cost of adopting energy efficiency 
technologies and practices, can make other meanings, such as energy efficiency’s ability 
to reduce CO2, more visible.  Once consumers interpret energy efficiency technologies 
and practices in a number of positive ways, or when they understand the different 
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benefits they provide, it becomes easier for utilities and energy efficiency organizations 
to help consumers adopt them.  By framing energy efficiency initiatives as solutions to 
consumers' problems, whether climate change or comfort, instead of as a new cost, 
utilities and energy efficiency organizations are motivating consumers to adopt these 
technologies and practices and to actually reduce the electricity they consume (Brint & 
Karabel, 1991; Fligstein, 1997). 
Utilities could not traditionally profit from the deployment of energy efficiency 
technologies and practices that reduced electricity consumption, and this created an 
anchor effect that marginalized the other ways they could interpret the use of them 
(Hayes et al., 2011; Kushler et al., 2006).  This anchor effect prevented utilities from 
proactively deploying energy efficiency initiatives to reduce electricity consumption even 
though doing so could help them achieve other goals, such as reducing CO2 emissions or 
avoiding new construction.  However, the implementations of energy efficiency 
performance incentives, which are partially funded through RGGI's revenue recycler, are 
changing how utilities interpret the use of energy efficiency technologies and practices.  
Specifically, the creation of performance incentives enables utilities to interpret the 
deployment of energy efficiency initiatives that reduce electricity consumption as a 
profitable and viable business opportunity.  Once electrical companies are able to view 
the use of energy efficiency initiatives that reduce electricity consumption as a business 
opportunity it facilitates their ability to interpret it according to other positive meanings.  
In this way, RGGI funds are changing how utilities interpret the use of energy efficiency 
initiatives by eliminating an anchor effect.  Making the deployment of energy efficiency 
initiatives profitable accentuates the dominant way utilities had been interpreting the use 
of these technologies and practices and makes other positive meanings more appealing 
(Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  
This effect can be seen in the region’s newspaper articles, industry articles, and in 
the interviews.  In the region’s newspapers the number of articles that connect CO2, 
electricity, and energy efficiency more than doubled after RGGI funds became available.  
Furthermore, these articles describe energy efficiency as a business opportunity much 
more frequently than past articles.  Within the PEM industry journal, the number of 
articles linking CO2 emissions with a desire to increase the use of energy efficiency 
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initiatives also grew in the late 2000s after the use of incentives became more common 
(York et al., 2012).  In the same industry publication, the number of articles referencing 
CO2 and identifying attention to electricity conservation as a source of industry change 
also increased once energy efficiency incentives became more widely used (York et al., 
2012).  The interviews also support the notion that getting electrical companies to view 
the deployment of energy efficiency technologies and practices as a profitable activity 
helps them to see and value the other benefits they provide.  The interviews specifically 
show that once electrical companies interpret energy efficiency technologies and 
practices as a profit source they are more inclined to view their use as a solution to their 
other problems, such as CO2 emissions, siting new facilities, and low consumer 
engagement.  Once electrical companies interpret energy efficiency in a variety of ways, 
or when they value the many benefits of reducing electricity consumption, they are more 
willing to deploy existing approaches and more open to exploring novel approaches.  
This is then motivating utilities to reduce electricity consumption themselves, or to work 
with energy efficiency organizations that are developing new methods for reducing 
electricity consumption.  
A significant portion of the funds that are being used to support energy efficiency 
initiatives in the region are coming from RGGI's auction revenues.  This means the 
different benefits that are emerging from the use of these funds are creating further 
support for RGGI, as well as for indirectly managing CO2 emissions through the use of 
energy efficiency.  When new resources are used to reduce the upfront costs of adopting 
energy efficiency initiatives and to create performance incentives for their use, it changes 
how electrical companies, consumers, and PUCs interpret the consumption of electricity.  
These funds do so by accentuating or suppressing the dominant economic meanings these 
individuals and organizations had been using to understand the use of electricity and 
energy efficiency technologies and practices (Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  For 
consumers and PUCs, RGGI funds are helping to reduce the salience of the first cost 
meaning which is increasing the visibility of energy efficiency's other benefits, such as 
reducing CO2 emissions and more efficiently providing the services that consumers 
desire.  For electrical companies, RGGI funds are helping to elevate a profit-generating 
meaning for energy efficiency.  This is making the other benefits that energy efficiency 
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provides more prominent, such as reducing CO2 and avoiding new construction, and is 
increasing utilities’ appreciation of them.  In other words, RGGI’s revenues are directly 
incentivizing the use of energy efficiency technologies and practices by creating financial 
rewards and removing first cost barriers.  However, in doing so these funds are also 
indirectly expanding the use of energy efficiency initiatives by making non-economic 
meanings for them more salient and valuable to electrical companies, consumers, and 
PUCs.  The increasing salience and value of positive economic and non-economic 
meanings are motivating these individuals and organizations to actually deploy or adopt 
energy efficiency initiatives to reduce electricity consumption.  
The ACEEE's evaluation of the energy efficiency requirements and initiatives 
occurring in the RGGI states indicates that utilities, consumers, and PUCs are becoming 
more receptive to reducing electricity consumption through the use of energy efficiency 
technologies and practices (Foster et al., 2012).  As part of this, utilities and energy 
efficiency organizations are developing and deploying new approaches to help consumers 
reduce the amount of electricity they are consuming.  Key amongst these innovations is 
energy efficiency initiatives that are specifically designed to appeal to the electricity 
consumer.  This focus on consumers' attitudes and behaviors is driving changes in how 
energy efficiency programs are marketed to consumers and the types of initiatives that 
are being developed.  More specifically, utilities and energy efficiency organizations are 
developing informational and behavioral energy efficiency strategies that exploit 
consumers' ideological and behavioral tendencies to reduce the amount of electricity they 
consume.  However, unlike traditional technological approaches to energy efficiency, 
reducing electricity consumption through the use of information and behavioral 
modifications requires the active support of utilities, consumers, and PUCs.  It would be 
much harder, if not impossible, to utilize informational and behavioral programs if 
utilities and PUCs are not interested in identifying new ways to reduce electricity 
consumption and if consumers are not actually interested in reducing the amount of 
electricity they use.  Due to these considerations, the emergence of increasingly 
innovative and sophisticated energy efficiency strategies appears to be driven by utilities', 
consumers', and PUCs' increasing desire to actually use energy efficiency initiatives to 
reduce electricity consumption.  Electrical companies, consumers, and PUCs want to use 
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energy efficiency initiatives that reduce electricity consumption because the new funds 
are helping them become increasingly aware and appreciative of the benefits they provide.  
The increasing appeal of energy efficiency to utilities, consumers, and PUCs in 
the RGGI states is expanding the amount of energy efficiency resources that are being 
developed within the region, and this is driving a number of integration innovations 
(Foster et al., 2012; York et al., 2012).  These integration innovations constitute systemic 
modifications that allow larger amounts of demand-side resources to be included in the 
region's electrical systems.  They include more sophisticated measurement methodologies 
and markets for energy efficiency resources.  As larger portions of the region’s electricity 
demand are met with demand-side resources, regulators, ISOs, electrical, and energy 
efficiency organizations all need a better understanding of the degree to which electricity 
consumption is actually being reduced (Foster et al., 2012; York et al., 2012). This is 
prompting all of these entities to refine existing and to develop new evaluation and 
measurement methodologies, so that the savings can be included in regional plans, be 
used to meet requirements and standards, and be eligible for performance incentives.  In 
particular, many organizations are developing measurement methodologies that are based 
on experimental design and include treatment and control populations.  Under this 
approach a particular energy efficiency initiative is diffused to the treatment population 
and not to the control.  After running the initiative for a certain amount of time the 
organization implementing the program would compare the electricity consumed by the 
treatment and control populations to determine the actual reductions the initiative is 
achieving. 
Similarly, increasing amounts of energy efficiency resources are also driving 
changes in how these resources are included in the region’s wholesale electrical markets 
(Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2011; Foster et al., 2012; York et al., 2012).  
The most significant change is the development of single wholesale markets that combine 
traditional supply resources with demand-side resources.  Within such a market, 
organizations stimulating reductions in electricity consumption are able to bid these 
negawatts into wholesale markets based on the cost of achieving them (American Council 
for an Energy-Efficiency Economy, 2012a; Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 
2011; Lovins, 1989).  The provision of negawatts reduces the amount of megawatts the 
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ISO has to source to meet the demand for electricity at a particular period of time, which 
allows supply- and demand-side resources to be incorporated into a single wholesale 
market (American Council for an Energy-Efficiency Economy, 2012a; Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, 2011; Lovins, 1989).  It is important to note that the industry 
interviewees presented these changes as ongoing paradigmatic shifts within both the 
region and industry that are occurring but are not yet complete.  This makes markets for 
energy efficiency resources and more sophisticated measurement methodologies 
innovations in progress.  
 
The Connection between the Effects of RGGI's CO2 Allowances and Revenue 
Recycler 
 
 The two data and analysis chapters highlight the importance of economic 
considerations to electrical companies, consumers, and PUCs.  Electrical companies, 
those with and without generation facilities, primarily interpret the physical materials and 
behavioral actions underlying electricity-derived CO2 according to their effects on their 
costs and revenues (Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  Consumers and PUCs primarily 
interpret these materials and actions according to their effect on the price and availability 
of electrical supplies (Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  Policymakers identified the central 
role that economic considerations occupy in electrical companies’ and consumers’ pre-
existing cultural controls and designed RGGI to align with them (Blanchard, 2008; 
Caronna, 2004; Scott, 2001).  In particular, they included a weak cap, a price collar, and 
pre-existing monitoring and compliance requirements to reduce the economic costs the 
new CO2 allowances would create.  They also included an energy efficiency revenue 
recycler so the policy would produce positive economic impacts.  Beyond facilitating 
RGGI’s enactment the implementation of these design features are also producing a 
number of effects.  However, because RGGI’s low allowance price is limiting the 
policy’s formal effects, the most significant of these effects are informal and revolve 
around how individuals and organizations interpret and use CO2, the operation of CO2-
emitting technologies, electricity, and energy efficiency initiatives.  In fact, the effects 
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identified in this chapter are primarily emerging because RGGI’s limited formal effects 
are producing significant informal or cultural effects.  
 RGGI’s design makes it inexpensive or economically beneficial for generators, 
consumers, and PUCs to use the new meanings for CO2, the operation of CO2-emitting 
technologies, electricity, and energy efficiency initiatives the policy encapsulates.  As it 
is inexpensive or economically beneficial for these individuals and organizations to use 
these meanings they are willing to, and by doing so they support the existence of the 
policy (Blanchard, 2008; Caronna, 2004; Scott, 2001).  One design feature that is heavily 
influencing the cost of using the meanings embedded in RGGI is the energy efficiency 
revenue recycler.  The new energy efficiency funds the recycler is creating are being used 
to help utilities, consumers, and PUCs see and appreciate the benefits that reducing 
electricity consumption through energy efficiency provides.  As these individuals and 
organizations are becoming more aware and appreciative of these benefits they are 
becoming more interested in actually deploying and adopting these technologies and 
practices to reduce electricity consumption.  The increasing use of energy efficiency 
initiatives that is occurring suppresses the demand for electricity, which limits price hikes 
and reliability issues, but also limits the price of CO2 allowances (Foster et al., 2012).  
Due to these effects, generators can continue to profit from using their CO2-emitting 
equipment and consumers can continue to get the services they desire from using 
electricity without paying more for them.  In other words, the increasing amount of 
energy efficiency resources that are emerging are reducing the cost and increasing the 
benefits of using the new meanings of CO2 and CO2-emitting technologies for electrical 
companies and consumers (Blanchard, 2008; Foster et al., 2012; Scott, 2001).   
Electrical companies and consumers are willing to use the new meanings 
associated with RGGI and in doing so they express their support for the existence of the 
policy, which then ensures increasing amounts of energy efficiency funds become 
available.  As more funds are allocated to expand the use of energy efficiency initiatives 
the benefits of reducing electricity consumption through their use become even more 
visible and valuable to the individuals and organizations inhabiting the region.  This 
would then motivate utilities, consumers, and PUCs to expand the deployment and 
adoption of energy efficiency technologies and practices even more.  The appearance of 
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these resources would further suppress the price that consumers pay for electricity, and 
the costs that electrical companies pay to operate their equipment.  These effects would 
then make it even cheaper for electrical companies and consumers to use the new 
meanings embedded in RGGI, which would create further support for the policy and 
additional funds for energy efficiency (Blanchard, 2008; Caronna, 2004; Scott, 2001).  In 
this way, RGGI’s two types of informal effects are interacting together and producing 
positive feedback.  The interaction of the two informal effects is increasing support for 











Managing CO2 emissions 
 
• Does your organization manage (measuring and/or attempting to reduce or minimize) CO2 
emissions? 
 
• What department(s) is tasked with managing CO2 emissions?  
 
• Which individual positions are tasked with managing CO2 emissions?  
 
• How many people are involved with the management of CO2?   
 
• What individual positions or departments receive information related to the emission of CO2? 
 
• Does one central department manage emissions at all facilities? Or does each generation 
facility have its own emissions department?  
 
• How long have CO2emissions been managed? 
                                                          
1 This information is for data management. No names will be included in the analysis, and the 
organization's name will be replaced with a pseudonym.  
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• What method and equipment is used to manage CO2 emissions?   
 
• Was this method and equipment always used? If not, what methods and equipment were 
used?  
 
• What considerations are used to select a measurement methodology and monitoring 
equipment? 
 
• Did the passage of RGGI affect these considerations? If so how? 
 
• Did the passage of 40 CFR Part 98 (EPA Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program) affect these 
considerations? If so how 
 
CO2 Emissions Trading 
• Is your organization involved with any form of CO2 emission trading? If so, please describe.  
 
• What individual positions or departments are involved with CO2 emissions trading?  
 
• How many people are involved with CO2 emissions trading? 
   
• What individual positions or departments receive information related to CO2 emission 
trading? 
 
 Follow-up Interview 
• Would you be willing to participate in a follow up interview? 
 
• If you are interested in participating, please suggest a few convenient times and whether you 







Chart 3: Information about Interview Data 
 
Interview Number Organizational Role Industry Position Focus within the Org. Secondary Focus within Org.
1 President Electrical Distributor Operations NA
2 Principal Energy Efficiency Organization Strategy Sales
3 Associate Director Policy Organization Energy Innovation NA
4 Associate Director Policy Organization Energy Innovation NA
5 Consultant Consulting Organization Renewable Energy NA
6 Director Consulting Organization Renewable Energy Strategy
7 Engineer Municipal System Operations Environment
8 Manager Municipal System Energy Efficiency Account Management
9 Policy Adviser Environmental Organization Climate Energy Innovation
10 Manager Independent Power Producer Environmental Compliance
11 Director Independent Power Producer Environmental Sustainability
12 Vice President Municipal System Engineering Environment
13 Manager Municipal System Demand Side Management Energy Efficiency
14 Director Investor Owned System Policy Environment
15 Analyst Planning Organization Energy and Climate NA
16 Counsel Legal Organization Environmental Energy
17 Manager Industry Group Organization Energy Efficiency NA
18 Manager Industry Group Organization Energy Efficiency NA
19 Director Industry Group Organization Climate Environmental
20 Vice President Energy Efficiency Organization Strategy Operations
21 Director Energy Efficiency Organization Customer Relations NA
22 (Two People) Deputy Director Energy Efficiency Organization Policy NA
22 (Two People) Manager Energy Efficiency Organization Policy NA
23 Manager Demand Side Management Organization Operations Customer Relations
24 Policy Adviser Government Organization Environmental Innovation
25 Manager Investor Owned System Environmental Strategy
26 Engineer Investor Owned System Energy Efficiency NA
27 Director Consulting Organization Operations NA
28 Scientist Investor Owned System Environmental Operations
29 Manager Independent Power Producer Environmental Operations
30 Editor Energy Media Environmental Technology NA
31 Manager Independent Power Producer Environmental Compliance
32 Analyst Independent Power Producer Environmental Operations
33 Principal Project Development Organization Strategy Operations
34 Director Municipal System Energy Efficiency Demand Side Management
35 Engineer Municipal System Environmental Operations
36 Associate City Government Environmental Technology Environment
37 Vice President Project Development Organization Strategy Operations
38 Supervisor Independent Power Producer Environmental Operations
39 Manager Independent Power Producer Operations Environment
40 Developer Independent Power Producer Project Development Renewable Energy
41 Analyst Independent Power Producer Environmental Operations
42 Director Industry Group Organization Communications NA
43 Communications ISO Operations NA
44 Analyst Energy Research Agency Environmental Technology Operations
45 Vice President Energy Efficiency Organization Strategy Operations
46 Coordinator Municipal System Environmental Operations
47 Engineer Utility Environmental Operations
48 Fellow Energy Research Agency Environmental Operations
49 Trader Energy Trading Organization Trading NA
50 Manager Energy Co-op Operations NA
51 Manager Original Equipment Manufacturer Business Development NA
Information About Interview Data
213 
 
Chart 4: Codes Applied to CO2/Electricity Articles  
 


















Uses Less Fossil Fuels

















Examples of the Codes Applied to CO2/Electricity Newspaper Articles
Technology Codes
Will Be Cheap with Energy Efficiency
Business Opportunity






Examples of the Codes Applied to RGGI Newspaper Articles
In Support of RGGI Against RGGI






























Examples of the Codes Applied to the Industry Journals














This chapter concludes the research by tying the main analytical findings together 
and discussing how they and the research’s conceptual framework can be applied to other 
contexts.  The chapter begins by briefly summarizing the main analytical points presented 
in the previous chapters.  It then discusses the implications of the analysis as they relate 
to controlling environmental activities and to improving environmental behavior.  In 
particular, the research findings are applied to the design and enactment of environmental 
policies, the use of a policy's informal effects, and the diffusion of energy efficiency 
initiatives that reduce electricity consumption.  This chapter normatively addresses these 
topics and utilizes the research findings to identify strategies or approaches that can help 
bring them about or improve the use of them (Lipsey, 2008).  After, potential extensions 
of the research’s theoretical framework and findings and the limitations to these 
extensions are identified.  Lastly, the chapter illuminates a few promising areas for future 
research.  
 In February 2013 policymakers concluded RGGI's first review period (Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 2013).  During the review, generating, consuming, and 
environmental stakeholders in the region expressed their support for the policy.  The Staff 
Working Group (SWG) policymakers leveraged this support to formally extend the 
policy to 2020 and to tighten the emissions cap for the upcoming 2014 compliance year 
from 145 million short tons of CO21 to 91 million short tons, an approximately 40% 
reduction (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 2009, 2013).  Based on RGGI's recent 
extension and increasing stringency, this chapter explores how the research framework 
                                                          
1This figure does not include New Jersey’s approximately 20 million tons of CO2 emissions  (Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 2009). 
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and findings can be applied to help develop additional environmental policies and to help 
improve individual and organizational environmental performance.  
 
Summary of the Analysis 
 
 Economically rational electrical companies and consumers primarily understand 
and use the physical materials and behavioral actions underlying electricity-derived CO2 
emissions through economic meanings (Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  Electrical 
companies primarily interpret these materials and actions through effects on costs and 
revenues; their willingness to accept alternative meanings depends on the costs and 
revenues that accrue from using them (Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  Consumers 
primarily interpret these materials and actions according to their effects on the price and 
the availability of the electricity they use to get the services they desire (Blanchard, 2008; 
Scott, 2001).  Their willingness to accept alternative meanings is based on whether and 
how their use affects price or availability (Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001). 
 For both electrical companies and consumers economic meanings are dominant, 
and this dominance manifests in two ways.  First and most obviously, electrical 
companies and consumers primarily understand and use the physical materials and 
behavioral actions associated with the production and consumption of electricity through 
economic meanings (Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  Second, these economic meanings 
also mediate whether electrical companies and consumers accept or reject alternative 
interpretations and uses of these materials and actions.  More specifically, electrical 
companies and consumers appear willing to accept alternative interpretations for these 
materials and actions if their use results in small or negligible economic costs or positive 
economic benefits.  For instance, companies and consumers accept treating CO2 as a 
controlled material and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies as a controlled 
activity and are changing their behavior to reflect the use of these meanings because 
RGGI’s design makes doing so easy, inexpensive, and economically beneficial. 
  The salience of economic meanings to both electrical companies and consumers 
makes them extremely valuable levers for shifting interpretations and behaviors 
(Blanchard, 2008; Brint & Karabel, 1991; Fligstein, 1997; Scott, 2001).  However, this 
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same salience also makes electrical companies and consumers especially sensitive to the 
costs associated with using new meanings, and if they perceive the cost of using new 
meanings to be too high they will contest their use (Blanchard, 2008; Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992; Scott, 2001).  In fact, the SWG spent large portions of the RGGI design 
process identifying which economic meanings were most relevant to different stakeholder 
groups and then evaluating how different design features would align with the pre-
existing cultural controls, or dominant economic meanings, held by these stakeholders 
(Caronna, 2004; Lindblom, 1977).  The SWG then demonstrated, with economic models, 
that the proposed policy’s treatment of CO2 and CO2-emitting equipment would not 
drastically increase the price of producing or purchasing electricity.  They also used these 
models to show how the policy's revenue recycler would create resources that benefit 
electrical companies and consumers.  These modeling exercises enabled electrical 
companies and consumers to see how the policy’s interpretations of CO2 and the 
operation of CO2-emitting technologies were aligned with their pre-existing, 
economically-based cultural controls (Bailey et al., 2011; Blanchard, 2008; Caronna, 
2004; Lindblom, 1977; Scott, 2001).  Due to this perceived alignment, electrical 
companies and consumers were willing to support the enactment of RGGI (Caronna, 
2004). 
 Furthermore, now that RGGI is in place, its consistently low allowance prices and 
recycled revenues make it inexpensive and economically beneficial for electrical 
companies and consumers to use the meanings for CO2 and CO2-emitting technologies 
encapsulated in the policy.  As a result, electrical companies are willing to treat CO2 and 
the operation of CO2-emitting technologies as controlled, to diffuse these meanings 
throughout their organizations, and to modify how they produce electricity to reflect the 
use of these meanings.  Similarly, as RGGI's treatment of CO2 and CO2-emitting 
technologies does not negatively affect the price or availability of electricity supplies and 
leads to beneficial investments in energy efficiency, consumers are also willing to accept 
the use of these meanings.  In fact, when individuals and organizations primarily interpret 
materials and actions through the costs and benefits they impose, then the costs and 
benefits of using different meanings can be more important than their actual content 
(Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  This reaction can be seen from the RGGI context.  
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Electrical companies and consumers accept and use the new meanings for CO2 and the 
operation of CO2-emitting technologies that RGGI conveys because doing so produces 
new benefits and does not result in significantly higher costs.  
 RGGI's revenue recycler also exploits the economic inclination of electrical 
companies', consumers', and PUCs' pre-existing cultural controls to accelerate the 
diffusion of energy efficiency initiatives that reduce electricity consumption (Blanchard, 
2008; Brint & Karabel, 1991; Scott, 2001).  More specifically, RGGI’s auction revenues 
are being recycled to reduce the upfront cost of deploying and adopting energy efficiency 
initiatives for PUCs and consumers, and to make their deployment profitable for 
electrical companies.  In doing so, these funds are accentuating or suppressing the 
dominant economic meanings these individuals and organizations hold, which then 
makes other non-economic meanings increasingly visible and valuable.  Once electrical 
companies can interpret the deployment of energy efficiency technologies and practices 
that reduce electricity consumption as a source of profits, they become more willing to 
value the other benefits they provide.  This then facilitates electrical companies’ ability to 
interpret energy efficiency as a solution to other issues they are experiencing, whether 
CO2 emissions, siting concerns, or low customer satisfaction.  The newly salient 
combination of positive economic and non-economic meanings motivates electrical 
companies to change their behavior by actually deploying energy efficiency initiatives to 
reduce electricity consumption. 
 Electricity consumers and PUCs are similarly affected by new energy efficiency 
resources.  Once these individuals and organizations stop interpreting the adoption of 
energy efficiency initiatives that reduce electricity consumption as a new upfront cost, 
they can better envision the other benefits they can provide.  This then enables consumers 
and PUCs to view energy efficiency as a solution to other problems they are experiencing, 
whether CO2 emissions, electricity costs, or personal comfort.  The newly salient 
combination of positive economic and non-economic meanings affects behavior by 
prompting PUCs to accelerate the deployment of energy efficiency technologies and 
practices and by encouraging consumers to actually adopt them.  As electrical companies, 
consumers, and PUCs become increasingly interested in and develop experience with 
using energy efficiency technologies and practices, new consumer-focused approaches 
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for marketing existing initiatives and new behavioral and informational initiatives are 
emerging (Foster et al., 2012; York et al., 2012).  Additionally, electrical companies', 
consumers', and PUCs' growing support for deploying and adopting energy efficiency 
initiatives that reduce electricity consumption is driving the creation of increasing 
amounts of demand-side resources (Foster et al., 2012; York et al., 2012).  Their 
appearance is stimulating further innovations in how these resources are evaluated, 
measured, and integrated into wholesale electricity markets (York et al., 2012). 
 Finally, RGGI's ability to leverage the economic biases of electrical companies, 
consumers, and PUCs to shift how these individuals and organizations interpret and use 
CO2, CO2-emitting technologies, electricity, and energy efficiency initiatives is also 
producing a positive feedback effect (Blanchard, 2008; Brint & Karabel, 1991; Fligstein, 
1997; Scott, 2001).  The feedback effect is driven by RGGI's energy efficiency revenue 
recycler.  Accelerating the diffusion of energy efficiency initiatives that suppress the 
price of electricity and CO2 allowances makes it even cheaper for individuals and 
organizations to modify their behavior to reflect the new meanings for CO2 and CO2-
emitting technologies associated with RGGI.  As the cost of using these meanings 
declines, electrical companies and consumers are more willing shift their behavior to 
reflect their use, and by doing so they express support for the policy.  Their support for 
the policy ensures that energy efficiency funds will continue to be generated and made 
available for recycling.  The use of these funds can further suppress the price of 
electricity and the need for and price of CO2 allowances, which then make it even 
cheaper for electrical companies to base their behavior, or how they produce of electricity, 
on controlling CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies.  In this way, the 
interaction of the two informal effects RGGI induces generates positive feedback that 
retains existing and attracts additional support for both the policy and for using energy 
efficiency to reduce electricity consumption.  Together, RGGI's formal design features 
and their informal effects allow the policy to reduce CO2 emissions and electricity 






Implications of the Research Findings  
 
 The analytical findings of this research have a number of potential implications.  
These primarily touch on: the design and enactment of new, environmental, market-based 
policies; the use of a policy's informal effects; and the diffusion of energy efficiency 
initiatives, which includes organizational and systemic implications.  The following 
sections explore these implications.  They do so by mining the research findings for 
normative suggestions that can help improve the design and enactment of new 
environmental policies, facilitate appreciation for and the use of a policy’s informal 
effects, and accelerate the diffusion of energy efficiency initiatives (Lipsey, 2008).   
 
Designing New, Enactable, Mandatory, Market Policies to Control Environmental 
Activities  
 The SWG utilized a number of strategies to help design and enact the first, 
mandatory cap and trade policy for controlling CO2 emissions in the U.S.  Their 
approaches and the process and design features they included can inform future efforts to 
design new, enactable, mandatory market-based policies for previously uncontrolled 
environmental activities.  In terms of process, the SWG allowed different categories of 
stakeholders to participate in nearly every facet of the policy's design and made extensive 
use of economic models to portray the potential outcomes of different policy designs.  
These efforts enabled the SWG to identify design features, such as a weak cap, an 
allowance auction, a price collar, and an energy efficiency revenue recycler, that critical 
categories of stakeholders could all support.  By designing a policy critical categories of 
stakeholders could support, the SWG ensured RGGI would be enacted (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 2003). 
 In order to design an enactable policy for a previously uncontrolled or informally 
controlled environmental activity, policymakers need to identify how different categories 
of stakeholders interpret and use the various materials and behavioral actions underlying 
the activity.  The most comprehensive method, and the one used to design RGGI, 
involves inviting all stakeholders to participate in the policy design meetings and 
soliciting their thoughts about the goals of the policy, indicators of success, and outcomes 
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to avoid.  Other approaches include surveying or interviewing different categories of 
stakeholders about these topics prior to the design meetings or inviting representatives 
from different stakeholder categories to comment on these topics during the design 
meetings.  When a new policy is designed through these processes policymakers can 
identify the misalignment that critical categories of stakeholders could perceive between 
their pre-existing cultural controls and the meanings and interpretations underlying 
different policy options (Caronna, 2004; Lindblom, 1977).  Additionally, when critical 
stakeholders are economically rational, policymakers need to specifically identify which 
economic meanings or effects are most important to different categories of stakeholders  
(Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  This information allows policymakers to identify the 
range of potential outcomes that would prompt different stakeholders to contest the 
enactment or ongoing presence of the policy, or which policy outcomes they must avoid.  
Policymakers can then use this information to identify policy components and 
combinations of components that produce effects that can attract the support of critical 
stakeholders and prevent them from contesting enactment.  
 Policymakers should also make extensive use of economic models when 
designing a market-based policy for an uncontrolled environmental activity that will 
affect economically rational stakeholders.  As part of this process, policymakers should 
use the pre-existing cultural controls held by stakeholders to help define the underlying 
assumptions of the models and the policy effects that stakeholders are most concerned 
about to set the output parameters.  Policymakers can then use the models to 
convincingly demonstrate the potential effects of various policy iterations to stakeholders 
in order to build support for a particular design (Bailey et al., 2011).  
 The modeling processes the SWG used to develop RGGI represent a fairly new 
approach for designing an environmental policy.  As such, soliciting critical stakeholders' 
opinions about the models' assumptions, and designing the models to depict the 
conditions most relevant to them, was difficult and time consuming.  In the future, 
policymakers should develop standardized procedures to educate stakeholders about the 
functions and limitations of economic models prior to their use, and to identify and 
integrate stakeholders' modeling preferences in a timely and organized fashion.  Doing so 
would speed up and improve the transparency of the modeling processes and potentially 
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make the results more convincing or legitimate.  Furthermore, even though RGGI 
primarily drew upon economic models, other modeling approaches, such as those that 
depict complex systems, may be complementary and could provide a richer and more 
nuanced perspective.  This approach would be especially valuable when policymakers are 
attempting to create and enact a new formal policy to control an informally or 
uncontrolled environmental activity.   
 In terms of designing an enactable, mandatory, new policy to regulate 
economically rational individuals or organizations, policymakers need to identify where 
the economic concerns held by different categories of stakeholders overlap, or what 
potential economic outcomes are acceptable to many of them.  With this information, 
they can then identify individual or combinations of policy features that produce 
economic effects that fall within this tolerable range.  This would reduce the economic 
misalignment that multiple categories of critical stakeholders could perceive between 
their pre-existing cultural controls and the meanings underlying the new policy, which 
would then make them more willing to accept and support its enactment (Blanchard, 
2008; Caronna, 2004; Lindblom, 1977; Scott, 2001). 
 After identifying the primary economic concerns of generators and consumers, 
the SWG utilized three design features to mitigate the policy's effect on the price of 
producing and purchasing electricity.  In particular, they minimized the perceived 
economic impacts associated with an auction-based cap and trade policy by making the 
initial cap level loose.  The SWG also cushioned the potential economic effects by 
coupling the allowance auction with protective safety valves and by creating recoupable 
benefits through a price floor and revenue recycler.  These features can inform the design 
of other environmental policies.  However, the price collar and revenue recycler are more 
broadly applicable, while an intentionally weak cap or tax should be applied more 
selectively.  
Price floors and ceilings can be used to create concrete boundaries around the 
range of potential outcomes that multiple categories of stakeholders will accept.  They 
provide a guarantee that the policy's economic effects will fall within the tolerable range 
of outcomes, which reduces the misalignment that stakeholders could perceive and 
facilitates their initial and ongoing support for the policy and its enactment (Caronna, 
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2004).  Furthermore, as the floor and ceiling components of a price collar typically appeal 
to different categories of stakeholders, their initial levels and threshold triggers that 
modify their levels can be jointly set to appeal to as many stakeholders as needed.  Lastly, 
when combined with a revenue recycler, a price floor guarantees a certain amount of 
beneficial resources will be created.  
 A revenue recycler is an extremely versatile policy tool that can reduce the 
misalignment that multiple categories of stakeholders could perceive.  It can also attract 
support for the enactment of a new formal policy.  The resources it generates can be used 
in various ways to create new benefits for the stakeholders that would be affected by a 
policy.  Ideally, the new resources would be used to create benefits for multiple 
categories of stakeholders, although their application can also be more focused if the 
support of an individual stakeholder group is essential.  RGGI's revenue recycler is 
especially effective because it is being used to accelerate the diffusion of energy 
efficiency initiatives.  Improving the efficient use of existing electrical supplies reduces 
the demand for electricity, which mitigates the policy's economic impacts on generators 
and consumers by respectively suppressing the price of CO2 allowances and electricity.  
Furthermore, the energy efficiency funds the recycler produces directly create new 
benefits for consumers and generators.  These funds reduce the cost consumers would 
have to pay to adopt energy efficiency technologies and practices and allow for 
performance incentives that enable electrical companies to profit from their deployment.   
  Recycling a policy's revenues to incentivize a more efficient use of the material 
or energy source underlying or driving the controlled environmental activity effectively 
reduces a policy's economic impact on multiple categories of stakeholders.  It also 
simultaneously makes the policy a source of new benefits for multiple categories of 
stakeholders.  Improving the efficient use of the material or energy source underlying a 
policy reduces the new economic costs the policy imposes on the organizations that 
produce or extract it and on the consumers that use it.  For producing organizations, 
incentivizing end use efficiency reduces the demand for the material or energy source 
without reducing the organization's revenues.  As a result, organizations can restrict their 
involvement with the detrimental environmental activity associated with the extraction of 
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the material or the production of the energy source without losing revenues, which limits 
the economic impact imposed by the policy.  
 For consumers, funding end use efficiency reduces the amount of the material or 
energy they need to use to get the benefits they desire without imposing new costs.  This 
then curtails the total cost consumers have to pay to get the benefits they desire and limits 
the overall economic impact of the policy, even if it increases the price of an individual 
unit of the material or energy source.  Recycling policy revenues to support technological 
innovations that reduce waste or educational programs that change consumption patterns 
may similarly reduce the economic impacts a policy imposes upon multiple categories of 
stakeholders.  To exploit these potential benefits, policymakers need to keep the use of a 
revenue recycler in mind when they initially solicit information about stakeholders' pre-
existing cultural controls.  Doing so can help them identify where stakeholder interests 
overlap and potential ways to use the revenues to address the concerns of multiple 
stakeholder groups. 
  The mechanics of a price collar and revenue recycler should be tailored to a 
specific context, but the base design features can be included in many types of 
environmental policies.  This is because both can minimize a policy’s perceived 
economic impact without severely weakening its ability to control behavior.  However, in 
certain situations policymakers should propose an intentionally weak market policy to 
facilitate its enactment even if the direct behavioral changes it can induce are relatively 
limited.  The remainder of this section identifies the conditions where policymakers 
should and should not consider proposing an intentionally weak market policy, as well as 
the indicators they can use to determine the political and environmental context they are 
working within.  
 To determine the political context they are working within, policymakers should 
identify whether and how similar policies have succeeded or failed in the past.  
Additionally, they should identify the arguments used in support of or against these 
policies, the type and amount of supporters and opponents, and their current and potential 
resources.  Policymakers should also identify the characteristics of the environmental 
activity they are trying to control.  This includes: whether the activity is immediately 
detrimental or toxic; whether it is driven by one or multiple behaviors; whether the 
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environmental activity can be addressed quickly with one policy or over time through 
multiple policies; whether or not controlling the activity requires complementary 
technical or infrastructure changes; and whether individuals are already engaging in the 
activity or if it is a potential activity that could occur in the future.  
Once policymakers identify the political and environmental context they are 
working within, they can then determine whether they should propose an intentionally 
weak market policy.  For instance, when previous attempts to enact a policy to control a 
specific environmental activity have repeatedly failed or when enactment is perceived to 
be very difficult, then policymakers should considering proposing a weak market policy 
to facilitate its enactment.  Tangentially, when opponents pre-emptively mobilize against 
the idea of a policy before it is even proposed or when they have deployed economic 
arguments against previous enactment attempts, then policymakers should also consider 
proposing a weak market policy.  Furthermore, if there are few existing supporters but 
many potential ones, policymakers can use the enactment of a weak market policy to 
draw out their support for future iterations. 
 Policymakers should also consider proposing an intentionally weak market policy 
when the activity to be controlled exhibits certain characteristics.  For example, when the 
environmental activity is not imminently harmful or toxic then policymakers have the 
option of deploying an initially weak policy to build support for stronger iterations, 
instead of trying to enact a stronger, but more politically contentious version first.  
Similarly, when the environmental activity is widespread and affected by a number of 
different social behaviors, such as CO2 emissions, then policymakers should consider 
using a weak market policy as a way to begin controlling the activity.  In such examples, 
the proposed policy represents only the first of many steps that need to be made in order 
to control the environmental activity.  In other words, when the policy represents the 
foundation for broader political, technical, or infrastructure changes then policymakers 
should consider proposing a weak market policy in order to create momentum and 
support for subsequent stages.  Developing this positive momentum, via the enactment of 
a weak market policy, is even more important when time is a pressing consideration for 
making all of the aggregate changes.   
226 
 
Furthermore, when multiple behaviors underlie the environmental activity, 
proposing to control one behavior through a weak market policy is not necessarily 
ineffective if the policy revenues are used to indirectly affect other behaviors.  This is 
most evident from RGGI’s revenue recycler which is indirectly reducing the region’s 
emissions by stimulating the use of energy efficiency initiatives that reduce electricity 
consumption.  Lastly, when policymakers are trying to control an existing environmental 
activity, rather than pre-emptively controlling a potential activity, they should consider 
proposing an intentionally weak market policy.  Individuals and organizations are more 
likely to perceive misalignment between the pre-existing and proposed cultural controls 
underlying an environmental activity they are already involved with than between those 
underlying an activity they are thinking about undertaking (Caronna, 2004).  As the 
perception of misalignment can motivate contestation, policymakers should consider 
proposing an initially weak market policy when they attempt to formally control an 
existing environmental activity for the first time (Caronna, 2004).  
 On the other hand, policymakers should not propose intentionally weak market 
policies when similar policies have been successfully enacted in the past or when they are 
extending or expanding existing policies.  Similarly, when potential opponents are not 
organized, do not have readily available resources, and are not using economic arguments 
to contest the idea or enactment of a policy then proposing a weak market policy may not 
be necessary.  This is especially true when well-funded supporters of the policy already 
exist and are motivated to fight for the policy’s enactment.  Additionally, when the 
environmental activity is immediately toxic it may be easier and more effective for 
policymakers to enact an initially strong policy rather than a succession of increasingly 
stronger ones.  Policymakers should also consider this approach when the environmental 
activity is driven by one behavior that can be immediately controlled with a single policy 
and does not require significant, complementary technical or infrastructure changes.  
Lastly, if policymakers are trying to enact a policy to prevent a future environmental 
activity from occurring they should propose a strong iteration.  Individuals and 
organizations would be less likely to perceive misalignment between pre-existing and 
proposed cultural controls because they are not currently involved with the activity.  In 
this context, policymakers would not have to facilitate enactment by using a weak market 
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policy to induce economically-based alignment because stakeholders would already be 
less inclined to perceive misalignment.  
 
Appreciating and Utilizing Policies' Informal Effects 
 The enactment and ongoing operation of RGGI's formal design features produce a 
number of informal effects.  The informal or cultural effects reflect shifts in the meanings 
individuals and organizations employ to interpret and use CO2, the operation of CO2-
emitting technologies, electricity, and energy efficiency technologies and practices (Scott, 
2001).  Changing the meanings that individuals and organizations use is not the same as 
changing their behaviors, but the two are highly intertwined.  This is due to the fact that 
social behaviors reflect the meanings that individuals and organizations employ to 
interpret and use the materials and actions constituting the behavior (Schnaiberg, 1980; 
Scott, 2001).  Expanding on this relationship, as individuals and organizations accept new 
meanings for materials and actions it changes how they use or participate in them, 
producing behavioral changes (Brint & Karabel, 1991; Scott, 2001).  So individuals’ and 
organizations’ willing acceptance of new meanings leads to behavioral changes whether 
or not they are consciously making the connection between meanings and behaviors.  
When individuals are unconsciously making the connection, participating in the behavior 
can reveal the use of these new meanings, or can help individuals make sense of the new 
meanings, even though they are already using them (Scott, 2001; Weick, 1995).   Within 
this research changes in meaning were identified by asking individuals and organizations 
in surveys and interviews about their awareness and use of new meanings, such as 
whether and how they are controlling CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting 
technologies.  These statements were then analyzed to ascertain how the use of these new 
meanings is influencing behavioral changes.  More specifically, the connection between 
new meanings and behaviors was identified through the behaviors that individuals and 
organizations mentioned when queried about the new meanings.  The connection between 
new meanings and behaviors was also revealed when individuals and organizations 
discussed new behaviors that are predicated upon the use of the new meanings, and when 
they used the new meanings to explain behavioral changes. 
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 From the surveys and interviews it is possible to see how individuals’ acceptance 
of new meanings prompted conscious and unconscious behavioral changes.  For instance 
a number of survey respondents made unsolicited comments about improving production 
and end-use efficiency when asked to comment about their efforts to control CO2 
emissions.  Other respondents explicitly made the connection between treating CO2 as a 
controlled material and improving production and end-use efficiency during interviews.  
These responses indicate that these individuals and the organizations that employ them 
are changing how they produce electricity as a result of treating CO2 and the operation of 
CO2-emitting technologies as controlled.   In fact, by working to minimize the amount of 
CO2 that must be emitted to produce one unit of electricity, these individuals and 
organizations are now using CO2 emissions as a new indicator of behavioral efficiency.  
Treating CO2 as an indicator of behavioral efficiency means that individuals and 
organizations are shifting their behavior to accommodate the new control-based meanings 
for CO2 and CO2-emitting technologies whether they are consciously aware of it or not. 
 Within the interviews, individuals also described how their organizations are 
using the new control-based meanings for CO2 and CO2-emitting technologies to explain 
behavioral changes and as levers to stimulate future behaviors.  For example, individuals 
working within electrical companies described technological and operational changes 
through their effects on CO2 emissions, such as by discussing a change from oil to natural 
gas burning facilities as a method for controlling CO2.  By making sense of their behavior 
through the use of these meanings, or by using these new meanings to explain their 
behavior, these individuals demonstrate how the use of the new meanings affects their 
understanding of past behaviors, which then inform how they behave in the present and 
future (Brint & Karabel, 1991; Scott, 2001; Weick, 1995).  The influence of these new 
meanings on existing and future behaviors is also evident from interviews that were 
conducted with individuals working within especially progressive electrical organizations.  
In these interviews, individuals discussed how treating CO2 and the operation of CO2-
emitting technologies as controlled is becoming a long-term strategic imperative as well 
as a motivational lever that their organization is using to shift employees’ future 
behaviors.  In other words, these organizations are using the new control-based meanings 
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for CO2 and CO2-emitting technologies to inform and explain their existing behaviors, as 
well as to determine and bring about their future behaviors.  
These shifts in meaning, and their subsequent behavioral effects, are affecting the 
development of additional CO2-controlling policies (Brint & Karabel, 1991).  Electrical 
companies and consumers increasingly interpret and use CO2 as a controlled material and 
the operation of CO2-emitting technologies as a controlled activity.  Electrical companies’ 
acceptance of these meanings is stimulating a number of behavioral changes in the ways 
they evaluate, structure, and use their electricity-producing operations.  These behavioral 
changes and the increasing acceptance of the new control-based meanings for CO2 and 
the operation of CO2-emitting technologies they reflect facilitate policymakers' ability to 
extend and strengthen RGGI.  This is because it is easier for policymakers to control CO2 
and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies more rigorously once companies and 
consumers have accepted the use of these meanings and have modified their behavior to 
reflect their use. 
Furthermore, electrical companies increasingly interpret the use of energy 
efficiency technologies and practices that reduce electricity consumption as a source of 
profits, and the acceptance of this meaning motivates companies to change their behavior 
by deploying larger amounts of them (Foster et al., 2012; Hayes et al., 2011; York et al., 
2012).  The behavioral change can be seen from interview responses that describe how 
electrical companies are increasingly using energy efficiency initiatives to address other 
issues they are experiencing, whether CO2 emissions, building new facilities, or low 
consumer engagement.  Likewise, electrical consumers and PUCs interpret the use of 
energy efficiency initiatives as a new upfront cost less frequently, and this is motivating 
them to change their behavior by accelerating the deployment and adoption of these 
technologies and practices (Foster et al., 2012; York et al., 2012).  The behavioral change 
can be seen in the ACEEE’s energy efficiency report card, which depicts the RGGI states’ 
focus on and use of energy efficiency initiatives (Foster et al., 2012; York et al., 2012).  
Collectively, electrical companies', consumers', and PUCs' increasing interest in 
deploying and adopting energy efficiency technologies and practices is stimulating new 
types of initiatives, improvements in how they are marketed to consumers, and 
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innovations in how demand-side resources are measured and valued in electricity markets 
(Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2011; Foster et al., 2012; York et al., 2012). 
 A formal policy's ability to shift how individuals and organizations interpret and 
use materials and actions is an underappreciated aspect of policy design and evaluation 
(Lindblom, 1977).  Based on the role these informal effects play in the enactment of 
additional policies and as determinants of behavior, policymakers should develop a better 
understanding of the relationship between formal and cultural controls (Brint & Karabel, 
1991; Caronna, 2004; Lindblom, 1977; Scott, 2001).  In particular, they should be more 
attentive to how different formal design features affect the meanings that individuals and 
organizations employ to interpret and use the materials and actions underlying the 
controlled environmental activity because changes in meaning are intertwined with 
behavioral changes (Schnaiberg, 1980; Scott, 2001).  This appreciation is valuable 
because it may be easier or less contentious to bring about a desired behavioral change by 
inducing informal effects than by trying to enact an ideal formal policy.  More 
specifically, under certain conditions it may be easier and more effective to control an 
environmental activity for the first time by enacting a series of weaker formal policies 
whose informal effects gradually allow for more rigorous controls than by trying to 
initially enact one ideal, formal policy. 
 With these informal effects in mind, the low price signals associated with a loose 
cap or a weak tax are not always detrimental or counterintuitive when a market-based 
policy is designed for and applied in particular political and environmental contexts.  
Intentionally designing a new environmental policy to have weak price signals makes it 
easier and less expensive for individuals and organizations to begin interpreting and using 
the materials and actions underlying the activity through the new meanings the policy 
highlights (Fligstein, 1997).  In fact, the appeal of using the new meanings embedded in a 
policy can be accentuated even further with a revenue recycler that makes their use 
economically beneficial (Fligstein, 1997).  Economically rational individuals and 
organizations are more willing to accept the use of new meanings and to change their 
behavior to reflect their use if doing so is not difficult or expensive (Blanchard, 2008; 
Scott, 2001).  
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As individuals and organizations use these new meanings to inform their behavior 
they express support for the policy that conveyed them.  The support can insulate a new 
policy that controls an environmental activity that had not been formally controlled from 
contestation.  It can also facilitate policymakers' ability to strengthen or expand the policy.  
Alternatively, if policymakers wanted to skip these steps to try to initially enact a strong 
policy with high price signals, it would make it more expensive and difficult for 
individuals and organizations to begin using the new meanings the policy encapsulates.  
The initial cost and effort associated with changing their behavior to reflect the use of 
these new meanings can make economically rational individuals and organizations less 
willing to use the meanings, which can then motivate them to contest their use by 
contesting the policy (Blanchard, 2008; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Scott, 2001).  
Therefore, in certain contexts it may be easier and more effective for policymakers to 
control an environmental activity for the first time by exploiting the informal effects 
induced by an initially weak, but progressively stronger formal policy than by trying to 
enact one ideal, formal policy.  
 Policymakers also need to develop a better appreciation of the relationship 
between formal and cultural controls because the two can complement each other to 
produce more widespread or significant effects.  This is particularly true when a policy 
includes a revenue recycler that creates new resources or benefits for affected 
stakeholders.  These resources can directly incentivize individuals and organizations to 
use certain technologies or to engage in certain activities, such as deploying or adopting 
energy efficiency technologies and practices.  However, these resources can also shift 
how individuals and organizations interpret the use of these technologies and practices in 
ways that make their adoption or deployment more appealing (Brint & Karabel, 1991; 
Fligstein, 1997).  This is especially true when financial resources are allocated to 
economically rational individuals and organizations.  The pre-existing cultural controls of 
economically rational individuals and organizations are heavily informed by economic 
meanings (Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  Based on this influence, recycling revenues to 
make the use of certain technologies or practices more lucrative can accentuate a 
dominant, positive economic meaning, a source of profits (Fligstein, 1997).  These 
resources can also be used to make the use of these technologies and practices less costly, 
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which can attenuate a dominant, negative economic meaning, a new upfront cost 
(Fligstein, 1997).  More specifically, once economically rational individuals or 
organizations interpret the use of a particular technology or practice as a profit source or 
once they stop interpreting it as a new cost, other positive, non-economic meanings can 
become more visible and valuable (Blanchard, 2008; Scott, 2001).  As individuals and 
organizations begin interpreting the use of a technology or practice through multiple 
positive meanings, or when they appreciate the different types of benefits it can provide, 
they become more motivated to change their behavior by actually using it.  In this way, 
the informal effects a policy induces can complement its formal design features to bring 
about more significant behavioral or technological changes.  
 Finally, policymakers who understand and appreciate the connection between 
formal and cultural controls can attempt to shift regulated and non-regulated individuals' 
or organizations' pre-existing cultural controls in anticipation of a new or extended policy 
(Fligstein, 1997; Lindblom, 1977; Scott, 2001).  For example, before a policy design 
process begins, policymakers could preemptively communicate with individuals and 
organizations about how easy, inexpensive, and beneficial it would be to use the new 
meanings.  Conveying this information before the policy design process begins may 
make stakeholders' pre-existing cultural controls more permeable to new meanings, 
which could then encourage them to support the idea of the policy, to participate in its 
design, or to be more open to various design features (Brint & Karabel, 1991; Caronna, 
2004; Fligstein, 1997).  Additionally, when a policy is being strengthened or expanded to 
other geographic or industrial realms, policymakers can identify the organizations whose 
behaviors best reflect the use of the new meanings and develop case studies around their 
approaches for compliance.  These cases can then be diffused to other organizations 
regulated by the policy or to those that may be regulated in the future.  The cases can 
demonstrate how easy and inexpensive it is for organizations to base their behaviors on 
the use of the new meanings.  Similar case studies about the benefits a revenue recycler 
produces can also be developed and diffused to individuals who may be regulated in the 
future.  These cases can depict the multiple benefits that accrue to different stakeholders 
from the use of the revenue recycler, or the different ways the technology or practice it 
supports can be interpreted.  The depiction can attract additional support for the policy 
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and make deploying or using the technology or practice more appealing.  Overall, 
preemptively trying to shift individuals' and organizations' pre-existing cultural controls 
can facilitate their alignment with the new meanings underlying a policy, and make them 
more willing to use these new meanings to interpret and inform their current and future 
behaviors (Brint & Karabel, 1991; Caronna, 2004; Fligstein, 1997; Lindblom, 1977; Scott, 
2001).  
 
Strategies For and the Implications of Accelerating the Diffusion of Energy Efficiency 
Initiatives 
 By reducing the upfront costs of and creating performance incentives for energy 
efficiency, RGGI's revenue recycler is changing how electrical companies, consumers, 
and PUCs interpret the use of these technologies and practices.  Specifically, by 
suppressing negative economic meanings and by elevating positive economic meanings 
these resources are making other non-economic meanings about the use of energy 
efficiency initiatives more visible and appealing.  Together the accentuated or attenuated 
economic meanings and the increasingly salient non-economic meanings make electrical 
companies, consumers, and PUCs more receptive to developing new and using existing 
energy efficiency technologies and practices (Brint & Karabel, 1991; Hayes et al., 2011; 
York et al., 2012; Zhao et al., 2012).  Given how new funds directly and indirectly 
accelerate the deployment and adoption of energy efficiency initiatives, electrical 
companies, consumers, and PUCs should be working with policymakers to identify new 
ways to create and allocate energy efficiency funds (Foster et al., 2012; York et al., 2012).  
Furthermore, existing and newly developed approaches for raising funds should be 
actively diffused beyond the traditional energy efficiency hot spots of the Northeast, U.S. 
and California.  This is especially important because improving the efficient use of 
electricity represents one of easiest and most cost effective ways to reduce CO2 emissions 
(York et al., 2012). 
 One important effect of RGGI's revenue recycler is that it raises new funds for 
energy efficiency without charging consumers, which is helping to change how they 
interpret the use of these technologies and practices.  In order to maintain this effect, 
larger amounts of energy efficiency funds need to be raised without significantly 
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increasing the costs for consumers.  One potential strategy builds on the RGGI policy by 
recycling the revenues raised through other environmental policies applied to the 
electrical industry.  These funds could be raised by collecting a portion of the sale or 
exchange price paid for NOx or SO2 emission allowances or a portion of the fines levied 
for violating various air, water, or waste disposal policies.  Other funding sources could 
be based on implementing a new tax or permitting fee levied on the construction of new 
fossil fuel-based generation facilities or their interconnection with ISO systems.   
 Portions of these funds should be used to expand existing and to develop 
additional educational programs about energy efficiency.  Some current energy efficiency 
initiatives include an educational component that informs consumers about the benefits of 
adopting energy efficiency practices and technologies that reduce electricity consumption, 
but these efforts need to be expanded.  The strong shadow effect created by the perceived 
cost of adopting energy efficiency initiatives makes it difficult for consumers to 
appreciate their benefits and suppresses their motivation to change their behavior by 
adopting these technologies and practices, even if the actual adoption cost is low (Jaffe & 
Stavins, 1994b; Zhao et al., 2012).  Programs that empower retail salespeople, as 
described by an interviewee, to talk about the actual costs and benefits of more efficient 
electrical technologies when consumers come to purchase them should be expanded and 
strengthened.  Furthermore, relevant information about the actual costs and benefits of 
reducing electrical consumption through the use of energy efficiency should be presented 
to young adults at schools and universities to curtail the emergence of a shadow effect at 
an early age.  Finally, existing efforts by industry groups, energy efficiency companies, 
and PUCs to accelerate the use of informational and behavioral energy efficiency 
initiatives should be expanded, perhaps through the previously described case studies.  
Policymakers can help accelerate the diffusion of these informational initiatives by 
establishing standardized evaluation, measurement, and verification methods, and 
procedures for bidding demand-side resources into wholesale electricity markets.  
 However, the increasing use of energy efficiency initiatives is prompting a 
number of changes in how electricity is produced, transmitted, marketed, and consumed 
and these are having widespread effects on the organizations that produce and deliver 
electricity and the broader electrical system (Foster et al., 2012; York et al., 2012).  
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Encircling these changes is the shifting conceptualization of electrical energy (Goldman, 
Reid, Levy, & Silverstein, 2010; Treadway, 2012).  Making the use of energy efficiency 
initiatives that reduce electricity consumption a profitable activity for electrical 
companies and a low or zero cost commitment for consumers is shifting the 
conceptualization of electricity away from a commodity that is delivered towards a 
service that is provided (Goldman et al., 2010).  When reducing electricity consumption 
represents a viable business opportunity, electrical companies are less concerned with 
selling or delivering units of electricity to consumers, and more interested in minimizing 
the cost required to provide the services that consumers desire, such as heat, cooling, 
light, or power (Goldman et al., 2010).  This can motivate electrical companies to 
improve the production and delivery efficiency of existing facilities as they can stretch 
their profit margin by providing the services that consumers desire with decreasing 
amounts of electricity.  At the same time, when energy efficiency initiatives are provided 
for free or at low cost, consumers are more willing to reduce their total consumption 
levels, especially when doing so does not impede their ability to get the services they 
desire.   
 In response to these shifts existing electrical organizations need to develop or 
acquire new skills.  These skills include: acquiring a better understanding of how 
consumers view electricity, energy efficiency technologies and practices, and the 
electrical organizations themselves; fusing communications technologies into the 
electrical system so that both companies and consumers have a better idea of how 
electricity consumption levels ebb and flow over time and in response to various 
initiatives; and analyzing and translating large amounts of production and consumption 
data into viable and appealing service offerings (Goldman et al., 2010).  These shifts are 
also creating space for new organizations to emerge and expand, such as energy 
efficiency, direct DSM, and evaluation, measurement, and verification organizations.  
These organizations challenge electrical companies' previously monolithic position as the 
sole provider of electrical service, electricity information, and energy efficiency 
initiatives, and make the ecosystem of organizations involved with the electrical sector 
increasingly diverse (Casazza & Delea, 2009).  Lastly, the increasing presence of 
demand-side resources is also driving changes in broader electrical systems as PUCs, 
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ISOs, and federal regulators are exploring new ways to integrate these resources into ISO 
system plans and wholesale electricity markets (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 
2011; Foster et al., 2012; York et al., 2012).  In particular, these issues reveal new venues 
for institution negotiations as different types of individuals and organization are now 
trying to position various measurement and evaluation methodologies as the best way to 
quantify demand-side resources and value them in electricity markets (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992; Fligstein, 1997; York et al., 2012). 
 
Extensions, Limitations, and Areas for Future Research  
  
 The findings of this research reveal a number of interesting implications about the 
design and enactment of environmentally-focused market policies, the use and value of a 
policy's informal effects, and the diffusion of energy efficiency technologies and 
practices.  These implications suggest how the research's conceptual framework and 
findings can be applied to other empirical contexts.  This section explores these potential 
extensions and discusses their limitations.  It concludes by integrating the research's 
findings with these extensions to identify promising areas for future research.  
 
Extensions 
 This research employs a conceptual framework that combines aspects of 
institutional and economic theories.  When used in tandem these two frameworks offer a 
unique and valuable perspective for analyzing market-based policies, including those 
applied to control environmental activities.  More specifically, their combination 
illuminates insights about the social processes underlying the design and enactment of a 
market-based policy, the ways its deployment can shift the meanings that individuals and 
organizations employ to interpret and use materials and actions, and how these shifts in 
meaning affect behavior (Brint & Karabel, 1991; Fligstein, 1997; Scott, 2001).  These 
uses make combinations of institutional and economic theories valuable for studying the 
creation of a new market-based policy, the application of an existing market-based policy 
to control social activities in other geographic or industrial realms, and the informal, 
social effects induced by these policies.   
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 For instance, this research identifies how the enactment of a market-based policy 
can exploit economically rational individuals' and organizations' inclination to interpret 
materials and actions through economic meanings to make other non-economic meanings 
more or less salient (Blanchard, 2008; Fligstein, 1997; Scott, 2001).  In particular, 
economically rational individuals and organizations appear willing to accept and to use 
new ways to interpret materials and actions to inform their behavior as long as doing so is 
inexpensive or economically beneficial (Blanchard, 2008; Brint & Karabel, 1991; Scott, 
2001).   The cost of using the new meanings encapsulated in a formal policy can be 
minimized or made positive by designing the policy to produce weak price signals or by 
recycling the revenues to benefit affected stakeholders.  When these informal effects are 
accounted for they reveal that market-based policies have broader and more widespread 
social effects that extend beyond their formal economic implications.  Acknowledging 
formal policies' informal effects also creates another criterion for evaluating the viability 
and value of different policy designs.  For example, RGGI demonstrates how, in certain 
contexts, policy designs that intentionally induce weak price signals can be more useful 
and can have more significant effects than a traditional economic evaluation would 
predict.  In this way, combining economic and institutional theories offers policymakers 
and researchers a more revealing approach for analyzing and evaluating the design, 
enactment, and effects of market-based policies.  
 Additionally, combinations of economic and institutional theories also offer a 
unique perspective for analyzing environmentally-hued institutional negotiations in 
general and those associated with the enactment of a market-based policy in particular 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).  Environmentally-flavored institutional negotiations have 
been presented as individual or organizational efforts to highlight alternative ways to 
interpret and use physical materials, natural ecosystems, and behavioral actions that 
transfer materials between and across ecosystems (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Fligstein, 
1997; Schnaiberg, 1980).  This research reveals that certain interpretive frames can make 
newer environmental-based meanings for physical materials and behavioral actions more 
salient to individuals and organizations (Fligstein, 1997; Scott, 2001).  This salience 
increases their willingness and desire to accept and use these meanings to guide their 
behavioral involvement with the environmental activity (Brint & Karabel, 1991; Scott, 
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2001).  In particular, policymakers or other institutional entrepreneurs can induce 
economically rational individuals and organizations to interpret and use the physical 
materials and behavioral actions underlying an environmental activity in a specific way 
by demonstrating how the cost of using the meanings is low or how their use can produce 
new benefits (Blanchard, 2008; Fligstein, 1997; Scott, 2001).  The interpretive 
connection that economically rational individuals and organizations make between 
positive economic and non-economic meanings illuminates how the enactment of a 
market-based policy can be used as strategic tool in an institutional negotiation 
(Blanchard, 2008; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Fligstein, 1997; Scott, 2001).  More 
specifically, it shows how policymakers can build certain design features into a market-
based policy so the new environmental meanings underlying it are also framed in an 
economically positive way (Fligstein, 1997; Lindblom, 1977).  When economic and 
environmental meanings are positioned to be mutually inclusive they can collectively 
become more salient to a broader range of individuals and organizations than either could 
be individually.  As many modern individuals and organizations exhibit at least some 
economic rationality, conceptual frameworks that combine institutional and economic 
perspectives are an appealing approach for analyzing environmental-based institutional 
negotiations and especially those that involve the enactment of a new market-based 
policy (Blanchard, 2008; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Scott, 2001).  
 
Limitations  
 The combination of economic and institutional perspectives this research draws 
upon can be used to analyze and evaluate the informal effects of a market-based policy 
and different types of institutional negotiations (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Scott, 
2001).  The findings of the research can also be applied to help design and enact market-
based policies and to help encourage the diffusion and acceptance of environmentally 
beneficial interpretations and uses for physical materials and behavioral actions.  
However, there are limitations to these applications, as the framework and findings are 
more relevant in some contexts than others.  
 The findings of this research can be used to help design and enact new market 
policies to control environmental activities.  However, they are most pertinent for 
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designing and enacting mandatory market policies implemented to control environmental 
activities not formally controlled in the past.  The findings of this research suggest that in 
certain political and environmental contexts policymakers should design a new, 
mandatory, market-based policy to have weak price signals or to create new benefits in 
order to attract support for its enactment and ongoing presence.  However, if new markets 
are voluntary and not mandatory, then policy designs that produce weak price signals 
may not produce these effects.  In the case of new, voluntary markets, low or weak price 
signals may limit economically rational individuals’ and organizations’ desire to join and 
participate in the market (Blanchard, 2008).  This would be due to the low perceived 
value of the new market asset.  Low price signals indicate the asset created and 
exchanged within a new market policy is not particularly valuable.  The lack of perceived 
value would limit economically rational individuals' and organizations' desire to 
voluntarily purchase the asset or to use the new meanings for materials and actions the 
policy is trying to highlight to guide their behavioral involvement with the activity 
(Blanchard, 2008; Lindblom, 2001; Scott, 2001).  For example, if a new, voluntary CO2 
market policy has weak price signals then economically rational individuals and 
organizations would not see the benefit of buying CO2 allowances or interpreting and 
using CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies as controlled (Blanchard, 2008; 
Scott, 2001).  This perception would then limit their desire to voluntarily change their 
behavior to reflect the use of the new meanings underlying the policy.  
 Additionally, if a new market policy for a particular environmental activity is 
mandatory, but the materials and behaviors underlying the activity had already been 
controlled through a formal policy, then intentionally designing the policy to produce 
weak price signals may not be necessary or effective.  If individuals and organizations 
have already become accustomed to interpreting the materials and actions underlying the 
new policy as controlled then policymakers do not necessarily need to assist their 
adoption by making their use inexpensive (Fligstein, 1997).  In such a case, policymakers 
would want to exploit individuals' and organizations' willingness to interpret these 
materials and actions as controlled to design and propose a strong policy.  As these 
individuals and organizations would have already been interpreting and using the 
material and behavior as controlled, they would perceive less misalignment between their 
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pre-existing cultural controls and the cultural controls encapsulated in a strong policy, 
which would facilitate its enactment (Caronna, 2004; Lindblom, 1977). 
 The findings of this research can also be used to help make environmentally 
beneficial meanings for materials and actions more salient to different types of 
individuals and organizations.  However, they may be most relevant for institutional 
negotiations that occur in institutional fields centered around industrial processes that 
palpably abut natural eco-systems (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983).  These industrial processes include extractive industries, such as mining, 
harvesting, and fishing, and those that directly deposit waste streams into environmental 
sinks, such as industries that produce air or water pollution they specifically dispose of.  
For instance, this research identifies how individuals and organizations are more willing 
to accept and use newer environmental meanings to inform their behavior when the cost 
of using them is low or when their use produces new benefits.  However, in institutional 
fields that do not directly abut natural eco-systems, such as service industries or product 
assembly, individuals and organizations may be less willing to change their behavior to 
reflect the use of environmentally beneficial meanings even if the costs of  doing so are 
low or the benefits are high (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2001).  For individuals 
and organizations associated with these types of institutional fields, environmentally 
beneficial meanings for materials and actions may be less broadly salient because their 
behavior does not directly involve the use of these materials or actions (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Scott, 2001).  In this case, the disconnection between the industrial process 
and the environmental activity may make individuals and organizations associated with 
the industry indifferent to how the materials and actions underlying the activity are 
interpreted and used.  This indifference would make environmentally beneficial meanings 
less salient even if their use is framed to be economically inexpensive or beneficial 
(Fligstein, 1997; Scott, 2001).  For instance, it may be hard to get an organization 
assembling manufactured components into finished products to interpret the materials 
and actions used to make the components through environmental meanings by making 
their usage cheap.  The difficulty would arise because these materials and actions are 




Areas for Future Research  
 The conceptual framework for this research and the findings that emerged reveal 
implications for designing and enacting new market-based policies and for exploiting 
their various informal effects to improve environmental performance.  Even after 
accounting for their limitations, this research's framework and findings can be applied to 
analyze and evaluate other environmental-based market policies and how the connection 
between economic and non-economic meanings can be used as a strategic tool for 
institutional negotiations (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Fligstein, 1997).  In fact, doing 
so reveals a number of promising areas for future research.  These areas include further 
research on the effects of CO2-controlling policies, RGGI, the design and enactment of 
environmental-based market policies, and the diffusion of energy efficiency technologies 
and practices.  
 To begin with, the conceptual framework and methodology used to evaluate the 
design and effects of RGGI can be used to study California’s recently enacted CO2 policy, 
the European Unions’ existing CO2 policy, as well as any other newly enacted CO2 
policy (California Environmental Protection Agency: Air Resources Board, 2012a; 
European Commission, 2010).  The enactment and effects of these policies extend 
beyond the scope of this research project, but it would be valuable to conduct a similar 
analysis of them in order to compare their design features and effects with those 
employed and induced by RGGI.  The comparative analysis could reveal whether certain 
policy design features are more or less appealing to electrical companies, consumers, or 
regulators with different geographic, industrial, or ideological characteristics.  It could 
also reveal whether these traits make different types of individuals and organizations 
more or less receptive to accepting and using new environmentally-based meanings to 
inform their behavior.  The potential findings could be used by policymakers to design or 
refine CO2 policies so the new meanings for materials and behaviors underlying them are 
more broadly appealing or more appealing to a specific type of company, consumer, or 
regulator (Fligstein, 1997; Lindblom, 1977; Scott, 2001).   
 With regard to RGGI, Governor Christie partially justified his decision to 
withdraw New Jersey from the policy on the basis that it was too weak to bring about a 
significant reduction in emissions.  Based on this reaction to weak price signals, is there a 
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tipping point where weak price signals switch from being a shield that can protect a 
newly enacted policy from contestation to a potential weapon that attracts and allows 
opponents to contest it? If weak price signals can bring about these opposing informal 
effects either simultaneously or sequentially then how can policymakers best deploy and 
then modify price signals to ensure initial and ongoing support for a market-based policy 
that controls an environmental activity for the first time?  
 The SWG was able to enact RGGI and to protect it from significant contestation 
by designing it to have weak price signals and so that its revenues are recycled to 
programs that benefit affected stakeholders.  Can the enactment of other market-based 
policies, for CO2 or other uncontrolled environmental activities, be facilitated by 
designing the initial policy to have weak price signals and a stakeholder benefitting 
revenue recycler? If so, how can multiple modeling approaches, such as economic and 
complex system models, best be used to help stakeholders envision the potential effects?  
For example, policymakers may be able to enact, market-based CO2 policies for other 
geographic or industrial sources by diffusing information about the economic and 
systemic effects imposed by existing CO2 policies and the potential economic and 
systemic effects that could be imposed by potential policy designs before the process 
begins.  These informational resources could include case studies from the RGGI region 
that demonstrate the ease, limited costs, and potential benefits associated with controlling 
CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting technologies.  They could also include clearly 
presented output figures from existing economic or complex system models and 
information about how stakeholders can help set the input and output parameters for new 
models.  If stakeholders receive this information before the policy design process begins 
and can participate in the process, would they be willing to support the enactment of 
potentially stronger policies? 
 Most market-based policies to date have not included a revenue recycler.  
However, it represents a valuable design feature that can attract support for a new policy, 
as well as a way to accentuate or attenuate dominant economic meanings, which can then 
make individuals and organizations more willing to accept and use other non-economic 
meanings.  Can recycling market policies' revenues to support other endeavors, beyond 
energy efficiency, produce similar or greater political and institutional effects?  If so, how 
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else could a revenue recycler be used?  Furthermore, are the political and institutional 
effects associated with the inclusion and operation of a revenue recycler amplified when 
more funds are available?  In particular, how can different emissions caps be combined 
with different types of revenue recyclers in order to attract the most support for a new 
policy, create the most revenues, or bring about the most significant environmental 
improvements? 
 Within and beyond the RGGI region, attention to and the diffusion of energy 
efficiency initiatives that reduce electricity consumption is increasing (Foster et al., 2012; 
York et al., 2012).  However, many of the initial opportunities are fairly easy and 
inexpensive, while improving the efficient consumption of electricity even further will be 
harder and more expensive (St. John, 2012).  Can additional resources for recycling help 
maintain or accelerate the diffusion rate of energy efficiency initiatives?  Can the 
allocation of these resources be improved or refined so as to bring about more specific 
behavioral changes in specific populations of electricity consumers? 
 Similarly, the allocation of new energy efficiency funds is making negative 
economic meanings for energy efficiency initiatives less salient for consumers and PUCs, 
and positive economic meanings for energy efficiency initiatives more relevant for 
electrical companies.  These institutional changes in turn make positive non-economic 
interpretations of energy efficiency initiatives more visible and valuable.  Are there other 
ways to frame the use of energy efficiency initiatives that appeal to both electrical 
companies and consumers?  How could these meanings be integrated with or supported 
by energy efficiency resources in order to accelerate the diffusion and innovation rate for 
energy efficiency technologies and practices? 
   Collectively, the increasing visibility and value of positive economic and non-
economic meanings for energy efficiency initiatives are motivating individuals and 
organizations to change their behavior by deploying and adopting these technologies and 
practices in greater numbers (Foster et al., 2012; York et al., 2012).  The increasing use 
of demand-side resources is changing the industrial constitution of  electrical systems by 
shifting the conceptualization of electrical energy away from a commodity that is 
delivered towards a service that is provided (Foster et al., 2012; Goldman et al., 2010; 
York et al., 2012).  Is it easier for existing electrical organizations to develop the skills 
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needed to thrive in this emerging operational context internally or by acquiring an outside 
contractor or pure energy efficiency company? How can electrical companies best 
develop the social, organizational, and technical capabilities needed to cultivate these 
skills internally?  What challenges arise when an existing organization attempts to 
integrate the new social, organizational, and technical capabilities it receives from an 
acquisition or by bringing in an outside contractor?  The shifting conceptualization of 
electrical energy away from a commodity towards a service accompanies and stimulates a 
number of large-scale changes in the electrical industry, many of which are creating 
space for new organizational types, such as energy efficiency organizations, to emerge 
and expand (Goldman et al., 2010; York et al., 2012).  What will the technological and 
organizational configuration of the electrical industry look like in the future?  How will 




 The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative represents an important environmental 
policy that has been falsely interpreted as ineffective.  Its initial cap size was set above 
the region's actual CO2 emission level, creating an oversupply that has consistently 
pushed the allowance price to the reserve price floor.  In fact, RGGI's low allowance 
price often prompted individuals working within regulated and non-regulated 
organizations in the region to claim the policy was having, at best, a minor influence on 
the region's electrical system.  The reaction is consistent with economic rationality.   
Regulated organizations perceived RGGI's low allowance price to be an almost trivial 
new cost.  This minimized their need and desire to drastically restructure their operations 
to reduce their CO2 emissions, which led individuals in regulated and non-regulated 
organizations to interpret the policy as relatively insignificant (Stavins & Whitehead, 
1992). 
 However, when the entire scope of the formal policy mechanism and its informal 
effects on regulated and non-regulated organizations are taken into account, it becomes 
clear that RGGI's overall impact extends beyond the limited formal effects attributed to 
its low allowance price.  RGGI pioneered an innovative new design feature for market-
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based policies by recycling a majority of its auction revenues to support energy efficiency, 
and these funds are being used to develop increasing amounts of demand-side resources 
(Foster et al., 2012; Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 2011b; York et al., 2012).  
Furthermore, the resulting energy efficiency funds and RGGI's low allowance price are 
also shifting how individuals and organizations in the region interpret and use CO2, the 
operation of CO2-emitting technologies, electricity, and energy efficiency initiatives.  
These informal effects are facilitating policymakers' ability to develop new and 
strengthen existing CO2 policies, and are making energy efficiency initiatives that reduce 
electricity consumption more appealing to electrical companies, consumers, and PUCs 
(Brint & Karabel, 1991; Caronna, 2004).  A revenue recycler is a novel design feature for 
market-based policies, and policies' informal effects are not often identified or analyzed 
(Lindblom, 1977).  Neither recycled revenues nor informal effects are typically used as 
an indicator or evaluator of a policy's effects (Aldy et al., 2010; Lindblom, 1977).  
However, when they both are, it clarifies how the effects of a market-based policy can 
extend beyond the assets and price signals it creates.  
 Even though the price of an individual CO2 allowance is low the collective sale of 
millions of allowances is generating significant revenues.  By recycling these revenues, 
RGGI's policymakers found a way to fund needed investments in energy efficiency 
without increasing the price of electricity for consumers and without imposing significant 
new costs on electrical companies.  These resources are being used to reduce the upfront 
cost of deploying and adopting energy efficiency initiatives for PUCs and consumers, and 
to make the deployment of these initiatives lucrative for electrical companies.  In doing 
so, these funds are also shifting how electrical companies, consumers, and PUCs interpret 
the use of electricity and energy efficiency initiatives so they perceive reducing electricity 
consumption through the use of these technologies and practices as appealing (Brint & 
Karabel, 1991).  The perceptual shift motivates electrical companies, regulators, and 
consumers to change their behavior by developing and adopting  demand-side resources 
that limit the need to construct and operate new CO2-emitting generating equipment 
(Foster et al., 2012).  In addition to directly reducing emissions through its cap and trade 
component, RGGI also indirectly reduces emissions through its revenue recycler.  As a 
result, RGGI is achieving greater than anticipated environmental benefits, along with the 
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other economic and systemic benefits that emerge from improving the efficient use of 
existing electrical supplies.  
 On the surface RGGI's low allowance prices do not appear to be changing the 
operation or systemic configuration of the region's electrical system.  However, the low 
allowance prices make it easy and inexpensive for regulated and non-regulated 
organizations in the region to begin interpreting CO2 as a controlled material and the 
operation of CO2-emitting technologies as a controlled activity.  This in turn makes it 
easy and inexpensive for electrical companies to use these meanings to shape their 
behavior, or how they produce electricity.  As RGGI is the first mandatory CO2-
controlling policy in the U.S. these informal effects represent a significant shift from how 
organizations had been interpreting and using this material and action (Hulme, 2009).  By 
intentionally designing RGGI to produce weak price signals, policymakers have been 
able to induce regulated and non-regulated organizations to willingly accept and use these 
new meanings for CO2 and CO2-emitting technologies to guide their behavior instead of 
contesting them (Fligstein, 1997; Scott, 2001).  Furthermore, over the course of RGGI's 
first phase, these organizations have become more familiar with these new meanings and 
have experienced the low costs and economic benefits of basing their behavior on them 
firsthand.  Regulated and non-regulated organizations' increasing acceptance of and 
willingness to use these meanings has enabled policymakers to extend RGGI and to 
tighten the cap for upcoming phases (Caronna, 2004; Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 
2013).  In other words, policymakers have been able to leverage RGGI's informal effects 
to bring about a stronger formal policy that probably would not have been politically 
viable had it been initially proposed as the first CO2-controlling policy.  
 Lastly, the two types of informal effects RGGI induces are interacting to produce 
positive feedback.  The feedback makes it increasingly inexpensive to treat CO2 and the 
operation of CO2-emitting technologies as controlled, and increasingly worthwhile to 
treat the deployment and adoption of energy efficiency initiatives as an appealing 
endeavor.  This is because the increasing use of demand-side resources suppresses the 
price of electricity and CO2 allowances, which makes it even less expensive for 
organizations to base their behavior on treating CO2 and the operation of CO2-emitting 
technologies as controlled.  As organizations accept and use these meanings they express 
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support for RGGI.  The support ensures the creation of increasing amounts of energy 
efficiency funds, which facilitates electrical companies', consumers', and PUCs' ability to 
positively interpret the use of energy efficiency initiatives even further.  In these ways, 
RGGI's informal effects create further support for both the policy and for using energy 
efficiency initiatives that reduce electricity consumption to manage CO2 emissions.  The 
importance and value of these informal effects means they significantly affect efforts to 
use formal policies to control social behaviors (Lindblom, 1977; Scott, 2001).  This 
makes acknowledging and addressing the relationship between formal design features 
and informal effects a crucial consideration for designing new policies and for evaluating 
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